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What is the meaning of theories of redemption, and what use do they 
have? This dissertation answers these questions from the vantage point of two 
ideas from Girardian Mimetic Theory: the hypothesis that human relationality is 
rooted in triangular structures of desire, and the hypothesis that the sacrificial 
death of Christ is what Girard calls a scapegoating event. 
For Girard, ritual sacrifice is a repetition of an original scapegoating event 
on which social cohesion depends. With the death of Christ, scapegoating has 
been denuded and sacrifice rendered inoperable, bringing humanity into a novel 
historical situation. Using Girard’s early seminal texts alongside crucial 
developments in his later work, I develop the thesis that the redemptive work is 
structurally a sacrificial act, but aimed at the transcending of sacrifice and the 
transformation of the generative potential of scapegoating; correspondingly with 
this objective redemptive work, believers in Christ undergo a conversion that 
consists in their re-orientation as subjects within a structure of transcendence 
determined by this sacrificial generativity. This thesis represents a significantly 
more systematic appraisal of the positive theological utility of sacrifice than is 
found in Girard’s work. 
To bolster my thesis, I reread key biblical and classical theological sources. 
The biblical foundation narratives and interplay of textual sources witness to a 
subtle subversion of scapegoating and sacrifice while still relying on sacrifice as 
an ordering principle. I then examine the paradigmatic theories of redemption of 
Peter Abelard, Anselm, and Gregory of Nyssa. Each of these theories exhibits the 
same sacrificial logic, despite the different ways they configure redemption. 
I conclude that theories of redemption give us ways to map the reality 
brought about by the process of redemption. They facilitate the believer, whose 
triangular relationality has been re-oriented toward the transcendent God, in 
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What meaning and use do theories of redemption have today? 
When I asked this question ten years ago, this research project began. It is 
not an easy one to answer. Theories of redemption, also referred to as atonement 
theories, hit two big snags in the minds of contemporary people, myself 
included. First, it is not clear why anyone cares. The doctrine of redemption, as 
distinguished from theories of redemption, indicates a Christian belief about an 
objective truth, namely salvation through Jesus Christ, who became incarnate, 
lived, taught, suffered, died, rose again, sat at the right hand of God, and is 
coming again to rescue what he created. This belief is exceedingly meaningful to 
many Christian believers, even given the present weak state of the Church in 
much of the world. Theories of redemption, on the other hand, attempt to give us 
a quasi-scientific explanation of how redemption works. There is an existential 
gap here. If redemption works, what further good does it do to know how? If we 
are meant to know how, why doesn’t Scripture reveal a clear theory of 
redemption? If theories of redemption are taken too seriously at face value, they 
become a matter of knowing about something, rather than of knowing something. 




Second, theories of redemption have gotten into trouble recently for the 
harmful ways in which they construct power relations and values. These 
criticisms have come from feminist, class-liberationist, Black and womanist, anti-
colonialist, and anti-militarist perspectives. In other words, traditional ways of 
thinking about redemption, and sometimes even the notion of atonement 
altogether, have fallen afoul of those who are critical of unnecessary real 
violence.1 The problems raised with redemption theory usually center around the 
notion of sacrifice, especially the valorization of obedient self-sacrifice. (Among 
recent past generations of European theologians and philosophers who are still 
widely read in America, the rejection of sacrifice stemmed largely from the 
 
1 A spectrum of appraisals of sacrifice can be found in contemporary critiques of sacrificial 
atonement. For Delores Williams, it is suitable to understand redemption, given black women’s 
surrogacy experience, as a ministerial work brought about through Jesus’ teachings, healings, 
prayer, and love rather than through the (voluntary or involuntary) surrogacy of a sacralized 
Crucifixion. The Cross is, for Williams, the world’s opposition to this life-affirming work (Delores 
S. Williams, “Black Women’s Surrogacy Experience and the Christian Notion of Redemption,” 
pages 19–32 in Marit Trelstad, ed., Cross Examinations: Readings on the Meaning of the Cross Today 
[Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006]). Kathryn Tanner, like Williams, sees the power of salvation as 
residing in life, not in a sacrificial death per se; but, unlike Williams, Tanner construes life as a 
sublimated form of sacrifice. One reciprocally offers the gifts obtained from the Word, and 
service to neighbor is constituted as a “sacrifice” to God (Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010]). JoAnne Marie Terrell pursues a third path, 
coinciding in its outlines with Girard’s thesis that Christ’s sacrifice overcomes sacrifice: “Because 
God desires mercy and not sacrifice, there should never really be any reason for the act of 
sacrifice. [God’s] institution of the sacrificial system and Jesus’ self-sacrifice are thus construed as 
the disclosure of God’s mercy. … Judeo-Christian traditions attempt to signify God’s 
unwillingness to trivialize the blood/life/loss of any creature (JoAnne Marie Terrell, “Our 
Mother’s Gardens: Rethinking Sacrifice,” pages 33–49 in Cross Examinations).” The critiques 
brought against traditional Western sacrificial atonement models by these authors are to be 
affirmed: one must find either a different way to give Christian sacrifice a positive meaning, or 
radically repurpose the traditional atonement models. I perform the latter operation on Anselm 
in § 22. 
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experience of Nazi Germany and opposition to the Vietnam War.)2 Even apart 
from such real-life ethical problems, one has a right to demand to know how it is 
plausible that one person’s suffering should do any good for other people’s sins, 
or affect their mortality. Yet surely the contemporary circumspection toward 
sacrifice is overstated. Sacrifice for the wellbeing of another can be a good thing. 
Interestingly, the most forceful attempts to rehabilitate the theological idea of 
sacrifice have come from margins well outside the Church; the radical leftist 
atheists Terry Eagleton and Slavoj Žižek are outspoken proponents for 
recovering the idea.3 And as Darby Kathleen Ray points out, sacrificial 
atonement theologies can become empowering in the very contexts in which they 
are oppressive.4 Is there positive value, then, in the notion of Christ’s death as a 
sacrificial transaction on behalf of humankind? 
I found a basis for answering these questions in René Girard’s theory of 
mimesis, sacrifice, and Christian religious conversion. Girard, who began work 
 
2 This goes also for the work of René Girard, as Mary Douglas recognizes in Chapter 2 of Jacob's 
Tears: The Priestly Work of Reconciliation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
3 Terry Eagleton, Radical Sacrifice (Yale, 2018), clearly has René Girard in the forefront of his 
thinking; Slavoj Žižek, who also shows traces of influence from Girard in his thinking on the 
scapegoat, argues for a rehabilitation of Christianity in The Fragile Absolute, or, Why Is the Christian 
Legacy Worth Fighting for? (London: Verso, 2000); like early Girard, Žižek rejects the idea that 
Christ’s death is an atoning sacrifice, but the two currents of the subversive power of Christ’s 
death and the value of a sacrificial ethic carry strongly through his writings. See Slavoj Žižek and 
Boris Gunjević, God in Pain: Inversions of Apocalypse (New York: Seven Stories, 2012). 




as a literary critic, is now recognized as a major theorist of sacrifice. Together, his 
ideas are known as Mimetic Theory (hereafter MT). 
MT speaks from and to the place of people in the contemporary world, 
with its particular concerns and problems: the unprecedented new preoccupation 
with overcoming violence; the constructive and destructive erasure of intra-
human divisions by globalization; the concerns over the differences between the 
earth’s poor and its wealthy; not finally, the novel amount of political and 
personal choice that more and more humans—notwithstanding the misguided 
recalcitrance of the current reactionary movement—are coming to possess. In a 
word, the late modern age is characterized by our confrontation with divisions 
and decisions. It is to this aspect of late modernity that MT most directly speaks. 
Christian theology’s grappling with the meaning of redemption, on the 
other hand, has proved a struggle in the contemporary situation. Does not the 
liberal respect for individuality and particularity undercut the credibility of the 
concept of sacrifice, especially after the mass oblations that were performed in 
fascist and communist countries in the name of a militant sacrificial rhetoric?5 
Can transcendence still fulfill a desirable ordering function in an irreversibly 
 
5 This objection to sacrificial theologies of redemption was the basis for Jürgen Moltmann’s The 
Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (1973; 
translated by R. A. Wilson and John Bowden [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1993]), a work which 




plural society? And is the rejection of sacrifice not all the more urgent right now, 
when a reckless nationalism threatens democratic countries again? The trend 
today, of which Girard can be counted an emphatic representative, therefore 
favors non- or anti-sacrificial theologies (though, as we shall see in Girard’s case, 
an anti-sacrificial theology can at the same time be very sacrificial!)6. Not only 
this, but, to take an even broader perspective on today’s landscape, the trend of 
ideas has complicated the plausibility of a universal transcendence, a notion that 
marks traditional Western belief in God and therefore underpins elementary 
doctrines such as redemption. Not since Derrida’s deconstruction of our refined 
mythologies of the transcendent, not since Foucault’s Nietzschean refusal of 
order and essence, not since Heidegger’s unsuccessful project to discover a new 
transcendence, has this medieval idea seemed seriously viable.7 Combine the 
existential difficulty occasioned by the failure to acknowledge transcendence 
with the repudiation of sacrifice by sensitive contemporary theologians, and one 
can see the predicament redemption theory faces. Yet the notion of sacrifice is 
 
6 This insightful parenthetical remark was made to Girard at a colloquium on liberation theology 
in Brazil in 1990. 
7 Divine transcendence has been convincingly argued for as a philosophical idea by some recent 
deconstructionist thinkers, such as John Caputo in The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013). But Caputo’s recovery of transcendence as a 
basis for open-ended expectation lies open to the reproach that it is toothless, and, moreover, that 
the theology that justifies it is overly apophatic. In the case of more theologically conservative 
attempts to rediscover transcendence, like the Heideggerian project of Charles Taylor, it remains 
unclear where the path they have taken leads. They constitute an unfinished project. 
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integral to the Christian tradition on redemption, and a subjective orientation 
toward God’s transcendence is a necessary outcome of the redemptive work. 
Even within mainstream theology, then, one finds that there is an ongoing 
scramble among both soteriological revisionists and their introvertedly resistant 
orthodox opponents. This is most true of Western and especially Protestant 
Christianity, probably because these traditions have been forced to engage more 
directly with the problems occasioned by secularization. Eastern Orthodox 
theologians have made occasional serious forays into redemption theory, even if 
largely on Western terms, but these efforts have not contributed much, despite 
Orthodoxy’s distance from the entanglements of Western atonement theory. 
Doubtless this is largely because, while theories of redemption have always 
existed in the Eastern Christian traditions, they are rarely discussed and hold no 
official status. But moreover, the 20th and 21st Centuries have been a time during 
which Orthodox theology is struggling to recover its creativity, and, despite 
inroads made by Bulgakov and Florovsky, Orthodox theology has proved 
disappointing when it comes to Christology and redemption theory.8 
 
8 Adding to the deleterious situation of Orthodox soteriology, Bulgakov’s major dogmatic trilogy 
(Sergius Bulgakov, The Bride of the Lamb [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002]; idem, The Comforter 
[Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004]; idem, The Lamb of God [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008]) 
has come to occupy only a relatively marginal place in contemporary Orthodox theology, 
perhaps owing to the condemnation they provoked from the Moscow Patriarchate and the 
Church in Exile (see Andrew Louth, Modern Orthodox Thinkers [Downers Grove, IL: IVP 
Academic, 2015], 45); Florovsky’s soteriological essays (collected in Georges Florovsky, Creation 
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I contend that MT provides a way to construct redemption that responds 
usefully to the basic concerns I have raised here. Not only this, but the task of 
constructing a Girardian soteriology can be done without serious damage to 
tradition. In my final chapters, I will use Girard’s theory to directly capture out 
of the various ideas of redemption that have fed the Church for millennia 
elements of truth that are urgent for theology to attend to today. MT, being itself 
of Christian parentage,9 born from the Gospels and a man’s conversion, is thus 
 
and Redemption [Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1976]), on the other hand, amount to a rather 
conservative synthesis of Patristic redemption theory, and has proven unable to generate much 
creative follow-up work over time. 
9 In Girard’s autobiographical words: “Since the beginning of the ‘novelistic conversion’ in Deceit, 
Desire and the Novel, all of my books have been more or less explicit apologies for Christianity” 
(René Girard, Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoît Chantre [East Lansing, MI: Michigan 
State University Press, 2010], xv); again: “Mimetic theory is essentially Christian” (ibid., 113). One 
would not be unjustified in asserting, with proper qualifications, that MT is a Christian theory. 
Such a claim certainly would not hold true for every iteration of MT by Girardians; but its 
validity for Girard’s own version of his theory is pervasively apparent in his opus. The following 
extended quotation from Girard puts it clearly: “There exist thousands of ways to codify and 
regulate social coexistence, like the laws concerning marriage, for example. But all these 
approaches have a single goal, that of preventing conflict and so transforming individuals who 
might experience reciprocal hatred into people capable of mutual amity. Analysis of these 
cultures makes it possible to identify thousands of buffers that are interposed between potential 
rivals—buffers that vary, because the problems to be dealt with are various, but that always have 
the same purpose. I have never ceased to believe that behind relativism there exists a unity of 
cognizance, which could only exist if this premise is accepted. The principle aim of my work has been 
to demonstrate that this is true in the most controversial area of all, by which I mean modern anthropology. 
Anthropology has failed because it was unable to account for the different human cultures as a 
unitary phenomenon, and that is why we today find ourselves bogged down in relativism. … 
And in my view Christianity offers a solution to these problems precisely because it demonstrates that the 
buffers, the limits that individuals reciprocally impose on themselves, serve to avoid a certain type of 
conflict. If it were understood that Jesus is the universal victim who came for the purpose of overcoming 
these conflicts, the problem would be resolved” (Gianni Vattimo and René Girard, Christianity, Truth, 
and Weakening Faith: A Dialogue [New York: Columbia University Press, 2010], 49–50, my 
emphases). Is not Christianity, then, what Girard discovered to be the very praxis and realization 
of what he had theorized in MT? 
8 
 
able to feed Christian soteriology the nutrients it needs, that it might grow in 
accordance with the tradition of the Church, and in proportion to the intellectual 
and practical demands of contemporary contexts. 
The argument of this dissertation will not engage the political or pastoral 
implications of its thesis, except cursorily in my conclusion; that is work for 
another time. It will stay instead at the level of theoretical foundations, with the 
goal of articulating a theological account of redemption that affirms the necessity 
and utility of the notions of transcendence and sacrifice while remaining in 
keeping with Girard’s stance that the death of Jesus Christ has a fundamentally 
anti-sacrificial significance. This position will be presented and advanced 
through:  (1) two basic hypothetical assumptions I will make regarding 
conversion and sacrifice;  (2) a rereading of Girard’s theory of mimesis and 
sacrifice (especially as expressed in his seminal work Violence and the Sacred);  (3) 
an examination of the operation of sacrifice and transcendence in selected biblical 
and Patristic texts. In all phases of this approach, I permit MT to shape my 
reading of the Christian idea of redemption, making Girard my teacher in these 
matters, while the disciple makes some appropriations of his work that are 
divergent from Girard’s own tendencies, or emphasize underplayed implications 
of his views. 
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Two facets of MT, which I will explain further shortly, present themselves 
as particularly applicable to this project, namely Girard’s notions of conversion 
and transcendence, and his theory of sacrifice. I build a hypothesis off of each of 
these facets: the first hypothesis provides a model of the structure of conversion 
and divine transcendence, generated directly out of Girard’s theory; the second 
hypothesis is the assertion, informed by the Bible and traditional theories of 
redemption, that the redemptive work, as sacrifice, includes an indispensable 
economic feature that takes the form of an exchange. It is these two assumptions 
that will inform my reading throughout. 
Through this procedure, I develop the following thesis: The redemptive 
work of Christ is a sacrificial act, aimed at the transcending of sacrifice and its 
structural-ontological outflow, and whose form includes an exchange; 
correspondingly with this objective redemptive work, believers in Christ 
undergo a conversion that consists in their re-orientation as subjects within a 
structure of transcendence. The nature of the saving exchange (transactional, 
metaphysical, penal …) and the identity of the parties to the exchange (God’s 
nature and human nature, God and the devil …) are mutable; it is the form of the 
exchange, including the dialectical persistence of sacrifice within the anti-
sacrificial operation of the redemptive work, that remains a constant. This thesis 
represents a strengthening of the accepted view in Girardian theology that 
10 
 
Christ’s death is a sacrificial act that causes the unravelling of an all-pervasive 
sacrificial order.10 It departs from current views in the field in asserting that, if we 
take Girard’s claims about sacrifice seriously, the redemptive act must be 
considered a sacrifice as such. One may therefore affirm the consistent sacrificial 
character of redemption, which extends even to the form of the converting 
believer’s intelligence.11 Redemption, that is, can be understood as radically 
homogeneous with sacrifice, despite the thoroughgoing transformation that it 
effects upon sacrifice. 
In addition to addressing the major challenges to redemption theory that I 
articulated, my thesis makes the following contributions with respect to the 
current state of theology. The theological utility of this reading of redemption as 
sacrifice-transcending sacrificial exchange, with its attendant consequences for 
Christian subjectivity, is fivefold: 
1. Within the field of Girardian theology, this thesis addresses an impasse 
between the Girardian anti-sacrificial reading of Christianity and the desire for a 
doctrine of atonement that defensibly accords with the catholic tradition of the 
 
10 See Scott Cowdell, René Girard and the Nonviolent God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2018), 173–201; Raymund Schwager, Jesus in the Drama of Salvation: Sketch of a Biblical 
Doctrine of Redemption (New York: Crossroad, 1999), 172–91. 
11 Contrast with James Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong: Original Sin Through Easter Eyes (New York: 
Crossroad, 1998), 77–83, 139–61. For Alison, the resurrection allows the disciples “to leave the 
understanding formed by the parameters of death,” but without any apparent repetition of the 
sacrificial structure in any strong sense. 
11 
 
Church.12 Until now, Girardian theologians have had to content themselves with 
two distinct categories of sacrifice, one pertaining to the violent sacred and one 
pertaining to the Christian Gospel.13 Honoring Girard’s claims about the 
structural ubiquity of sacrifice in human culture, my thesis applies the term 
“sacrifice” to Girard’s concept of archaic sacrifice and to the redemptive Passion 
and death of Christ univocally, and does so without compromising on his 
death’s transformative uniqueness and subversive anti-sacrificial power. 
2. My thesis provides a new opportunity to address the sacrificial reading 
of Christ’s death within contemporary atonement theology, where this reading 
has met with justified discomfort.14 My Girardian approach can re-inject sacrifice 
into the center of an anti-sacrificial soteriology. As such, it affords the possibility 
 
12 The struggle over reconciling Girard’s views with Christian orthodoxy can be witnessed in the 
correspondence between Girard and his Jesuit friend Raymund Schwager. Schwager succeeded 
in persuading Girard that his anti-sacrificial reading of the Cross was reconcilable with Catholic 
dogma. See René Girard and Raymund Schwager: Correspondence 1974–1991, ed. Scott Cowdell (New 
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016). On the struggles of orthodox theologians to accept Girard’s 
views, see the review in Cowdell, The Nonviolent God, 84–114. 
13 See Cowdell, The Nonviolent God, 66–73. Consider e.g. the following passage in René Girard, 
Evolution and Conversion: Dialogues on the Origins of Culture (London: T&T Clark, 2007), 154–55, 
where Girard expresses the dichotomy between the two forms of sacrifice: when Solomon judges 
the two prostitutes (1 Kings 3:16–28), proposing to resolve their dispute by dividing the living 
child, “One of [the prostitutes] accepts, while the other one prefers to give up her child, in order 
to save him. This action was prophetic of Christ in the highest sense. … There is no doubt that the 
distance between these two actions is the greatest possible, and it is the difference between 
archaic sacrifice, which turns against a third victim the violence of those who are fighting, and 
the Christian sacrifice which is the renunciation of all egoistic claiming, even to life if needed, in 
order not to kill.” 
14 Sacrificial atonement is often criticized for  (a) sacralizing suffering and/or  (b) making room for 
imperialist expressions of Christianity by personalizing and interiorizing the meaning of the 




to relieve much of the strain felt by progressive theologies when confronted by 
their classical source-texts. Conversely, this thesis makes Girard’s anti-sacrificial 
theology available to those who would retain a strong doctrine of sacrificial 
atonement. Despite the proximity of Girard’s idea to the sacrificial and especially 
substitutionary models of redemption sanctioned by various Christian traditions, 
the Girardian view has proven resistant to reconciliation with these models.15 My 
reading of Girard works toward bridging this gap. 
3. Nothing dogs sacrificial theories of redemption like their ambivalent 
and vague relationship to praxis.16 The Girardian theory of sacrifice, on the other 
hand, is built upon an existential theory of subjectivity (mimetic desire).17 By 
specially including the existential in my considerations of the theoretical, I 
contribute groundwork for a future practical theology of redemption. 
 
15 A case in point is Michael Kirwan’s evaluation of MT from the point of view of Anselm’s 
satisfaction theory in Girard and Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 61–69, which quickly 
reverses into a diagnosis of Anselm from Kirwan’s Girardian point of view. Kirwan, like 
Schwager, whom he relies upon, is not able to advance beyond felicitous formal similarities 
between Girard’s views and Anselm’s; see also Schwager, Der wunderbare Tausch: zur Geschichte 
und Deutung der Erlösungslehre (Munich: Kösel, 1986), 179–84. 
16 See Kirwan, ibid. What exactly is one called upon to do once one’s sins have been atoned for? 
And if one is to join in the suffering of Christ, in what way is this suffering beneficial? It is 
difficult to accept as divinely sanctioned an idea that lends itself more readily to empty or 
nefarious uses than to good ones. 
17 See René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 290–314; idem, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 143–68. 
13 
 
4. My study also holds incidental ecumenical value. It represents, to my 
knowledge, the first thorough appropriation of Girard by an Eastern Orthodox 
for systematic theology. Girardian sources, methods, and interests have been, 
from Girard onward, distinctly Western in their purveyance.18 In making my 
appropriation of Girard, I open up a new avenue by which Orthodox may gain 
better access to the complexities of Western atonement theory, while I bring to 
bear some distinctively Eastern resources and perspectives for the enrichment of 
Girardian research.19 
5. Finally and most importantly, I wish to furnish a potent new paradigm 
for understanding the saving work of Christ. In doing so, I must, of course, 
assume responsibility for all use and misuse of my sources. But I believe it to be 
worth doing, as I know of no more promising synthesis right now of the 
 
18 Girard evinces in his writings little familiarity with or interest in the literature and traditions of 
the Christian East. Engagements with redemption theory by Girard’s disciples have 
foregrounded Anselm almost exclusively (see Kirwan, Girard and Theology, 57–69) and sometimes 
engaged with the Western academic construct known as the Christus Victor theory (see Cowdell, 
The Nonviolent God, 222–37; Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement, 48–51). The major exceptions to 
this trend are Raymund Schwager’s collection of studies on a broad array of historic redemption 
theories in Der wunderbare Tausch, and the research of Robert Daly into early Christian 
understandings of sacrifice, in Sacrifice Unveiled: The True Meaning of Christian Sacrifice (London: 
T&T Clark International, 2009). Schwager’s study, however, is piecemeal, and his collection has 
not circulated widely due to its being yet untranslated into English. As for Daly, the impact of 
Girard on his invaluable work is limited. 
19 Criticism of Western theories of atonement has been a minor but persistent feature of Orthodox 
theology at least since the popularization of the idea of the “Western captivity.” The interest 
continues today, often in a more charitable mode (consider the recent publication On the Tree of 
the Cross: Georges Florovsky and the Patristic Doctrine of Atonement, eds. Matthew Baker, Seraphim 
Danckaert, and Nicholas Marinides [Jordanville: Holy Trinity Seminary, 2016]), but the direction 
of this interest and the reasons for it remain unclear. 
14 
 
liberative power of the Christian proclamation than that supplied by Girard’s 
work. 
§ 1. Aims, Scope, and Procedure of the Investigation 
The first facet of MT that I will borrow to undergird my procedure is Girard’s 
notion of conversion, including his theory of transcendence annexed to it.20 
Girard’s notion of conversion construes the Christian’s awakening as the transfer 
of one’s desire from objects of idolatry—the persons whom we sinners, in our 
search for metaphysical fulfillment, set up as our gods—to the true God, who can 
never become an idol on account of his surpassing transcendence. The immanent 
relations arising from the presence of God’s transcendence in the orientation of 
the will, seen over against the false transcendence of the idol, I term the 
“transcendence-structure.” The transcendence-structure may become deformed; 
if one’s orientation is diverted onto a false transcendence, one inhabits such a 
deformed or “deviated” transcendence-structure. 
The removal of the false horizontal transcendence of the idol, when 
combined with the re-orientation of a person’s desire toward a vertically 
transcendent God, entails a restructuring of one’s relationships with other 
persons and with created being as a whole. According to Girard, the ordinary, 
 
20 On Girard’s notion of transcendence, see Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 53–82. 
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one might say fallen, mode of relationship one has toward others is governed by 
a triangular structure in which the idol constitutes the medium through which 
one desires some third element; our desire, that is, for some object is borrowed 
from the mediator-idol’s presumed desire for or possession of it. God, by 
contrast, neither possesses nor wishes to acquire any object for himself;21 when 
God is the mediator of our desire, then the triangular structure of desire, while 
formally still in play, is subverted. These two configurations of desire I term 
“structures of relationality.” These vertical and horizontal structures of desire are 
the basis on which I understand conversion in the Christian life; they constitute 
the first major assumption of my method, the conversion-hypothesis. 
The second facet of MT that underpins my thesis is Girard’s theory of 
sacrifice. According to Girard, the triangular relationships among members of a 
community tend to multiply spontaneously if unchecked. The result is the spread 
of the desire for some common object, not unlike the outbreak of a contagion. 
The resulting conflicts of interest precipitate a crisis. The chaos can be assuaged, 
however, by the unanimous expulsion of a scapegoat, onto whom all presumed 
 
21 See René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2001), 14; cf. ibid., 33; cf. 
Girard’s words in Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 65: “Men who cannot look freedom in the face are 
exposed to anguish. … There is no longer God, king, or lord to link them to the universal. To 
escape this feeling of particularity they imitate another’s desires. …” 
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wrongdoing can be transferred.22 This scapegoating event is the origin of 
sacrifice, as well as of human institutions generally.23 
Christ’s death, Girard maintains, is another occurrence of the 
scapegoating event, but is unique in that the scapegoating of Christ undoes the 
power of the victim mechanism over society; it accomplishes this by clearly 
exposing both the injustice of the victim’s death and the madness of the 
persecutors.24 The sacrificial offering of Christ, then, is a reversal of the 
victimization of the scapegoat, even though Christ himself is the scapegoat par 
excellence. In Girard’s view, Christ’s sacrifice, as a self-offering for the sake of 
those held captive by the cyclical recurrence of the contagion—both victims and 
persecutors—redefines sacrifice for the Christian religion.25 It is on this last point 
that I will substantially depart from Girard’s theology. 
The rereading of Girard’s theory of sacrifice that I will make pertains 
specifically to his interpretation of the Cross, and is inspired directly by the 
traditional Christian ideas of redemption (ransom, satisfaction, exemplification): 
 
22 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 1–38. 
23 Structuring and generative violence are discussed throughout Violence and the Sacred, as well as 
in René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World: Research Undertaken in Collaboration 
with Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 45–78. 
24 Girard, Things Hidden, 152–72; see also Girard’s general argument in I See Satan Fall Like 
Lightning. 
25 René Girard, The One by Whom Scandal Comes (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University 
Press, 2014), 33–45; consult also Robert Daly’s Girardian study, Sacrifice Unveiled. Here I disregard 
Girard’s earliest view, which denied any place to redemptive sacrifice within Christianity. 
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since Christ’s redemptive work, culminating in his sacrificial self-offering, 
operates from within the sacrificial economy, it necessarily takes the form of an 
exchange in some way. This proposition of divine exchange, through which I 
supplement the Girardian interpretation of the Cross, will constitute my second 
major assumption, the exchange-hypothesis. 
Some explanation is needed about how Girard’s “scapegoating theory” of 
the Crucifixion can be brought together with a theory of redemption as an 
exchange. The link by which I will join these two halves will come from the 
conversion-hypothesis; specifically, I will understand the reconfiguration of the 
structure of desire from mediation through a false transcendence—desire as 
mimesis of an idol—to mediation through Christ—desire as mimesis of the truly 
transcendent God—as an effect of the redemptive work.26 Conversely, I will 
understand redemption to be the means of conversion. This restructuring of the 
mediation of desire is the reciprocal action that corresponds to God’s 
Incarnation: the change undergone by the Second Person brings about a 
symmetrical change in the structures the human subject inhabits. Herein lies the 
exchange. 
 
26 The notion of Christ as mediator of desire, though emphasized throughout Girard’s oevre, is 
never connected by him to the death of Jesus, but only to his Passion; see Girard, I See Satan Fall 
Like Lightning, 121–36. 
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§ 2. Methodological Remarks 
Some brief methodological remarks are in order if we are to ensure a secure 
approach to the intersection of MT with redemption theory. Of chief concern is a 
problem of the intelligibility of categories. 
MT is constructed from the vocabulary and methods of disciplines far 
afield from theology, such as literary criticism, anthropology, and the social 
sciences generally. How well can MT really understand the concerns of theology, 
and can theology really appropriate the social-scientific categories in which MT 
speaks? The problem of categories presents, I believe, both a blessing and a 
difficulty. Social-scientific categories are a blessing, because they are intelligible, 
relevant, and appealing in the modern framework. They present a difficulty 
because theology is not accustomed to them. 
Every theory of redemption is intelligible within the categories of its time. 
The early ransom theory, whose motifs still enliven the liturgical poetry of the 
Eastern Church, speaks the language of myth. The Anselmian theory, having 
been contrived for a society whose highest virtues could not tolerate deceptive 
intent on God’s part, elevated God’s honor and justice to the highest place, and 
in doing so satisfied the needs of an ecclesiastical piety founded on merits. The 
distinctively Eastern idea of salvation as deification speaks from the categories of 
19 
 
Greek philosophical thought. The modern theory of redemption par excellence, 
the penal substitution theory, appeals to a conception of justice that Westerners 
usually find easy to understand. In other modern societies, however, penal 
substitution may be confusing in exactly the same aspects.27 The Girardian 
approach to redemption has its own distinct appeal for its time and place: it is 
intelligible within scientific categories. 
But the concepts of MT cannot be naïvely substituted for traditional 
Christian expressions about salvation, sin, conversion, end times, etc.28 One may 
raise the question of whether MT needs to be restated altogether if it is to 
overcome this impediment to its intelligibility for religious doctrine. The doctrine 
of redemption, on the other hand, finds itself beset by its own predicament not 
just of plausibility as already discussed, but also of intelligibility. The idea of an 
incarnate God dying and rising for people’s sins and eternal life seems illogical 
and bizarre today more than it ever did in the past. The proportions of this 
problem have not been taken seriously enough by theologians, however one cuts 
it. Perhaps this is because of the greater attention that Christian preachers and 
 
27 See Mark D. Baker and Joel B. Green, Recovering the Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in New 
Testament and Contemporary Contexts (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2011), 192–209, for a 
perspective on the unique suitability of the penal substitution view to Western conceptions of 
justice. 
28 One might discern evidence of this in Schwager’s insistence on a redefinition of “sacrifice,” a 
term central to both MT and atonement doctrine, or in Alison’s inventing or borrowing new 
theological vocabulary (“intelligence of the victim,” “ecclesial hypostasis”) in order to translate 
the essence of the Girardian insight into a workable theological language. 
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thinkers have directed to the more obvious crises of Christian ideology: the 
threat posed by Darwinian evolution to God’s providence over the animal 
kingdom, the calling into question of Christian moral hegemony by democratic 
secularization. An examination of the nature and causes of this crisis in our 
received ideas of redemption is not within the scope of this study. The most 
obvious symptom of the crisis, however, is quite relevant to it: when Christians 
speak of redemption, they are confused about what it is, and when they speak of 
the fruit of redemption, viz. salvation, they lack any consistent and functional 
understanding of what is meant by it. 
Our ignorance is not always apparent on the plane of theoretical 
understanding. Many Christian believers have very specific ideas about how 
salvation works (e.g. by a transaction through blood atonement), about what they 
are being saved from (perhaps eternal punishment), and perhaps even what they 
are being saved for (the next life). But a theoretical confidence in the reality of 
salvation is not sufficient, especially if one’s theoretical conceptions have no 
bearing, or worse, have a wrong bearing, on reality in the first place. And the 
latter is always the possibility to be presumed; rather yet, there is no system of 
ideas that does not bear on how people live. No free-floating thoughts. And so, 
when we ask whether a Christian who “has knowledge” leads a life that is 
significantly distinguishable from that of an average “decent person” or 
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“fulfilled person”; when we ask how much of the difference between the one and 
the other consists in works whose value is self-referentially religious, such as 
praying and reading the Bible, or in civic virtues, such as the renunciation of the 
pursuit of excessive wealth; or when we ask how the institutions belonging to 
such a self-evidently radical instance as Christianity can have become socially 
conservative forces, predictably aligning themselves with political ends having 
no positive relation to the Gospel, we ought to presume a deficiency in 
knowledge as it relates to praxis. The Girardian preoccupation with the real, the 
constraining materialities of existence, takes theology off the level of the purely 
symbolic and shorts out this closed circuit of references, though without 
dispensing with the constitutive importance of the symbolic for the real, as we 
shall have opportunity to see. 
§ 3. Plan of Work 
Chapter 1 will explain and justify my first basic hypothesis, defining the 
relationships between transcendence, the transcendence-structure, and the re-




Chapter 2 will situate redemption theory within soteriology, and will 
establish my second basic hypothesis, namely, that redemption is a sacrificial 
exchange, through an examination of relevant biblical passages. 
Chapter 3 will develop and apply the Girardian understanding of sacrifice 
in the terms set by two basic hypotheses. Beginning from Girard’s theory of 
triangular desire and the generation of structure through the scapegoating 
mechanism, the investigation will proceed to an analysis of the sacrificial system 
and the possibilities for transcending its order, drawing especially from R. G. 
Hamerton-Kelly’s reading of the Gospel of Mark. The transcending of the 
sacrificial system coincides, in my reading of Girard, with the divine work of 
redemption. 
Chapter 4 will develop and refine the hypothesis of a redemptive exchange 
through an examination of illustrative biblical texts and traditions, indicating 
and highlighting the dialectical relationship between sacrifice and the historical 
transcendence of sacrifice in the biblical salvation history. 
Chapter 5 will analyze a selection of paradigmatic medieval and Patristic 
theories of redemption, giving special attention to any evident role for sacrificial 
exchange as the means of modifying the believer’s standing within the 
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transcendence-structure, as well as to the difference between creature and 
Creator that constitutes the condition of this structure. 
Chapter 6 will conclude the study with a return to the motivating 
questions concerning the validity of the sacrificial interpretation of Christ’s death 




SALVATION AND TRANSCENDENCE 
In this opening chapter, I define certain terms and relations that necessarily play 
a role in my approach to redemption and its corresponding subjective act, 
conversion. I arrange my field of concepts in relation to God’s transcendence, 
working from theologically plausible assumptions based on Girard’s notion of 
Christian conversion.29 The terms and relations explored here will provide my 
methodological foundation, and will enable me to articulate my first major 
hypothesis. 
I begin by relating the existential phenomena of salvation and conversion 
to the theoretical knowledge we call soteriology; in so doing, I seek to justify the 
existential significance of my approach to soteriology and to the doctrine of 
redemption (§ 4). I then present divine transcendence in its structural 
relationship to salvation and conversion (§ 5). Finally, I clarify my presentation of 
divine transcendence by situating it in relation to some major historical notions 
 
29 See René Girard, “Literature and Christianity: A Personal View,” Philosophy and Literature 23, 
no. 1 (1999): 32–43; idem, “The Conclusion,” pages 290–314 in Deceit, Desire and the Novel; idem, I 
See Satan Fall Like Lightning; René Girard and James G. Williams, Resurrection from the 
Underground: Feodor Dostoevsky (New York: Crossroad, 1997); and Girard’s important minor texts 
“Mimetic Desire in the Underground: Feodor Dostoevsky” and “Conversion in Literature and 
Christianity,” both included in René Girard and Robert Doran, Mimesis and Theory: Essays on 
Literature and Criticism, 1953–2005 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 246–73. 
Girard’s notion of conversion is discussed in more detail in § 24. 
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of transcendence, highlighting the contrast between spatial and temporal 
configurations of this concept (§ 6). 
§ 4. Salvation, Soteriology, and the Fundamental Conditions of Conversion 
A fundamental methodological question that must be addressed preliminary to 
an attempt to interpret the doctrine of redemption concerns whether, to what 
extent, and in what manner it is possible or desirable to add determination to our 
knowledge of the mystery of salvation. This question arises on account of a basic 
theological axiom, namely that of the radical transcendence of God (the absolute 
difference between created and Uncreated), and implicitly conditions any 
soteriology. 
The pertinent form of this question for my purposes is whether the 
absolute transcendence of God excludes the possibility of his communicability 
qua transcendent. The Dionysian tradition, so informative for the Church’s 
understanding of this question, affirms that it does not. The “wonderful name” 
that is “above every name” is “nameless” («ἀνώνυμον»),30 but not not a name. 
The transcendent Godhead is describable by language that bears on his 
relationship to created being, especially living being; the Godhead is “the life of 
 
30 On Divine Names I.6, in Διονύσιος ὁ Ἀρεοπαγίτης, Φιλοκαλία τῶν Νηπτικῶν καὶ Ἀσκητηκῶν, 
τομ. 3 (Θεσσαλομίκη, Γρηγόριος ὁ Παλαμάς, 2013), 56.21. 
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the living, and the essence of beings”;31 only in God’s essence, what he is in 
himself, does he remain absolutely and permanently inaccessible.32 There is an 
attainable contemplation of God, who bestows illuminations proportionate to 
each mind, drawing intellects upward to participation in him and toward 
likeness with him.33 This likeness, which is to be understood neither as actual 
similarity nor as commensurability, nevertheless makes it possible to speak of 
God according to likeness, as it were—as it were, since language cannot 
represent even the likeness of the Essence. But the likeness of language is effective; 
that is, in spite of God’s utter transcendence, he is truly communicable. It is his 
communicability which forms the basis of the doctrine of the divine energies.34 
God’s communication is, in truth, a self-communication, which takes place 
toward a being who is drawn into similarity with him. God’s self-
communication, which is a genuine communication of the Uncreated, is termed 
“grace.” And since this communication is a form of relationality, one is 
compelled to assert also that knowledge of the divine mystery takes place only in 
 
31 Divine Names I.3 (50.6–7); cf. VI. 3 (168.8–19). 
32 Divine Names I.2 (46.21–48.6): “For just as It [the Divinity] has benevolently delivered to us in 
the Oracles, the science and contemplation of whatever It is is inaccessible to those who are, since 
It is supra-essentially elevated above all. … Yet the Good is not altogether incommunicable 
(ἀκοινώνητον) to any thing that is, but benignly shines Its supra-essential ray, fixed uniquely in 
Itself, by illuminations proportional to each one who is, and elevates to Its attainable 
contemplation and communication and likeness (θεωρίαν καὶ κοινωνίαν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν) those 
sacred minds who, as far as is lawful and befitting, strive directly after It. …” 
33 Ibid. 
34 I.e. the Palamite doctrine; see below, p. 41. 
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the field of relationality. The structures making such relationality possible 
constitute the basis for my discussion of conversion. 
 This relationality of divine knowledge secures the possibility of directing 
an investigation of redemption into the existential domain, that is, the domain of 
life as such, the real “scene of action” of all that is to be discussed. One may thus 
introduce a working distinction between faith on the one hand as an existential 
reality that is the ground of praxis, versus the theoretization of said faith and 
praxis on the other. We can see this distinction reflected in conventional 
theological terminology in the difference between salvation and soteriology. An 
interpretation of these terms will help elucidate the methodological approach 
underlying this study. 
 Let us uncontroversially term “salvation” that which is received by means 
of divine grace and whose perfection is one’s possession of grace. Salvation 
determines the structure of one’s relation to God and to other creatures, and so, 
as an event, entails a re-structuring of one’s relationality. This re-structuring is 
what is designated by the term “conversion” in MT, whose use of the term falls 
within the domain of its uses in the theological tradition.35 Conversion as the re-
structuring of relationality entails not a mere moral effort, much less a 
 
35 See Ch. 6. 
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submission to a numinous force that will from now on govern a person’s life 
apart from any understanding of what one has gotten into. Conversion 
presupposes a realization, an enlightenment which, regardless of whether it has 
taken place instantaneously or over a prolonged period of life, or whether the 
realization is ever rendered articulate or not, marks a transition in a person’s or 
community’s life to a new and more truthful understanding of both the Creator 
and the created, transforming one’s relation to the one and the other, while at the 
same time entailing a rejection of a previously held false or less perfect 
understanding. Because, then, understanding is a determinant in one’s re-
structured relationships, a knowledge of these new relational structures is 
implied in conversion, even if, again, this knowledge is left unarticulated, as it 
may be in the majority of real-life cases. Should one’s understanding extend to 
the relational structures in which one was engaged prior to one’s conversion, one 
always has the possibility of knowing the difference between the two sets of 
relational structures. That is, one always may know the change brought about by 
grace, and therefore have knowledge of the gift of salvation. Let us term the form 
and content of such knowledge “soteriology.” Each person who has knowledge of the 
experience of grace therefore possesses also an at least implicit soteriology, as the term has 
been defined. Access to such formal knowledge can only be gained, however, 
through rendering explicit the structures entailed by the event of salvation, i.e. 
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by beginning from the experience of grace and the re-structuring brought about 
by the conversion that follows from the acceptance of grace. 
 The relationship of priority between salvation and soteriology is not one-
way. It is not the case that salvation is the sole foundation of all else, something 
that can self-sufficiently maintain perfect stability, in the life of one who has been 
vouchsafed the gift thereof. It is true that one can obtain salvation without any 
knowledge about soteriology, and in this respect salvation is all that matters. But 
it is also true that the possession of soteriological knowledge is inseparable from 
salvation. How so? The indispensability of soteriological knowledge is rooted in 
the intrinsic relation of knowledge to salvation itself, insofar as the realization 
entailed by conversion presupposes an at least implicit knowledge of what one is 
converting towards and away from. The necessity of soteriology is, then, similar 
to that of grammar, a functional understanding of which is inseparable from the 
use of language, whether or not one is ever enlightened by the thought that there 
are nouns and verbs; but it is dissimilar from grammar in that grammar is a 
science imposed a posteriori on a language one already knows and is thus 
altogether unnecessary for facility in speaking, whereas, on the other hand, the 
ideal content of a soteriology always has a direct function in one’s conversion, 
though one’s grasp of it be never so vague. Soteriology thus does not merely 
serve practical ends, as an intellectual prop or interior awareness that serves as a 
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stay for one’s easily misled faith in God, or as a basis for “models of salvation” 
that can be used for evangelistic purposes or to deepen one’s spirituality, though 
these functions are real as well. The soteriological is, rather, inherent in salvation 
itself, insofar as it is impossible to undergo a conversion from orientation within 
one set of structures toward orientation within another without some kind of 
reflective understanding of what one is doing. And so the proposition stated 
above may be modified to read that each person who has the experience of grace 
possesses an at least implicit soteriology; the knowledge of the experience is 
assumed in the experience itself. Moreover, and equally importantly, it may be 
asserted that soteriology describes the form of salvation, inasmuch as it lays bare the 
structures that are formally constitutive of the conversion that is concomitant with 
salvation. And in laying these structures bare, soteriology, as theory, is feeding 
back into the enlightenment, the gain of awareness, that is constitutive of 
salvation. The soteriological is that which manifests the contrast between the two 
sets of structures implied in a conversion, thereby making possible the judgment 
to prefer the one over the other, the better over the worse. The soteriological has 
the place of informing salvation, in the literal sense that it lends salvation its 
proper form. 
 What we are doing, then, in constructing a soteriological idea, is not 
extraneous rationalizing. Far from it, we are dealing with that (soteriology) 
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which provides the form of what it is describing (salvation) such that the former 
furnishes the latter with its constitutive existential intelligibility. Soteriology as 
understood here has to do entirely with the real structures governing life, and 
the decision to forsake the worse in life in favor of the better; it has to do with 
nothing else. 
 But does salvation then prove to be equivalent to a form of knowledge? In 
making these assumptions, does one unwittingly assert a kind of Gnosticism? By 
no means: one asserts only that knowledge is a constituent of salvation. Nor does 
one risk undermining the primacy of faith. On the contrary, faith presupposes 
some understanding of what one is faithful to; “blind faith” is not only faith that 
is not founded on evidence—the merits of this kind of faith can be debated as 
others please—but is also something much more uncertain than unfounded 
belief ever could be: faith that is devoted to it-has-no-idea-what. Such a situation 
would be the extreme case of the blind leading the blind. 
 The subservience of knowledge to faith occupies a yet more fundamental 
place, however, in the chain of causes. Genuine faith plainly implies a conversion 
toward God. This conversion is what I have described in terms of changing one’s 
orientation within certain structures. Conversion and knowledge have mutually 
constitutive roles. While conversion must, for the reasons given, involve 
knowledge as a logical prerequisite for itself, the actual conversion, i.e. the 
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change in orientation, is what makes it possible in the first place to possess the 
new form of knowledge that in turn makes it possible to speak of a conversion. 
That is, what is possible knowledge in the field of soteriology is determined by 
one’s orientation, and therefore by one’s conversion. Knowledge and conversion 
hold priority over one another in a circular fashion, and knowledge is therefore 
not at all the foundation of conversion, faith, or salvation. But more important 
than this restraint on the role of knowledge in salvation is the positive role of 
knowledge. Knowledge serves the end of faith, not the reverse. Being an 
irremovable component of conversion, knowledge is therefore partially 
constitutive of salvation. Knowledge does not save, but knowing is part of 
believing. 
Here the reader must be reminded as clearly as possible that the kind of 
knowledge in question is the knowledge of structures we inhabit, and certainly 
not an objective, necessarily thematic knowledge about the world, God, or 
ourselves. This should be evident based on the manner in which the terms of the 
problem have already been laid out. 
In light of the whole preceding discussion, then, the problematic of 
salvation will require that the following be worked out: 
33 
 
1. The structures out of and into which one’s orientation moves in the act of 
conversion. These can be approached only by working from the direction of the 
reception of grace. These structures, since they are intelligible only in light of the 
orientation of the believer toward or away from the Divinity, will be termed 
“structures of relationality.” The elucidation of the structures of relationality will 
consequently elucidate the change in the believer’s life that is his or her 
conversion. This first aspect of the problematic raises the next two. 
2. Conversion, one’s change in orientation between sets of relational 
structures, that is, between structures of relationality. This re-orientation entails a 
“re-structuring” of one’s orientation. Any “structure of conversion” one may 
speak of, however, likewise any “structure of faith,” would not itself be a 
structure of relationality, because one would not live in orientation within such 
structures, nor, consequently, could one move into orientation within them; one 
does not “believe in conversion” or “convert to faith.” 
3. Faith. Let us define faith as one’s changed (re-structured) orientation. 
One who has faith is a believer. A conversion is directed into a life of faith; the 
judgment that is necessarily part of a conversion is the act of believing. 
34 
 
4. Finally, but not least, each of the foregoing items must be worked out 
with a view toward the believer’s relation to the transcendent divine, since this 
same relationality is the condition for salvation and all that it involves. 
These tasks call for an immediate characterization of the just-mentioned 
“transcendent divine,” which will be treated at once under the classic rubric of 
“divine transcendence.” 
As for the structural elements that undergird these items—conversion, 
faith, transcendence, as well as the structures of relationality themselves—these 
are to be understood for the time being as hypothetical. The hypothesis that they 
together constitute will be one means by which I bring redemption theory into 
engagement with MT. 
§ 5. Two Aspects of Divine Transcendence; Transcendence and Orientation 
The preceding justification of the possibility and utility of an exploration of the 
theoretical constituents of a believer’s salvation, as well as of the inescapability of 
having an understanding of salvation, i.e. a soteriology, so as to render explicit 
the structures governing the experience of salvation, yielded four items that need 
to be worked out, namely: the structures of relationality that we have assumed to 
be the conditions for conversion; conversion itself; faith; and the believer’s 
relation to divine transcendence with respect to the other three items. The 
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preliminary essentials of the fourth task, since its results will impact the 
fundamental approach to the other three, are dealt with in the next pages. Since 
the relationality of God’s transcendence is the first condition for salvation, it is 
needful to work out the nature of conversion, faith, and the structures of 
relationality with an unwavering view toward divine transcendence from the 
very start. 
Here it must be asked, for the sake of clarifying the following discussion, 
what divine transcendence signifies, since the logic of divine transcendence is a 
condition for the grammatical integrity of the whole theological system. 
Divine transcendence breaks down into two aspects. On the one hand, a 
person can experience God in God’s transcendence, such that transcendence 
functions as an attribute by which God is recognized. Transcendence in its aspect 
as an attribute can be further divided: it can be a generic attribute, encompassing 
God’s positive attributes, such as his (transcendent) glory, his (transcendent) 
goodness, his (transcendent) love, etc., as well as his negative attributes, such as 
his surpassing immateriality, incomprehensibility, immortality … ;36 or 
transcendence may refer to any one of these particular attributes, and be referred 
 
36 Cf. Divine Names I.6 (56.21; 58.2): the “Nameless” (ἀνώνυμον) is identically the “Many-named” 
(πολυώνυμον), and known under each of these names. With each name is conveyed the entire 
Deity (Divine Names II.5 [74.4–11]). 
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to by it in turn. One might recognize God under any of his positive or negative 
attributes, as well as under the generic attribute that encompasses them. All of 
these are included in God’s transcendence as an attribute. 
The experience of God under his attribute of transcendence is what makes 
it possible to indicate the second aspect of divine transcendence: there is a 
structure of transcendence governing a creature’s relationship to God. This 
expression “structure of transcendence” is to be read such that “transcendence” 
is a qualifier of “structure,” not a possessive; it is a transcendence-structure, not a 
structure belonging to transcendence. The transcendence-structure is the 
condition of possibility for the experience of God’s transcendent attributes. In 
order to distinguish clearly between transcendence in its aspect as an attribute 
and transcendence in its aspect as a structurally governing principle, the latter 
will be consistently designated by the term “transcendence-structure.”37 The 
transcendence-structure governs the structures of relationality that are 
 
37 The structural signification of Girard’s la transcendance is evident on a reading of Deceit, Desire 
and the Novel, where his term does not signify just “transcendence” plain and simple: “Denial of 
God does not eliminate transcendency [la transcendance] but diverts it from the au-delà to the en-
deça” (Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 59); “Hegel’s unhappy consciousness and Sartre’s projet 
to be God are the outcome of a stubborn orientation toward the transcendent [l’au-delà], of an 
inability to relinquish religious patterns of desire when history has outgrown them. The 
novelistic consciousness is also unhappy because its need for transcendency [la transcendance] has 
outlived the Christian faith. … The need for transcendency seeks satisfaction in the human world 
and leads the hero into all sorts of madness” (ibid., 158–59). “Trancendency,” as Yvonne Freccero 




implicated in conversion, and may do so concretely by means of the specific 
divine attributes that are subsumed under the generic attribute of transcendence. 
The former aspect of divine transcendence, i.e. as an attribute, will be 
treated first. 
Outside the intra-trinitarian relationships, the relationship to the 
transcendent God is necessarily the relationship of a creature to God. In the case 
of the human creature a special form of this relationship obtains, due to this 
creature’s unique similarity to God (Gen 1:27): the relationship of the human 
creature to God is its relationship with God. Leaving aside the perennial question 
of the nature of the similarity, it is clear that the relationship of the human person 
with God is the only suitable representative case on the basis of which one may 
investigate divine transcendence insofar as this transcendence bears on salvation. 
The relationship-with is the possibility for salvation. 
It is not necessary, on the other hand, to restrict the investigation to the 
case of the believer, the one converting, or even such a thing as the Rahnerian 
idea of the “anonymous Christian.” Whatever the nature and status of the divine 
similitude in the human being, the scripturally warranted assumption that the 
image of God is at least potentially present in all people is adequate assurance 
that every person possesses a potential or actual specifically human relationship 
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with the transcendent God. Nor would it be possible to object that some people 
have a relationship with God apart from his transcendence, such that the human-
divine relationship does not actually imply transcendence. A God who is 
stripped of his proper transcendence is not God at all, but only someone’s 
phantom, an idol. 
One might, on the other hand, be misled into thinking that all people have 
an identical mode of relationship with the transcendent God. This is far from the 
case. Conversion implies a change in one’s relationship with God; this takes 
place by way of a change in one’s disposition toward him. The re-orientation that 
is called conversion is a re-orientation toward God. The relationship with God is 
precisely what changes in conversion. Theology understands this change in 
relationship as a restoration brought about by grace—a restoration, that is, to a 
proper relationship with God. The mode of relationship which one was restored 
from is designated as inauthentic, alienated, sinful; it is characterized as 
historically secondary to the proper relationship, being a consequence of the fall. 
These two modes of relationship with God correspond to and are analogous to the two 
structures of relationality that are found on either side of conversion, i.e. before it, 
when one is in a state of alienation, still “in one’s sins,” and after it, when one 
inhabits a restored transcendence-structure. Conversion is a change in one’s 
mode of relationship with God in his transcendence. 
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But conversion is not any change of this kind. Nor did we hit the mark 
when we said that conversion is a re-orientation toward God, since this statement 
does not adequately define conversion so long as one overlooks the question of 
what one is converting from. What is the nature of the deviated relationship that 
is in need of being modified or replaced? 
There are two possible answers to this question: either one has a 
relationship with a God who has been reduced to an idol through a failure to 
perceive his proper transcendence, and so believes in God as e.g. a corporeal 
being, or a “philosophers’ God,” a “God of the gaps,” or a supplier of values; or 
one has elevated a creature, whether a natural being or a creation of one’s own, 
to the status of a divinity, assigning to it an illusory transcendence of its own. 
In either of these cases, the object of one’s orientation is neither simple nor 
singular; one is spun about in an infinite ocean of possibilities, unable to know 
what one is worshipping, unable to see the impropriety of one’s orientation, and 
therefore unable even to choose which of the multiplicity of beings one is going 
to make into one’s idol. To what sort of being has one reduced God? With what 
kind of being has one replaced him? If one were aware of the answers to these 
questions, one would not have committed the error in the first place that makes it 
needful to ask them. Such a state is therefore to be characterized as one of 
disorientation. Its characterization as disoriented proportionately enriches the 
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meaning of the re-orientation in conversion: dis-orientation implies a more 
originary orientation of which it is the negation; re-orientation does not mean, 
then, just a change in orientation, but also a restoration of orientation, an 
orienting-again. Re-orientation is a return to orientation. This is necessarily so, 
even if in one’s history one was never actually oriented to begin with. This fact 
demonstrates the absolute priority of God’s transcendence over any deviation thereof, and 
over any other transcendence whatsoever. God, by contrast with beings, is simple 
and singular by nature. He is the possible object of absolute orientation. 
A further important point of terminology remains to be clarified. We have 
spoken variously of “divine transcendence,” “God’s transcendence,” and “God 
in his transcendence.” Let us fix the first two terms as synonymous on the 
grounds that the only true divine transcendence is God’s. Is God’s 
transcendence, then, the same thing as God in his transcendence? It would seem 
obviously not; God’s transcendence is an attribute of his, whereas God in his 
transcendence is God in one of his aspects. But does this distinction really hold 
up? For two reasons, it holds less water than it at first appears. 
The first reason flows from the axiom of divine simplicity. The attributes 
of God are distinguishable from himself with respect to knowledge about God 
(theology), but in God’s actuality it is impossible for there to be real 
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distinctions;38 that is, the energies of God are not divided from his essence, but 
are known distinctly and spoken of as such on the conceptual level only because 
of the paradox of God’s communicability and essential incommunicability. The 
multiplicity of God, in other words, is taken up into his simplicity.39 It is 
therefore justified, under appropriate conditions, to speak of an attribute of God 
or of God himself interchangeably. This is the justification for treating the 
“transcendent divine” as an equivalent term for God’s transcendence. But what 
are the appropriate conditions that permit the interchangeability of this 
language? This question will be answered by the second reason for not 
unequivocally upholding the distinction between God’s transcendence and God 
in his transcendence. 
This second reason, which draws on the same principle as the first, is that 
a creature knows God only in his attributes or operations.40 This dogma41 
undercuts any possibility of speaking of God as ontologically distinct from his 
 
38 Returning to Dionysius again, there are only four distinctions proper to the Godhead: the three 
distinctions proper to the divine Persons according to their respective modes of generation, and 
the distinction of the Second Person as the only Person to be made incarnate (Divine Names II.5–6 
[70.20–74.27]). 
39 Divine Names II.11 (80.7–10): “For the Divinity, being given to all being things, and pouring out 
of its excessive abundance the impartings of all goods, is rendered distinct in unity, and 
multiplied in oneness, taking many shapes out of its being One without going out of itself.” 
«Δωρουμένη γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ ὑπερχέουσα τὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀγαθῶν μετουσίας, 
ἡνωμένως μὲν διακρίνεται, πληθύεται δὲ ἑνικῶς, καὶ πολλαπλασιάζεται ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς 
ἀνεκφοιτήτως.» 
40 The energeiai, “actualizations” or “actualities.” 
41 Constantinople 1351. 
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attributes. One still has the possibility of theologizing in order to distinguish 
between what the knower has immediate experience of, i.e. the energies or 
attributes, and the divine essence. But whenever it is our knowledge that is the 
subject in question, one may not properly speak of an attribute or operation of 
God as being actually distinct from God himself. Nor can one rightly object to 
this that the knower, though he has experience of God only through his 
attributes and operations, nonetheless has a secondary kind of knowledge about 
God’s essence as that which is signified or referred to by his attributes and 
operations. The grace of God—his energies that one experiences—is God’s 
communication of himself directly, apart from signs or any other real or 
conceived intermediary. Nor is there any metaphysical entity hidden behind 
God’s grace that could complete, supplement, or augment the communication of 
himself by grace. To receive grace is to receive God. 
What does this mean for the orientation toward God’s transcendence? It 
means that the distinction between God “himself” and God’s attribute of 
transcendence, when both are considered as objects of orientation, is moot. When 
addressing one’s existential relationship with God, there is no significance to the 
distinction between relating to God’s attributes or operations and relating to God 
“himself” personally. In Palamite terms, one has experience of God only through 
his energies, never directly with his essence. One admittedly runs the risk here of 
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confusing God’s transcendence with the fact of his transcendence when following 
this line of reasoning. Naturally, recognition of the mere fact or idea profits 
nothing, and is not what is meant when speaking here of an orientation toward 
divine transcendence. 
We are now prepared to turn to the transcendence-structure as the key to 
unravelling the relation of divine transcendence to conversion, faith, and the 
structures of relationality. The transcendence-structure is the principle in light of 
which the structures of relationality can be interpreted; their interpretation is to 
be carried out with respect to one’s orientation within these structures, i.e. 
toward or not toward God in his attribute of authentic transcendence. A 
deviation from this orientation will take the form of either a commensurate 
orientation toward false transcendence, or an incommensurate orientation 
toward no transcendence at all. The former situation, in which one mistakes a 
creature for God, would be governed by a deviated transcendence-structure; the 
possibility of the latter case can be disregarded for the time as overly 
hypothetical. Now, the phenomenon of conversion signifies a re-structuring into 
orientation toward divine transcendence, i.e. the configuration of a structure of 
relationality that is governed by the transcendence-structure. One’s own 
converted orientation within the transcendence-structure supplies the crucial 
determinant of the “post”-conversion structure of relationality, and this 
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orientation is faith; in other words, faith and the transcendence-structure come 
together to determine the structure of relationality that is constituted through 
one’s conversion. 
With these preliminary guideposts in place, it will be useful to sketch 
what is meant by the transcendence-structure in more tangible terms. It is with 
this end in view that I provide the following snapshot of some salient historical 
ideas of transcendence and the transcendence-structure in theological inquiry. 
§ 6. Historical Snapshot of Some Main Ideas of Divine Transcendence; 
Characterization of the Transcendence-Structure in Light of These; 
Spatial and Temporal Representations of the Transcendence-Structure 
The significance of the transcendence-structure governing the human-divine 
relationship as it relates to theology’s classical models of transcendence has not 
been addressed by my discussion thus far; yet this structure has always been 
present as a foundational principle for the whole problematic of salvation. A 
brief characterization of the notion of the transcendence-structure against the 
background of the historical articulation of divine transcendence will prove 
illuminating. 
The ancient Greek concept of transcendence, in its recognizable form, goes 
back to Plato, whose doctrine placed reality or “truth” (ἀλήθεια) in the realm of 
the eternal forms (ἰδέαι). Later Platonic philosophy took it upon itself to arrange 
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the forms in a heavenly hierarchy42 culminating in the universal condition of 
“one” (most distinctly in the rejuvenated Platonism of Plotinus). “One” («ἕν») 
was seen as either synonymous or coterminous with being («ὄν»), though the 
precise nature of the relationship between these two terms was debated 
continually since as early as Plato himself43 and was never satisfactorily resolved. 
The Platonic notion of transcendent being bears the notable features of ocularity 
and isochronicity. The «ἰδέαι,» as the usual translation “forms” correctly suggests, 
are apprehended on the basis of visual metaphor and, moreover, in primordial 
dependence on the actual physical sense of sight (νοεῖν, κατανοεῖν: see, look at, 
observe). The existence of these forms was also believed to be entirely static: 
there was no sense of development, evolution, or creation of the forms, and, to 
the contrary, such notions were rigorously excluded from the domain of the 
transcendent in the Platonic system. Change pertained only to the material 
domain of inauthentic being, which was systematically denied any higher 
significance in itself. 
But what makes for “higher” significance? The Platonic tendency to 
imagine the transcendent as “up there,” ruling from the domain traditionally 
 
42 The term “hierarchy” itself is Christian, a neologism of Dionysius the Areopagite. 
43 Sophist. The earlier Eleatic philosophy of the unity of being does not appear to belong among 




assigned to the gods, was obviously derived from pre-philosophical religious 
sensibilities; and, however much Plato himself did or did not associate the forms 
with the celestial realm at any point in his recorded thinking, the Aristotelian 
positioning of the Prime Mover beyond the heavens gave unequivocal concretion 
to the philosophical tradition of a heavenly, transcendent God, already in 
evidence in Plato’s Timaeus and Letters. The transcendence-structure was being 
thought in spatial terms. As the line of Aristotelian thinking was pursued 
through the Middle Ages, this spatial arrangement gained strength to the point 
of sometimes acquiring an almost crudely physical nature.44 
The Jewish and Christian traditions, while themselves making an 
appropriation of the Greek metaphysical tradition, exercised an influence of their 
own upon philosophical speculation, especially on its understanding of 
transcendence. The Bible proved a source of great enrichment for the philosophy 
of transcendence once its theological notions had been “translated” into the 
language of metaphysics. Within Origen especially, the cosmology of Middle 
Platonism was consecrated in marriage to that of the Jewish-Christian tradition. 
In this incredible and awe-inspiring conflation of worldviews, the unity of God 
was joined to the God-Ἕν, and the angelic hosts made one with the intermediary 
 
44 The 12th-century Persian philosopher Suhrawardi’s illuminationist doctrine posited a hierarchy 
of immaterial heavenly lights whose luminosity made possible the apprehension of lower objects. 
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minds that fall between the supreme Intellect and the material world. In this way 
the spatial arrangement of the transcendence-structure persisted, while the 
primacy of ocularity was retained in the inchoate doctrine of divine 
illuminations. 
The representational systems of the Bible and of Jewish and Christian 
tradition exerted a far-reaching influence that surpassed the mere reinforcement 
of what was already present in Greek thought. They opened up a whole new 
dimension of possibilities—one which the Christians explored and deepened 
over the centuries, while Hellenist thinkers remained enclosed in their own 
increasingly sterile thought-patterns. The Christian tradition therefore became 
the principal location where cross-pollination between its own resources and 
Greek ideas took place. 
The topical scope of this cross-pollination was not limited to images of the 
divine, the universality of God, or other themes that were expressly discussed by 
the earliest generations of Christian apologists. The Christian biblical sources 
brought with them an implicit sense of divine transcendence as temporal 
alongside the evident spatial transcendence of the God who is “in the sky.” The 
development within Greco-Roman Christianity of this sense of temporality was 
unfortunately stunted by the limitations of Greek philosophical vocabulary, 
which was calibrated rather for speaking only in visual-spatial categories, and 
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doubtless also by the increasing ambivalence of the urban ecclesiastical 
authorities toward millenarian sensibilities over the first three Christian 
centuries. When Christians did use the Greek vocabulary to speak about 
temporality, they usually resorted to the Aristotelian language of ἀρχή—
μεσότης—τέλος and γένεσις—φθορά and suchlike. It is this vocabulary that, in 
various guises, has shaped the approach to temporality across Christian 
scholasticism up till relatively recently. 
The presentation of God’s transcendence in the Bible, in both its spatial 
and temporal representations, is obscured by a veil of images and parables. This 
is not to say that a biblical idea of a transcendence-structure was merely inchoate; 
the structure-making function of God’s temporal transcendence in particular was 
highly developed, though not always thematized. Temporality manifested in 
Scripture rather through the phenomenon of the call, a theme prominent in both 
the Old and New Testaments. By the time of the perspective of the New 
Testament, the whole history of the people of God had become conditioned by 
their continual calling—a calling which retroactively made a history of them 
possible in the first place. 
The earliest biblical reference to Israel’s being “called” in the relevant 
sense is Hosea 11:1: “I called my son out of Egypt.” This “calling” at the nation’s 
origin, the original significance of which is difficult to fix with any precision due 
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to obscurities in the Hebrew of the surrounding text (Hos 11:2), is picked up 
again as a theme in deutero-Isaiah, where the calling buds into a distinct 
theological motif: God has “called [Israel] from the womb” (Isa 49:1), and “called 
[her] like a woman forsaken” after the catastrophe of her exile (Isa 54:6); the 
language of “calling” is further attested in the near-contemporaneous material of 
Jeremiah (7:13; 35:17) and trito-Isaiah (65:12; 66:4), but in these cases the national 
calling of Israel, which is now a calling to repentance, is refused. This last pair of 
citations differs, then, in both tone and meaning from the senses of Isa 49:1 and 
54:6, which concern the calling of the nation into existence and then back into 
existence respectively. The motif of the calling is otherwise absent from the 
language of the Old Testament; at no point do the Old Testament Scriptures 
speak explicitly of a “calling” of any individual, such as Abraham, traditional as 
this notion has become. 
In the New Testament, the “calling” (κλῆσις) of God’s people emerges as 
a central theological theme, which is used to interpret the historical existence of 
Israel. The most illustrative passage in this regard, Hebrews 11:8, projects this 
Epistle’s characteristically New-Testament theology of the calling back onto 
Abraham; Abraham, like the believers in Christ, was called to receive a promise 
(11:8; 9:12), the fulfillment of which was to belong to the future and, for 
Christians, to the eschaton (“heavenly calling,” Heb 3:1). The calling, which is 
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alluded to by name in nineteen New Testament books,45 applies variously to the 
community of the faithful (e.g. Rom 1:6, 7; 9:24; 1 Cor 1:1, 2, 9; Gal 1:6; Eph 4:4, 1; 
Col 3:15; 1 Thes 2:12; 2 Thes 1:11; 2:14); to individuals who are “called” to a 
certain ministry (Rom 1:1; 1 Cor 1:1); to individuals who are “called” “in” a 
certain state, such as circumcision or uncircumcision, slavery or freedom, 
marriage or virginity (1 Cor 7:15–24 and ff.); to the nation of Israel, as in the 
Prophets (Rom 11:29); or to Christ himself (Eph 1:18). The “calling” signals 
predestination (in the case of the individual, Gal 1:15; cf. Jer 1:5; in the case of the 
community, 2 Tim 1:9; in general, Rom 8:30); a heavenly or otherwise 
eschatological goal (Hebrews; Phil 3:14); the responsibility to follow in Jesus’ 
footsteps and to reduplicate his beneficence in response to one’s own suffering at 
the hands of others (1 Pet 2:21; 3:9); the incumbency of living a holy life and 
forsaking an evil way of life (Matt 9:13; 1 Thes 4:7; 1 Pet 1:15); and the gathering 
of those called into an assembly (ἐκκλησία) (Col 3:15). Certain of these 
qualitative aspects of the “calling” bear a phenomenological similarity to the 
Jeremian-trito-Isaian thread having to do with repentance (cf. Luke 5:32); others 
pick up on the deutero-Isaian theme of the calling of God’s people into existence 
(Rom 9:24–26; Col 3:15). These two threads find their richest combined 
 
45 I have indexed occurrences by relevant uses of καλέω, κλῆσις, κλητός. In the discussion that 
follows, parallel occurrences across the Gospels are omitted from references. 
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expression in the recurrent theme of the wedding banquet (Matt 22:1–14; Luke 
14:16–24, here merely a “supper” («δεῖπνον»); Rev 19:9; figurally in John 2:1–11). 
In the parable of the wedding banquet, those who are invited (κεκλημένοι) yet 
beg off on account of worldly responsibilities are literally refusing the call. The 
eschatological character of the banquet is made clear in Matthew by the 
expulsion of the unworthy guest into “the outer darkness,” where there is 
“weeping and gnashing of teeth” (Matt 22:13), and is self-evident in Revelation 
19:9. The banquet was traditionally identified by exegetes as the Son’s union with 
the Church or as the end of the age.46 
What is essential for my purposes about these rich contents of the calling 
is that they represent an encounter with God’s transcendence that is recognizably 
temporal in its structure and auditory in its mode of apprehension. The calling is 
toward an end, understood naively as an actual future time of the world when 
salvation will take place (Rom 3:11) and the individual will be restored bodily 
along with the whole of creation. That the future consummation of the world 
coincides with the “restoration” (αποκατάστασις, Acts 3:21) of all things is an 
indication that the future salvation will also be, in some manner, a return to 
 
46 In Matthew’s version of the parable, as the union with the Church: John Chrysostom, Hom. 69 
(PG 58:648); Gregory the Great, Hom. 38 (PL 76:1281). In Luke’s version, as a representation of the 
end of the age: Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on Luke, ch. 14 (PG 72:788D–789A); Gregory the 
Great, Hom. 36 (PL 76:1266). 
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creation’s origin, i.e. to the originary past. The temporal structure of cosmic 
salvation thus reaches into both the protological and the eschatological. 
The revelation that the world is approaching a time of God’s presence that 
transcends the present as much as heaven (spatially) transcends earth47 has ever 
since proven eminently difficult for theology to talk about in an articulate 
manner. (Does not all conceptualization of time depend on spatial metaphors to 
begin with, including even the notion of “transcendence” itself?) This was 
especially the case for the heirs of the Hellenic vocabulary. Perhaps its 
maladaptation contributed to Origen’s error of identifying the restoration with 
the actual beginning, so as to arrive at a cyclical conception of time. Nothing ever 
ultimately changes; the net motion of the universe is emphatically nil. Nor can it 
be said that the Orthodox correctors of Origen always did much better. For those 
thinkers who engaged the problems of eschatology up through the Middle Ages, 
the exit-and-return of creation again amounted to a cycle.48 It has consequently 
been a perpetual struggle for theologies of the fall and redemption to safeguard 
the value and significance of the saeculum, the domain of history, which came to 
be regarded in Christian civilization as merely transitory. None of this is to say 
that the sense of God’s temporal transcendence was missed during this period, 
 
47 Cf. Ps 102:11. Citations from the Psalms will follow Septuagint numbering unless noted. 
48 Cf. Divine Names I.7 (58.19–60.2) and the entire Dionysian corpus, passim; Proclus, Elements of 
Theology, prop. 35. 
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during which the popularity of apocalyptic beliefs, books, and artwork made up 
for any deficiency in the relatively marginal phenomenon of Hellenizing 
scholastic theology; it is the latter that has had the most trouble groping for 
appropriate language. In today’s scholasticism, which is franker about 
confronting the historical interests and responsibilities of the Church in society, 
the problem of temporality has been redressed, largely thanks to its 
appropriation of new philosophical traditions that conceive temporality richly 
(Hegel and Heidegger). Yet the perspicacious observer would note that the 
Church has really had no choice in the matter; in the age of air and space travel 
and with the dominance of scientific representation, there is no longer a 
possibility of thinking of God as “up there.” He and his heavenly kingdom have 
been banished to the unobservable and untestable realm of the not-yet by those 
who haven’t already confined him to the has-been. It is for this reason that a 
displacement of the reign of God into the future needs to be handled carefully, as 
it always presents itself as an opportunity to evade the challenges posed to 
Christianity in modern times. Insofar as the deferral of God to the future offers 
an intellectual escape route, it obstructs opportunities to enrich our conceptions. 
Medieval scholasticism, for its part, despite its reception of Christian 
eschatology, failed to progress beyond two limitations: a fundamentally 
Aristotelian notion of temporality, in which all things are teleologically oriented 
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toward God as the One who contains the perfection of their being, and the 
Proclean-Dionysian notion, itself only quasi-temporal, of exit-and-return. Both of 
these conceptualities proved weak with respect to their capacity to depict an 
eschatology. (Even until the present, strong eschatologies have been more the 
domain of sectarian movements.) But a strong eschatology is exactly what the 
calling requires; not only a restoration, a return to a beginning, but a radical 
transformation as a result of the return. The circularity of time ought to be 
dominated by its linearity. The calling is not only a calling-back, but a creative 
act, a calling into being (Rom 4:17) and heavenward (Phil 3:14), to a state in 
which the source of our existence lies, but in which we ourselves have never 
been. God’s transcendence in its temporal representation is an end toward which all 
things move, and in this respect it is also their source. This formula is and 
historically has been the foundation of all genuine Christian teleology; if it holds, 
it provides validation for the metaphor of the calling, in that a call can originate 
motion as a response to the call (motion toward), while a response “from” a call 
(motion from) is nonsensical. A call is always a call toward a future, and this 
holds true even if the call is a calling-back. The priority of futurity in the calling 
implies an irreversible change, even though this change takes place in the process of a 
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return to an origin. The circular movement of exit-and-return is dominated by a 
linear movement that is proper to the Christian conception of time.49 
What can be said, then, about the transcendence-structure in relation to 
the predominant historical notions of God’s transcendence? A few conclusions 
can be depended on:  (1) It is to be remarked that there had been no clear 
discussion of a transcendence-structure as such until modern times; among the 
first modern attempts to articulate such a structure were transcendental 
theologies such as Rahner’s, which do not necessarily coincide in their methods 
and assumptions with the project being attempted here. Yet the notion of a 
transcendence-structure can validly be used as a tool for reading the historical 
forms of the doctrine of transcendence, since a transcendence-structure has been 
implied by Christian conceptions of transcendence from the beginning. 
A second result:  (2) The transcendence-structure is of such a nature that it 
expresses itself through both auditory and visual metaphor; it consequently 
manifests in temporal as well as spatial representations. The received tradition, 
however, has usually overemphasized the visual-spatial to the neglect of the 
auditory-temporal. In order more accurately to characterize the transcendence-
 
49 Dionysius, in one of his best moments, goes beyond the notion of circular motion, and posits 
that beings move with respect to the Godhead in the form of a helix—both circularly and linearly. 
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structure, it will be necessary to be more attentive to its auditory-temporal form 
than classical theology has been. 
Finally:  (3) Divine transcendence is not a philosophical invention, even if 
scholastic theology has explained it by relying on philosophical concepts from 
external sources since the early centuries of the Church. The earliest extensively 
articulated philosophical doctrine of a transcendent divinity, that of Plato, is 
plainly dependent on religious antecedents for its inspiration. Divine 
transcendence is a philosophical formulation of a religious idea. This fact must 
not be forgotten or painted over: it means that the transcendence-structure is in 
essence a religious idea prior to being a philosophical one. Part of the strength of 
Girard’s theory lies in his locating the secrets of the transcendence-structure 
within concrete religious phenomena, not abstracted metaphysical speculation. 
The structural phenomenology of Christian religious experience described 
in this chapter constitutes the first assumption of my method. This hypothesis 
will later be combined with my second hypothesis, namely, the principle of 
sacrificial exchange. These hypotheses, as I will be able to demonstrate by the 
end of this work, allow us to bring MT into conversation with redemption 
history and traditional theories of redemption with a unique dynamism. The 
reinsertion of the results of this procedure back into redemption theory can 
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REDEMPTION AS SACRIFICIAL EXCHANGE 
In this chapter, I first situate redemption at the epistemological center of a 
general cosmological framework, allowing me to take redemption as my starting 
point for understanding the totality of soteriological meaning; I next move to a 
discussion of what redemption is, taking an exegetical lead from Girard to 
characterize the form of redemption as consisting in a sacrificial exchange. 
The assertion that redemption is to be understood as a sacrificial exchange 
calls for some qualification by way of prolegomena in light of current directions 
in systematic theology. While well within the bounds of traditional theology, my 
assertion goes against the grain of much current work on the doctrine of the 
atonement, where the preference is to qualify or disavow redemption’s sacrificial 
and transactional character.50 Indeed, since Gustaf Aulén in his classic study 
 
50 One might broadly characterize liberationist theologies (as well as orthodox theologies that 
attempt to respond to their challenge) as qualifying the meaning of Christian sacrifice, among 
which many feminist theologians are the firmest in rejecting the notions of sacrifice and 
transaction altogether. Further, many of the most influential liberationist theologies, without 
disavowing sacrificial-transactional models, show little interest in them, since these theologies 
problematize the suffering of Jesus as such, and concede any possibility of rationalizing it. One 
might see these three ways of disowning the orthodox idea of substitutionary sacrifice 
respectively in Jürgen Moltmann (The Crucified God), who essentially disregards it; in Jon Sobrino 
(Jesus the Liberator: A Historical-Theological Reading of Jesus of Nazareth [Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 
1993], esp. at 223–24, 254 ff.), who affirms hieratic sacrificial language but radically reinterprets its 
significance; and in James H. Cone (The Cross and the Lynching Tree [Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2013]), 
who identifies substitutionary atonement as an ideological support for white supremacy. 
Consider also Ray, Deceiving the Devil. Many Girardians express similar attitudes: consider S. 
Mark Heim’s thoroughly anti-sacrificial reading of Christ’s death, bordering on a moral influence 
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advocated for a reconsideration of the pre-Anselmian Christus Victor idea of the 
atonement, a pluralistic approach to redemption theory has become a widely 
preferred method in the academy and beyond.51 The most recent literature 
accentuates this trend by its marked preference for multiple metaphors.52 
Half a century of rapid progress in deconstructionist philosophy has by 
now made it impossible to go back on this postmodern preference for plurality,53 
and my assertion of sacrificial exchange, which could easily associate my 
position with reactive theologies,54 must not be taken as resistant to plurality. 
Nor do I wish to force the inconsistent multiplicity of images used in the New 
Testament and the Fathers into an implausible systematic unity.55 
 
theory, in Heim, Saved from Sacrifice: A Theology of the Cross (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006); 
or Anthony Bartlett’s search to ground a non-violent ontology in the Cross in Bartlett, Cross 
Purposes: The Violent Grammar of Christian Atonement (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 
2001), and idem, “After Sacrifice Ontology: The Shared Revelatory Dynamic of Heidegger and 
Girard,” Contagion 24 (2017): 119–38. 
51 Gustaf Aulén, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of the 
Atonement (New York: Macmillan, 1967); on the grounding for the preference for plurality, see 
Kevin Vanhoozer, “The Atonement in Postmodernity: Guilt, Goats, and Gifts,” pages 367–404 in 
Roger R. Nicole, Charles E. Hill, and Frank A. James, eds., The Glory of the Atonement: Biblical, 
Historical & Practical Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Roger Nicole (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 2004). 
52 Consider Vanhoozer, ibid.; Baker and Green, Recovering the Scandal of the Cross; Stephen Finlan, 
Options on Atonement in Christian Thought (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007); Lisa Sowle 
Cahill, “Quaestio Disputata: The Atonement Paradigm: Does It Still Have Explanatory Value?” 
Theological Studies 68, no. 2 (2007): 418–32, at 418–21. 
53 See Finlan, Options on Atonement, 88–102; Vanhoozer, “The Atonement in Postmodernity.” 
54 One is hard pressed to find progressive ecclesiastical (as opposed to academic) theologies that 
reassert sacrifice, which is most often linked today with orthodox Protestant notions of 
substitutionary atonement, and especially with conservative Evangelicalism. 
55 See Stephen Finlan, The Background and Content of Paul’s Cultic Atonement Metaphors (Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2004). 
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What I do wish to assert is that the characterization of the saving death of 
Jesus Christ as a sacrificial exchange is decisively warranted by the New 
Testament witness on the grounds of its pervasiveness and coherent 
development within this body of texts; the New Testament witness therefore 
legitimates a focus on this composite image. 
To make my way to this conclusion, I determine redemption to be the 
starting point for any knowledge we have about the creation and consummation 
of the world (§ 7), proceed to an investigation of a scriptural link (with Girard as 
my lead) between the beginning of the world and sacrifice (§ 8), and conclude 
with an exegetical argument for assuming that redemption must take the form of 
a sacrificial exchange (§ 9). 
§ 7. Redemption in the Cosmic Work of Salvation 
If salvation is the end of the Christian life, redemption is the means to this end; 
correspondingly, redemption is the means executed by God through which he 
brings about salvation. Any understanding of salvation, then, that lacks an 
understanding of redemption is like a day-dream about a place one can never see 
for oneself. Redemption is the means of God’s purpose; that purpose is the 
salvation of the human race. 
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 Humanity’s salvation is treated in the Christian imaginary, including in 
Scripture, as coinciding with  (a) the salvation of the whole of creation (Rom 8:22) 
and  (b) the consummation of the world (or “age”; 2 Pet 3:10–13). A means falls 
between two extremes. Between the consummation of the world and what other 
extreme does redemption mediate? The extremes are necessarily commensurate. 
Redemption mediates between the beginning of the world and its end. The 
doctrine of redemption therefore relies on the doctrine of creation. 
 But the act of creation, like the consummation, is concealed from view. 
Our knowledge about it can derive only from our knowledge of our present 
phase of existence. Since this phase corresponds to the historical means between 
the beginning and end of the world, it corresponds also to God’s redemptive 
activity. Redemption is our means of access to knowledge about the beginning 
and the end. 
 How does one begin to theorize redemption, then? In traditional 
theologies, beginning even as early as Irenaeus and Athanasius, one does not 
necessarily take redemption as the starting-point of one’s explanation, but 
proceeds rather from the chronological beginning, onward through the work of 
redemption, finally to arrive at the eschaton (if one indeed gets so far).56 The 
 
56 Cf. Irenaeus’ Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching and Athanasius’ two-part work Contra 
Gentes and De Incarnatione. It should be noted that the eschaton appears to be missing from 
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choice of this order is not only a matter of artful storytelling, of portraying the 
grand scheme of cosmic history in the form of a drama. It is, rather, a 
consequence of the logic of redemption itself: redemption presupposes a repair, 
or an improvement, or a fulfillment of some deficit; redemption requires a 
problem. The problem is the condition that determines what redemption can be 
and must be. Next, creation and redemption relate to the consummation of the 
world by, again, a causality that conforms to their chronological order. The 
beginning and the middle make the possibilities for the end. The restoration or 
fulfillment that constitutes the end is brought about by redemption, and by 
nothing else; and since redemption addresses a problem that existed since the 
beginning (provided the “beginning” includes the fall), the protological 
conditions that it addresses are carried over into the determination of the end. 
 Following the logic that organizes this chronological scheme, however, it 
turns out nonetheless to be the case—unavoidably so—that knowledge of 
redemption is the condition of possibility for knowledge about creation and the 
consummation. Nothing bears out this point so obviously as the qualitative 
differences in narrative form when it comes to how we tell the history of each of 
these three events. Redemption is a historical event, centered around an 
 
Irenaeus’ and Athanasius’ cosmic narratives. Presumably this is because they considered the 




empirically verifiable act known as crucifixion, and involving other events 
which, though often unverifiable and unnatural, are nonetheless historical in 
character, e.g. the virgin birth, the resurrection, the spread of the Church, etc. By 
contrast, religious narratives of the beginning and the end of the world rely 
entirely on metaphor and obvious fiction. These narratives are of such a peculiar 
character that, consider it a closed case that the universe we know had its origin 
in some determinable event like the Big Bang, this would throw no direct light 
on the veracity or falsity of our religious creation stories. Nothing is clearer than 
the fact that the contents of our creation- and consummation narratives are 
contrived totally independently of the essence of scientific historicality. Why so? 
Because, one might naively respond, when these stories took form, no one had 
any empirically founded knowledge about the world’s origin or end. Sure 
enough. But provided they had, their (our) knowledge about the beginning and 
end of the world could never overpower the brute fact that no one can ever 
encounter the extremes of existence; human existence is always historical, always 
between a past and a future, a beginning and an end. So, the limits of past and 
future, the beginning and the end, must always remain hidden from view. Our 
accounts of them must be “filled in” based on extrapolations from the historical 
situation that we already have an account of; the accounts that we fill in will, 
moreover, be of a different quality from a naturalistic scientific account, for the 
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simple reason that physical science does not extrapolate from existence, but from 
mathematical principles. An account of creation and consummation will 
necessarily be of a purely ideological character, such that it cannot be directly 
informed by mathematical considerations. Now, historical existence is the 
domain of redemption, the means between beginning and end. Historical 
existence thus includes both the work of redemption and its dialectical contrary, 
the problem that redemption addresses. A theologian can work only from these, 
either backward towards an understanding of the beginning or forward towards 
an understanding of the end, on the basis of what is implied in the concept of 
redemption itself. In doing so, he or she has the aid of the human, especially 
historical, sciences: history, anthropology, linguistics, psychology, etc. But the 
theologian can only make mediated use, on the other hand, of the “hard” or 
purely physical sciences, except when they can confirm or deny the reality of the 
physical bases of the former sciences. The “pure” sciences are otherwise 
excluded by their fundamentally a-historical construction. 
 All this said, grand theological narratives generally tend not to start from 
the middle, but order their story “from Genesis to Revelation.” The burden of 
proof, then, lies on us. What more convincing way to address this concern than 
to see whether the chronological scheme of the Bible can furnish, out of itself, a 
prioritization of redemption over the beginning of history, such that redemption 
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is formally constitutive of these? And what better avenue to this task could be 
found than Scripture’s placement of redemptive sacrifice at “the foundation of 
the world”? It is with an investigation of this connection in the New Testament 
that I begin my characterization of redemption as a sacrificial exchange. 
§ 8. Sacrifice and the «καταβολὴ κόσμου» 
The creation of the world is hidden from the creature. 
 According to the report of the First Evangelist, however, Jesus is able to 
make its secret known, albeit under the form of enigmas: “And without a parable 
he did not speak to them, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the 
Prophet, saying, I will open my mouth in parables, I will utter things which have 
been kept secret from the foundation of the world (ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου)” 
(Matt 13:34–35). Here, as elsewhere in the New Testament, “the foundation of the 
world” is a locution that emphasizes the concealment—but in the light of the 
Gospel revelation, now unconcealment—of the world’s beginning. The phrase 
“the foundation of the world” is pertinent to our line of inquiry. Might it include 
a hint about the nature of redemption? 
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 «Καταβολὴ κόσμου» is a phrase virtually unique to New Testament,57 
and occurs across several of its authors, placing it in a privileged class of terms 
alongside such others as “the Kingdom of God.” This phrase “the foundation of 
the world,” as Girard keenly perceived,58 turns out to contain a revelation about 
creation—veiled, as always, in the vocabulary of an imagined religious 
cosmology, but with an important disclosure about history lying beneath its 
surface. A small amount of exegetical work will make clear the relevance of this 
phrase for both cosmology and soteriology. 
 The variety of contexts in which the phrase “the foundation of the world” 
is used in the New Testament is quite restricted in proportion to the breadth of 
its distribution across authors.59 Most frequently, and across the greatest number 
of authors, the phrase is connected with either the eternal election of the Messiah 
or the election of the saints. 
 
57 This Greek phrase does not occur anywhere in the LXX; the calcified form of the expression 
across the New Testament warns against a lazy identification of the phrase with the mere 
occurrence of «καταβολή» in e.g. 2 Macc 2:29. The exact phrase «ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου» 
occurs only once in the Apostolic Fathers (Ep. Barn. 5:5) and is attested further in the Testament of 
Moses 1:14, a work of uncertain date (see the introduction by J. Priest to T. Mos. in James H. 
Charlesworth, The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, vol. 1 [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983], 919–
26, at 920–21). See also David E. Aune’s references for the phrase in Word Biblical Commentary: 
Revelation 6–16 (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 748. 
58 Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World (Des Choses Cachées Depuis la Fondation du Monde) 
is, of course, the title of one of Girard’s chief works. Girard’s passing discussion of this phrase is, 
despite the proportions promised by such a title, limited to Matthew 13:35 and Luke 11:50–51 
(Girard, Things Hidden, 153). The detailed exegetical connections I draw between “the foundation 
of the world” and sacrifice are my own. 
59 10 occurrences across 7 authors. 
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The first of these two usages most commonly appears in the later New 
Testament writings, and occurs in the Gospels only in John. In his high priestly 
prayer, Jesus states that his Father’s love for him was “before (πρό) the 
foundation of the world”; this happens to be the sole instance in which the 
phrase is headed by a preposition other than ἀπό—an exception that reinforces 
the regular status the phrase with ἀπό must have enjoyed in the early Christian 
community. In John, “the foundation of the world” has to do primarily with 
Jesus’ centrality in the Father’s redemptive plan from eternity (cf. John 1:1), but is 
also secondarily linked with the mission of the Son through the theme of the 
Father’s love for the Son that is the common subject of both the divine mission 
and the eternal plan (John 17:23: “that the world may know that you have sent 
(ἀπέστειλας) me, and have loved them, and have loved me”). John 17:23b 
implies a further connection between the mission of the Son and that of the 
Apostles, who will experience the same love that pre-exists the world: “that the 
world may know that you have sent me, and have loved them as you have loved 
me.” John 17:24 elaborates this connection: “Father, I will that they also whom 
you have given me be with me where I am, that they may behold my glory 
which you have given me; for you loved me before the foundation of the world.” 
The mission of the Apostles, their ἀποστολή, is to be in the place of Jesus, who is 
about to fulfill his own mission on the Cross (cf. John 21:18–19). On the Cross, 
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Jesus’ glory, given to him before the world came into being, will be manifest. 
Throughout John’s Gospel, Jesus’ death is the locus of his exaltation and 
glorification. The Fourth Gospel’s single use of the phrase “the foundation of the 
world” is connected, then, with Jesus’ death-as-his-mission, as well as with the 
mission of his Apostles—and, one might infer by symmetry, with the Apostles’ 
deaths. The Father’s eternal love for Jesus and his disciples—which is itself the 
subject of the eternal secret—and the relationship of their deaths to Christ’s 
glorification constitute further significant data in this complex of ideas. 
A second, though less rich, passage connecting “the foundation of the 
world” to the election of Jesus is found in 1 Pet 1:20, which declares Jesus to have 
been “foreknown (προεγνωσμένου) before the foundation of the world.” The 
blood of Christ who is the subject of such foreknowledge is the instrument of 
redemption (1:19) from the vain way of life received by tradition from the 
audience’s ancestors (1:18). “The foundation of the world” is again, as in John, 
connected with Jesus’ death, and is associated by 1 Peter with a divine secret, 




A pair of closely related uses of the phrase occurs in Revelation. Rev 13:8 
says of the Beast: “All who dwell on the earth shall worship him, whose names60 
are not written in the book of life of the lamb [that was] slain from the foundation 
of the world.” Here, the phrase “from the foundation of the world” is a crux. 
Does this temporal clause modify “slain” (cf. 1 Pet 1:19–20) or “written”? An 
argument from parallelism can be made for the latter possibility by appealing to 
Revelation’s other occurrence of the phrase, in Rev 17:8: “And those who dwell 
upon the earth shall wonder [at the Beast], whose names were not written in the 
book of life from the foundation of the world. …” Revelation’s use of the phrase 
would then refer to the election of the faithful by virtue of their negative 
relationship with the worshipers of the Beast (if the latter’s names are excluded 
from the book of life, then clearly the believers in Christ are those whose names 
are included in it). But the security of this reading in the case of Rev 13:8 is 
undercut by the fact that we are not altogether warranted in assuming such 
consistency of use on the part of Revelation’s author, nor in assuming simplicity 
of authorial intent. The two previously discussed passages that connect Jesus’ 
death with “the foundation of the world” hold open the door for the possibility 
that Rev 13:8 is predicated on a similar connection. 
 
60 The UBS text prefers the variant reading that contains the singular (οὗ τὸ ὄνομα), but the 
difference is inconsequential for my line of argument; the received reading presumably reflects 
the sense of the awkward singular. 
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The one remaining occurrence of “the foundation of the world” in its 
usage referring to the election of Jesus is found in Hebrews; it is anomalous in 
that the significance of the phrase is negative: 
[Christ entered into the heavenly sanctuary] not that he should offer 
himself repeatedly, as the high priest enters into the Holies every year 
with alien blood; for [then] he would have had to suffer repeatedly since 
(ἀπό) the foundation of the world; but now once, at the end of the ages 
(ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων), he has appeared, to put aside sin through 
the sacrifice of himself (διὰ τῆς θυσίας αὐτοῦ) (Heb 9:25–26). 
 
No positive connection can be made on the basis of this passage between Christ’s 
election and “the foundation of the world”; but the mere fact of the occurrence of 
this special phrase nonetheless begs that some connection be drawn. The phrase 
is a non sequitur: the author could have simply written, “he would have had to 
suffer repeatedly”;61 alternatively, he could have used a different locution for the 
archaic past such as «ἀπ’ αἰῶνος» (Gen 6:4; Ps 118:52; cf. Luke 1:70) or «ἀπ’ 
ἀρχῆς» (Ps 77:2; Mic 5:1), both of which are very frequent in the Septuagint. The 
exact phrase «ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου» could have come only from within 
Christian discourse, since the phrase is unknown in the Septuagint but, as noted 
above, occurs across the New Testament in its exact given form (with the slight 
exception of John 17:24). Either Hebrews’ use of the phrase is related positively 
 
61 Compare Harold W. Attridge’s difficulty in explaining why this phrase is included in this 
verse: “The note that such a multiple offering would have to have taken place ‘from the 
foundation of the world’ (ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου) simply emphasizes the absurdity of the 
proposition” (Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews 9:26 [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989], 264). 
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to its use in other New Testament texts, or Hebrews marks an intentional shift in 
its signification. No evident features of Hebrews, however, appear to support the 
latter possibility. Jesus’ death is being contrasted with traditional sacrifices, 
which, like his own slaughter as characterized in John, 1 Peter, and possibly 
Revelation, have taken place “from the foundation of the world.” Thus the 
apparent contradiction between Hebrews and the aforementioned texts can be 
settled by the supposition that for Hebrews, Jesus’ death is a sacrifice that is at once 
of a piece with yet radically different from those many sacrifices offered from the 
beginning of the world. Moreover, the theology of Hebrews clearly holds that all 
sacrifices before Christ’s have some association with “the foundation of the world.” 
These assertions require us to look further in order to confirm or deny their 
plausibility as hermeneutic assumptions for reading other New Testament 
theology. 
These passages exhaust the occurrences of «καταβολὴ κόσμου» in its 
usage referring to Christ’s election. To complete the picture, and to find data that 
may buttress our interpretation of Heb 9:26, let us now consider the class of 
occurrences referring to the election of the saints. One, possibly two, of the 
occurrences of this second usage group have already been covered in Rev 13:8 
and Rev 17:8. Another such occurrence is to be found in Heb 4:3:  
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For we who have believed are entering into that rest, as he said: I swore in 
my wrath, They shall not enter into my rest, even though the works had 
been completed since the foundation of the world (τῶν ἔργων 
γενηθέντων ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου). 
 
The works, that is, were completed before the seventh day of creation, as the text 
goes on to clarify (v 4). The author extends the protological theme of the week of 
creation to his audience’s present-day life in the end times, so that the “works” 
here become the precondition of the “rest” into which the faithful will enter (vv 
6–11). A similar use of καταβολὴ κόσμου is found in Matt 25:34, where the 
“kingdom” is the eternally prepared inheritance of the elect. To this usage group 
may finally be added Eph 1:4, which speaks of the election of the faithful from 
the beginning of time. 
The two remaining occurrences of «ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου» in the New 
Testament resist easy classification within the two identified usage groups. Matt 
13:35 uses «ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου» in a quotation of Ps 77:2: “I will open my 
mouth in parables; I will utter things hidden from the foundation of the world.”62 
Here, significantly, Matthew changes the LXX’s «ἀπ’ αἰῶνος», a much more 
literal rendering of the Hebrew קדם מני . Matthew’s quotation is meant to explain 
 
62 The reading followed here is that of the majority text. Certain manuscripts of Origen and 
Jerome omit «κόσμου», but if their reading is to be recommended, it is of little consequence for 
my argument. The fact that Matthew’s use of ἀπὸ καταβολῆς (κόσμου) occurs in a quotation 
from a Psalm similar in theme to Ps 94:11, quoted in Heb 4:3 and connected by the writer of 
Hebrews to the καταβολὴ κόσμου, is remarkable. 
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Jesus’ use of parables, with the upshot that eternal secrets are being revealed 
only to a select group of listeners while remaining concealed from the crowds 
(Matt 13:34). 
The final and most peculiar use of this phrase is in Luke 11:49–51. The 
present generation, Jesus declares to a legal scholar or nomikos, will have to 
answer for all the blood of the apostles and prophets sent by God’s wisdom (who 
is God’s wisdom other than Jesus himself?) “from the foundation of the world,” 
beginning from Abel. Here a similarity with Heb 9:26 is apparent: both passages 
use “from the foundation of the world” to characterize the holy bloodshed that 
has gone on from eternity. The difference is that in Hebrews, it is only goats and 
rams that are being killed; in Luke, it is the messengers of God. Has the killing 
been religious sacrifice, or religious murder?63 And how is a legal scholar 
implicated in the killing, if we are to take seriously the insinuations of Jesus’ 
tirade? Do we make anything of the fact that in Revelation the names that are 
written in the book of life are the names of the saints who suffer persecution and 
death like the Lamb (Rev 20:12)? 
We can sketch the following conclusions. The New Testament passages 
that we have considered paint a picture in which the killing of the saints is linked 
 
63 Cf. Girard, Things Hidden, 152–57. 
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with their divine mission (Luke 11:49–51; John 17:23); the associations between 
Luke 11:49–51, Heb 9:25–26, and the martyrdom theme in Revelation hint that a 
connection is presumed to exist between the killing of the saints and ritual 
sacrifice. Finally, the cases of the first usage group discussed attest that the 
trifecta of mission–death–sacrifice applies also to Jesus himself, and that he is 
moreover the true, eternal archegos (Heb 2:10) of this way of the saints. The 
election of the saints, then, is rooted in a circumstance which occurred at the 
world’s foundation, and which continued up to and beyond the time of Jesus 
(Luke 11:51). We may infer additionally from the fact that the first usage group is 
attested only in the later New Testament writings (John, 1 Peter, Hebrews, and 
possibly Revelation) that the Christian community’s application of the mission–
death–sacrifice trifecta to Jesus was more likely than not secondary to their 
application of them to the saints. If this should be the case, then there is a 
reciprocal relationship between Jesus’ mission/persecution and the 
mission/persecution of the saints: Jesus is the eternal prototype of the latter, but 
his own persecution—what is now customarily called his “saving work”—is 
intelligible only in light of the persecution of the saints. And, to bring this 
reciprocity full circle, the intelligibility of the persecution of the saints is made 
accessible to us only by Jesus’ own words in the Gospels. Jesus’ death is 
patterned after those of the saints; but, paradoxically, the mission that ends in 
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such a death proceeds from him alone. This consideration must weigh heavily in 
our own propositions about redemption. 
The foregoing exegetical road trip has provided a blueprint for 
constructing a soteriology. What emerges from the foundation of the world, from 
our origin which is ever out of sight, is the Lamb sent on his mission from the 
Father to be slaughtered. And not only the Lamb, but also his saints, who bring 
the occluded time of the world’s foundation into the time of history, even past 
the time of Jesus and into our present. This mission is the saving, redemptive act. 
If such is the content of the redemptive mission, an urgent question is 
raised for us: What is the essential principle behind these violent deaths? If the 
mission is about these violent deaths for their own sakes, have we not led 
ourselves to a very absurd conclusion? And a second question: Should we 
discover, or should the sacred writers discover for us, an essential principle 
behind the redemptive mission, will this not also reveal to us the principle of 
creation, of our origin, of the world’s foundation, and thus lead us into the 
contradiction of knowing that which we as creatures cannot know? Will our 
inquiry be exposed as an act of hubris, a quest for impossible or forbidden 
knowledge? And what about the consummation? Will we presume to attain 
knowledge of it, too? What is the profit of such knowledge? 
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These frightened questions, masquerading under the guise of prudence, 
strike me as resistant to the progress of knowledge into mystery that marks the 
New Testament revelation. The New Testament passages we have examined 
declare that just such a revelation of knowledge is happening. It would be foolish 
to piously dismiss the possibility of revitalizing our understanding of revealed 
tradition. Knowledge, according to Saint Paul, ought to be subservient to faith, 
hope, and love; but those who would therefore cast knowledge aside as of little 
value ought to heed the Scripture: 
Receive my instruction rather than silver, 
and knowledge rather than choice gold (Prov 8:10). 
 
§ 9. Sacrifice and Redemption 
Earlier, we reached the conclusion that “the foundation of the world” involves 
the shedding of blood, referring variously to the killing of the saints or of Christ 
himself. We assigned these religiously significant deaths to the category of 
sacrifice on the contextual warrant provided by the New Testament sources 
themselves. We now find ourselves confronted by questions that had been 
lurking nearby the whole time: Why and how is sacrifice implicated in the 
foundation of the world? Is sacrifice implicated in creation broadly speaking? 
These questions require first a more complete characterization of Christ’s 
sacrificial death, to be carried out presently. A lead can be obtained on the basis 
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of certain ready-given interpretations of Christ’s death in the New Testament. 
These fall under two major headings, namely, the interpretation of his death as a 
sacrifice on the one hand, and as redemption or an exchange on the other. I wish to 
show that these two dominant images in New Testament redemption theology 
are intimately related, and that their content is inseparable. 
 My tacit equation of sacred killing with sacrifice—which one might 
protest is overdrawn—is, in fact, ready to hand in the New Testament’s 
vocabulary: θύω retains its more basic meaning of “kill” (e.g. John 10:10; Acts 
10:13) alongside its cultic meaning of “sacrifice” (Mark 14:12; 1 Cor 5:7; 10:20).64 It 
should come as something of a surprise, then, that it is rare in the early New 
Testament texts for Christ’s death, already interpreted along cultic lines in the 
earliest report of the eucharistic ritual (1 Cor 11:25), to be called θυσία; the only 
appearance of such a use of θύω or cognates in the authentic Pauline corpus is in 
1 Cor 5:7: “For Christ our Passover has been slaughtered (ἐτύθη).”65 All of this 
notwithstanding the obvious juxtaposition of the Crucifixion with the Passover 
sacrifice in the Gospels! Sacrificial metaphors do appear, however, under other 
terms of expression in a handful of locations in the early texts. The “shedding of 
 
64 One should also consider the complex interplay between generic animal slaughter and sacrifice 
in certain Old Testament laws, sometimes implying an identity of the two, as in Lev 17:2–5; cf. 
Deut 12:20–21. 
65 Paul is prone to speak of θυσία rather as a work done by the Christian believer than as 
something Christ did; consider Rom 12:1; Phil 2:17. 
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blood” (configurations of ἐκχυννέω + αἷμα) is connected with the eucharistic 
Cup in all three Evangelical institution narratives (Matt 26:28; Mark 14:24; Luke 
22:20), the word ἐκχυννόμενον surely being meant to evoke the paschal sacrifice 
(cf. Mark 14:12; Luke 22:7). Within authentic Paul, the Gospels, and Acts, the only 
remaining references to Christ’s death in explicitly sacrificial terms are restricted 
to Romans. Christ’s blood has atoning (Rom 3:25) and justifying (Rom 5:9) 
functions.66 
Within some of the later New Testament writings, characterizations of 
Christ’s death in sacrificial terms proliferate to an extreme, most famously but by 
no means exclusively in the Letter to the Hebrews. Christ is a θυσία (Heb 9:26) as 
well as the offerer of a θυσία (Heb 10:12); he offers (ἀναφέρει) himself (Heb 
7:27), and offers up (ἀναφέρει) our sins (Heb 9:28) in his own body («τὰς 
ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἀνήνεγκεν ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ», 1 Pet 2:24), removing our 
sins so that we may live in righteousness/justification («ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις 
ἀπαγόμενοι, τῇ δικαιοσύνη ζησόμεθα», 1 Pet 2:24). In contrast to the Levitical 
priests (Heb 5:1, 3; 9:7, 9), Christ makes a perfect offering (προσφορά, 
 
66 The meaning of the key word in Rom 3:25, ἱλαστήριον, conventionally rendered by 
“atonement” or some similar term, is unfortunately quite beyond ascertaining in Paul’s use; were 
it not, this passage might settle a whole host of disputes relating to the doctrine of redemption. 
What can safely be asserted is that  (a) Paul does not feel the need to explain his anomalous use of 
ἱλαστήριον, which translates the name of the cultic object כפרת in the LXX, and  (b) the object of 
the implied act of ἱλάσκεσθαι is sins, not God. See G. Kittel and G. Friedrich, eds., Theological 




προσφέρω) of his prayers (Heb 5:7) and of himself, that we ourselves might in 
turn render service (λατρεύειν) to the living God (Heb 9:14); he offers his own 
body (Heb 10:10, 14). His hieratic ministry achieves the expiation (ἱλάσκομαι) of 
the sins of the people (Heb 2:17), and he himself is the expiation (ἱλασμός) for 
the sins of the faithful (1 John 4:10) and of the whole world (1 John 2:2). As 
Christ’s blood serves an atoning and justifying function in Romans, so in the later 
writings does it serve the cultic or quasi-cultic functions of redeeming (Eph 1:7; 1 
Pet 1:18–20), making peace (Col 1:20), sanctifying (Heb 13:12), washing from sins 
(Rev 1:5), and mediating the purchase through which God acquires his people 
(Rev 5:9). 
A sacrificial interpretation of Christ’s death is made unavoidable by these 
texts for anyone who takes a holistic view of the Bible; but one has a right to 
demand a stronger demonstration of its existence in the early books. Does not the 
virtual absence of sacrificial characterizations of Jesus’ death in authentic Paul, 
the Synoptics, and Acts effectively undermine any claim that his death is, at the 
heart of it, sacrificial? Is there not a question of whether the handful of sacrificial 
references in the early texts have been interpreted by tradition too literally? Can 
his death be considered sacrificial only in virtue of a rather distant metaphorical 
link, whose importance is historically relative and can be buttressed only by 
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excessive theologizing?67 The notion of redemption, which we have already 
discovered in the cultic contexts of Eph 1:7 and 1 Pet 1:18–20, provides the 
decisive lead that can extricate us from this quandary. 
Redemption in the Hebrew Scriptures (68(פדה ,גאל derives its principal 
sense from a class of economic functions. These are acts of “buying back” land 
(Lev 25:23–28), houses (Lev 25:29–34), or Israelite bondservants, who may be 
“bought back” by their relatives (Lev 25:47–55). Since the act of redemption 
involves in each case the restoration of possessions or persons to their rightful 
state of belonging, these economic transactions make a suitable metaphor for 
liberation and deliverance; Lev 25 repeatedly ties the redemption laws to the 
liberation of Israel from Egypt (25:23, 38, 42, 55). Alongside this economic 
practice, there existed also a cultic practice of redeeming sacrificial animals and 
 
67 I have particularly in mind the “thin” doctrine of Christ’s death found in early Girard: “If we 
can rid ourselves of the vestiges of the sacrificial mentality that soil and darken the recesses of 
our minds, we shall see that we now have all the elements at hand for understanding that the 
death of Jesus takes place for reasons that have nothing to do with sacrifice” (Girard, Things 
Hidden, 197). The sacrificial reading of the Passion represented, for early Girard, a 
characteristically medieval trajectory that has now been superseded. It is this position I am 
refuting. 
68 For examples demonstrating the synonymity of these terms, compare: Ruth 4:4, where the 
terms are used interchangeably; Exod 6:6 with Ps 25:22 and Ps 130:8; and Ps 49:15 with Ps 69:18 
and Ps 72:14 (all references to MT). It should be noted that in spite of the general equivalence of 
these words, the books of the Torah use פדה only for the redemption of animals and firstborn 
sons, and גאל only for the redemption-price of slaves and non-living possessions; see the 
illustrative examples in Lev 27:13, 15, 19, 20, 31 versus Lev 27:27. There does not, in any event, 
appear to be any difference in the functions these terms stand for in the Torah books, but only in 
the circumstances of their use. 
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children,69 which can be understood by analogy with the economic practice. In a 
passage directly following the institution of Passover, God commands the 
sanctification of all male firstborn of any living creature in Israel (Exod 13:1). The 
dedication of these creatures to God unfortunately requires their slaughter (זבח = 
θυσία) (Exod 13:15; cf. Num 18:17), and so a means of “redeeming” children and 
economically indispensable beasts of burden (asses) was instituted (Exod 13:13, 
15; cf. Exod 34:20; Num 18:15–17). The etiology given for God’s possession of the 
firstborn and the possibility of substituting an animal for a son’s life is the 
slaying of the firstborn of Egypt, from man unto beast (Exod 13:15), together with 
the success of the apotropaic blood of the paschal lamb. One was therefore able 
to exchange either a lamb (for an ass, Exod 13:13) or a sum of money (Num 18:16) 
for the victim’s life. The presumed logic of this whole situation, then, in light of 
its homonymous economic institution, appears to have been as follows: God 
buys (redeems) Israel out of Egypt by inflicting the price of the blood of the 
firstborn on Egypt; therefore, by reciprocity, the firstborn of Israel are owed to 
God;70 but they may nonetheless be bought back with a symbolic equivalent. 
(Dizzyingly, this practice amounts to an allowance for redemption from 
 
69 See Jon D. Levenson’s well-known study of the redemption of children in ancient Israelite 
society: The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son: The Transformation of Child Sacrifice in Judaism 
and Christianity (New Hartford, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 3–52. I diverge somewhat from 
Levenson in my methodology and my interpretation of the phenomena. 
70 The etiology is, of course, obviously fictive in light of passages such as the Akedah; see 
Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 43–45 and passim. 
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redemption!) The connection of redemption with sacrifice as two forms of 
transaction is clear in an instance such as this one. The debt of the firstborn and 
their subsequent redemption constitutes a sacrificial economy of exchange. 
Can a similar logic be appealed to in order to explain the sacrificial 
significance of redemption in the New Testament? 
Unlike the explicitly cultic language of sacrifice, the language of 
redemption (λύτρωσις and cognates) is common in both the early and late New 
Testament books; a term with substantial overlap of meaning with redemption, 
(ἐξ)αγοράζω, also occurs in a relevant context. Neither term’s New Testament 
usage in relation to the redemptive work of Christ always conveys evident 
sacrificial significations, but both terms are sometimes wedded directly to 
sacrificial imagery. A survey of the important textual loci will illustrate. Luke 
and Acts employ λυτρόω in such a way that any difference in its meaning from 
“deliverance” cannot be demonstrated (Luke 24:21; Acts 7:35). Paul, with at best 
weak shades of sacrificial meaning, speaks of Christ “buying” («ἐξηγόρασεν») 
the faithful out of the curse of the Law (Gal 3:13; cf. Gal 4:5), and reminds the 
Corinthians twice that they were “bought with a price” (1 Cor 6:20; 7:23); neither 
of these examples displays any self-evident connection with either sacrificial 
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institutions or Old Testament redemption laws.71 Different, however, is Paul’s 
use of ἀπολύτρωσις in the later Romans. In this letter, whose theology 
represents the most mature developments in Paul’s thinking, the free gift of 
justification results directly from ἀπολύτρωσις through the conjoined causes of 
Christ himself and God’s putting forth of Christ as an ἱλαστήριον: 
For all have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God, [but] are justified 
(δικαιούμενοι) freely by his grace through the redemption 
(ἀπολυτρώσεως) that is in Christ Jesus, whom God presented (προέθετο) 
as an ἱλαστήριον [means of effacing sins? see n. 66] through faith in his 
blood as a demonstration of his righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) … that he 
may be righteous (δίκαιος) and be the justifier (δικαιοῦντα) of one who is 
of the faith of Jesus. (Rom 3:24–26) 
 
The demonstration of God’s righteousness is presented here by Paul as 
something that takes place on account of Christ’s sacrificial death, and thus is 
explicitly joined to the justification of the faithful; that is to say, it is clear that the 
justifying function of Christ’s death as an act of redemption (readily interpretable 
as a development of the theology of “buying” in Gal 3:4) is now thoroughly 
interwoven with a sacrificial theology. For Paul, Christ’s death as a redemptive 
act is now equivalent to Christ’s death as a sacrifice. 
 Paul invokes the metaphor of redemption again in Romans 8. The 
subjection of flesh to spirit and the quickening of the body, achieved by the death 
 
71 It is noteworthy that Paul’s choice of the term ἐξαγοράζω has no precedent in the LXX. 
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of Christ and forming the basis of Paul’s ontological doctrine of sin (Rom 8:1–11), 
is the condition of the awaited “redemption of our body” (Rom 8:23) and 
deliverance of the whole material creation from suffering (Rom 8:18–23). In 1 
Corinthians, the same eschatological transformation is described in terms of an 
exchange: 
We all shall be changed (ἀλλαγησόμεθα) in an instant … and the dead 
shall rise incorrupt, and we shall be changed (1 Cor 15:51b–52). 
 
The verb ἀλάσσω that is used here does not mean change in the sense of a 
transformation (μεταβολή) or alternation (ἀλλοίωσις), but of an exchange 
(ἀλλαγή): the corruptible state of our bodies is to be (ex)changed for an 
incorruptible state.72 
 An oblique but unmistakable hint of a connection between redemption 
and sacrifice can be found in Matthew and Mark. These Gospels report in 
parallel the phrase «λύτρον αντὶ πολλῶν» in the mouth of Jesus to express the 
purpose of his impending death (Matt 20:28 = Mark 10:45). The phrase evokes the 
“for many” (ὑπὲρ πολλῶν; Matt: περὶ πολλῶν) that characterizes the blood of 
the New Covenant in the narrative of the Mystical Supper (Matt 26:28; Mark 
14:24; Luke is missing all of the preceding phrases, a fact which reinforces the 
 
72 For an additional data point in support of this rendering of ἀλάσσω, compare its use in the 
different context of Rom 1:23; cf. Ps 105:20 (LXX). One may think of the German Wechsel, or the 
English “change” for returned cash. 
85 
 
link between them); the cultic significance of the blood of the Cup in relation to 
the Passover sacrifice is clear.73 Christ’s death, the slaughter of the new Pascha, is 
a redemptive work. 
 There is, then, an explicit presence of sacrifice in the early New Testament 
books’ characterizations of Jesus’ death, often connected with or embedded in 
some notion of redemption; additionally, the notion of redemption often retains 
its literal sense as an exchange. 
 What, on the other hand, do the later New Testament books have to say 
about redemption and sacrifice? We find that several of the later books—
initiating a two-millennium trajectory of theorizing on the subject—
acknowledge, fortify, and explicitly integrate these themes, reading Jesus’ death 
as a sacrifice and a redemption-payment all in one. According to Hebrews 9:12, 
Jesus the High Priest procures eternal redemption (αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν 
εὑράμενος) by his blood. Elsewhere, redemption (ἀπολύτρωσις) through his 
blood is the means of forgiveness of sins (Eph 1:7 = Col 1:14). Again, Christ is the 
sacrificial lamb whose blood is the instrument of our redemption from a vain 
way of life (1 Pet 1:18–19); the same passage directly contrasts redemption 
through his blood with redemption through money, reinforcing the literal 
 
73 See above, p. 78. 
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transactional meaning of redemption. The explicitness with which these passages 
combine these themes renders a detailed explanation of each case unnecessary. 
 To summarize, the New Testament bears witness to:  (a) the 
characterization of Jesus’ death as either redemption or sacrifice separately;  (b) 
the (usually later) unification of the concepts of redemption and sacrifice as 
inseparable characterizations of his death. Each of the two characterizations, 
then, is able to stand on its own, without direct reference to the other, while, at 
the same time, a theology of redemption ought to be able to integrate them in 
some manner; this integration, which is delivered to us by the New Testament 
books both early and late, nonetheless calls for interpretation, as testified by the 
fact that the relation between sacrifice and redemption perceptibly intensifies 
over the chronological course of the New Testament’s development. This 
trajectory is made yet more complicated by the fact that it continues well beyond 
the New Testament and into the history of Christian theology as a whole. 
Finding ourselves confronted with such complexity of material, we ought to 
remind ourselves to approach the topic of redemption with humility. We have, 
however, won the right to add a basic second hypothesis alongside that of the 
transcendence-structure: Christ’s sacrificial death is, as sacrifice, a redemptive 
exchange. And an important corollary to this statement: A sacrificial interpretation 




THE GENESIS OF STRUCTURE AND THE END OF THE AGE 
The transcendence-structure is coeval with creation; it is found always and only 
alongside that which is not God. This axiom offers the first clue as to the 
meaning of the “foundation of the world” for the concept of sacrifice. The 
transcendence-structure has an ancient relationship with something sacrificial. 
What is the nature of that relationship? One can tackle this question by re-
problematizing systematic atonement theology in the Girardian terms of 
transcendence and sacrifice. 
The twin hypotheses I have presented, namely, the structure of conversion 
as a re-orientation toward authentic transcendence, and the form of sacrificial 
redemption as an exchange, bear on each other in their very essence. Conversion 
is itself the (ex)changing of one thing for another: of a false transcendence for 
God’s transcendence, of a way of life determined by the former for one 
determined by the latter. Redemption is, conversely, a means toward effecting 
this (ex)change. The taxonomic system organizing most “textbook” systematic 
theologies overlooks this essential connection: redemption and conversion are 
usually presented as separate phases of the salutary process, the redemptive 
work being considered strictly objective and preceding conversion, while 
conversion is considered strictly subjective, and is made possible by the prior 
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redemptive act. One does not confuse redemption with the realities of one’s 
personal conversion, lest the boundary between faith and works become blurred. 
 The objectivity and subjectivity of redemption and conversion do hold, as 
does their distinction in logical priority; but while distinct, redemption and 
conversion are not separate, and the distinction between their respective 
objectivity and subjectivity, as well as in their priority, is not as strict as popular 
and textbook atonement theory would impress on us. In order to understand 
redemption—and therefore conversion as well—one must be able to appreciate 
the redemptive exchange as a sacrifice, an objective event, as most traditional 
(especially Protestant) theories of redemption take pains to emphasize. But to 
appreciate the redemptive work as a sacrifice, one must grasp its relation to the 
transcendence-structure and the believer’s turn toward it, for the sake of which 
redemption has taken place. The same traditional theories of redemption, 
particularly the “objective” theories, tend to give only a weak treatment of this 
connection. 
The connection between the transcendence-structure and sacrifice will be 
explained and investigated in this chapter. Girard’s early work Violence and the 
Sacred will provide the main lead into the problem. 
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Girard’s theory of sacrifice constitutes an integral part of MT. Its salient 
points, each of which will be expanded upon in this chapter as necessary, may be 
summarized briefly. The most important claim of Girard’s theory of sacrifice is 
that sacrifice provides the material conditions needed to generate ideational 
structure on the level of human language and cognition—the rudiments of 
symbolic thinking. Sacrifice is therefore both a creative and a destructive force. It 
is this aspect of Girard’s thinking on sacrifice that I wish to emphasize and 
extend. In its creative aspect, sacrifice produces structure by generating binaries 
that can be mapped onto the difference between better and worse (and hence 
include a power relation).74 The resulting system of structure, besides forming 
the basis of social distinctions as emphasized by Girard, underlies value, and 
allows for judgment to take place, i.e. the act of dividing between the better and 
the worse. The system of divisions may also act recursively, such that the 
sacrificial system and all it entails may exalt or condemn itself. This latter 
possibility, of a self-subversion of the sacrificial system, gradually realizes itself 
in the biblical writings. 
In order to fully appreciate Girard’s theory of sacrifice in all its originality, 
however, we must introduce a process that Girard believes underlies sacrifice 
 
74 A là Jacques Derrida. For a place where Girard discusses (unusually) his positive relationship 
to French deconstruction, see “The Logic of the Undecidable: An Interview with René Girard,” 
Paroles gelées 5, no. 1 (1987): 1–24. 
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(and which is central to his view of Christianity). Girard’s Mimetic Theory posits 
a hypothetical process called “scapegoating” or, more technically, the “surrogate 
victim mechanism,” that underlies sacrifice and precedes its institutionalized 
ritual form. A single victim is singled out by the community, blamed for all the 
community’s woes, and probably killed. Only on the basis of scapegoating does 
sacrifice function for Girard as the generative event at the origin of symbolic 
thinking. 
One final element of the Girardian theory of sacrifice needs to be 
mentioned. For Girard, the surrogate victim mechanism and sacrifice lie at the 
heart of the experience of religious transcendence. In the view of the Girardian 
biblical scholar Robert G. Hamerton-Kelly, whose conclusions I will discuss 
below, this sacrificial transcendence is expressed primordially as a transcendence 
of place (spatial transcendence) and is an outgrowth of sacrifice’s structural 
generativity. 
Over the course of time, growing consciousness of the generative process 
can lead to its subversion or dismissal. The most complete instance of such a 
subversion takes place, according to Girard, in the biblical revelation, 
culminating in the total denuding of the surrogate victim mechanism in the 
pages of the four Gospels. I will systematize, bolster, and somewhat revise 
Girard’s view on this point. 
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Once, however, the aforenamed process of self-subversion through the 
ongoing, binary-generating creativity of sacrifice is set in motion, a shift of the 
form of transcendence functional in the system begins to take place. Here 
Hamerton-Kelly’s interpretation of Mark’s eschatology makes a decisive 
contribution to Girard’s analysis of the Gospel phenomenon. The victim, for 
Hamerton-Kelly as for Girard, functions in the sacrificial system as a 
“transcendental signifier,” an originally derisive term employed by Derridean 
deconstructionists to designate what functions for traditional philosophies and 
theologies as a signifier of that presumed ultimate signified which all other 
signifiers imply (God, being, consciousness, etc.).75 The sacrificial system, with its 
victim serving as a transcendental signifier, makes the place (and secondarily the 
time also) of the victim’s sacrifice the center of the structural system, the 
controlling point of its web of significations and system of references. Once the 
system has subverted itself, however, it is set in an unstable and therefore free 
motion. This free motion is authentic time. The control over the system no longer 
comes from a point, and ceases really to be any control at all; the “control” comes 
from an undetermined future. Only God’s promise assures this future, not any 
deterministic historical process. 
 




The elements of MT that the argument of the present chapter 
fundamentally relies on thus fall into four parts: the scapegoating- or surrogate 
victim mechanism and the institution of sacrifice (§ 10); the generation of 
structure through these, as well as of the transcendence of place (§ 11); the 
possible means by which the generative process can be subverted (§ 12); and the 
transformation of spatial into temporal transcendence resulting from the 
sacrificial system’s subversion (§ 13). 
§ 10. Girard’s Surrogate Victim Mechanism 
Sacrifice is a substitute for murder, and murder is a substitute for sacrifice.76 This, 
Girard’s thesis in its most basic expression, already gives us a glimpse of the 
transactional structure of redemption. By a symbolic substitution, one thing is 
put in place of another. These items are fully fungible, like money and goods. 
Girard’s proposition of the interchangeability of murder and sacrifice has 
from the start a Christian direction in his work. As in the New Testament, 
sacrifice is for Girard the “foundation of the world”—of the symbolic, linguistic, 
and cultural phenomena that make up the world as we humans can know it. This 
claim of Girard’s is the basis of a social-scientifically inflected religious 
philosophy, not, as has sometimes been alleged, a wrongheaded subordination of 
 
76 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 1. 
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theology to social science.77 The evidence for this is that Girard approached 
Christianity again and again over his career from the viewpoints of different 
methodologies, be they those of the social sciences as in Violence and the Sacred, 
the human sciences as in Deceit, Desire and the Novel, or theology as in I See Satan 
Fall Like Lightning. Girard did not, conversely, employ explicitly theological 
assumptions in his methodological approaches to non-religious subjects. It is 
Christianity, and more broadly religion in general, which interests Girard. There 
is therefore no a priori reason to doubt that Girard’s view and the New 
Testament are sufficiently homologous in their basic interests and outlook to 
justify experimenting with MT as a hermeneutical tool to leverage meaning from 
the Bible and the Christian theological tradition. 
Sacrifice’s most basic function, according to Girard’s theory, is to keep 
violence at bay within a community.78 The precondition for internecine violence 
as well as for the sacrificial response to it is what Girard terms “mimetic rivalry.” 
Members of a community enter into mutual conflict because they appropriate 
one another’s desires; if member A desires or appears to desire object X, then 
member B, his neighbor, will readily fall into the snare of desiring X as well. This 
 
77 As objected inaccurately by John Milbank in Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991), 392–98. Milbank’s objection is worth noting, since it has so 
often been paraphrased in dismissals of Girard. 
78 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 14. 
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kind of imitation is termed “mimesis” by Girard. Such a highly developed 
propensity to mimesis distinguishes humans from other primates, and is an 
attribute to be prized, since it enables culture and creativity. But once “mimetic 
desire” for some object spreads to enough members of the community, the 
potential of mimesis to lead to uncontrolled violence may begin to realize itself 
spontaneously (Girard calls this propensity toward violent mimesis 
“mimetism”).79 As members imitate each other’s desires more and more, they 
enter into competition for the same objects, and thus become “mimetic rivals.” A 
locus Girard likes to point to so as to underscore the gravity of runaway mimesis 
is the Tenth Commandment: “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods.”80 It is 
not the taking of another’s goods that is prohibited (this was already dealt with 
under the Seventh Commandment), but the desire for them. In concluding with a 
 
79 Brian Robinette interprets Girard’s notion of mimesis along Levinasian lines: “As my desires 
are formed by mirroring those of the Other, I find myself inextricably connected with this Other. 
Though we retain our unique identities … still our respective senses of “mineness” (ipseity) is [sic] 
connected at the most fundamental level with the “non-mineness” (alterity) of the Other. A 
person’s identity is an identity-in-relation, where “relation” is not something subsequent to 
identity, as if I come into relation with the Other only after self-constitution, but logically prior 
and ontologically constitutive of identity” (Brian Robinette, Grammars of Resurrection: A Christian 
Theology of Presence and Absence [New York: Crossroad, 2009], 260). The capacity of mimesis to 
induce imitation, however, as well as its proneness to conflict, support an interpretation of 
mimesis in parallel with Lacan-Žižek’s notion of drive: the face of the Other is not something that 
calls me into relational being, but is experienced by me as a mask that conceals the ever-
unattainable object a, the essence or being that Girard posits is perceived to exist within the 
Other. Whatever desires (or other metaphysical attributes) I perceive the Other to possess, these I 
seek to appropriate for myself. The ultimate object of mimesis, the Big Other, is the scapegoat, the 
common Other of all who, in his divinized form, is identical with the symbolic order. 
80 See e.g. Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2001), 7–12. 
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prohibition against desiring what belongs to another, the Mosaic Law attacks the 
root of evil in the Israelite community. 
The relationship of mimetic desire—let us be intentionally Patristic and 
call it envy—to the conversion-hypothesis is easy to deduce. Envy orients one 
toward the apparent transcendence of one’s neighbor, the proprietor of the 
desired object, who thus becomes one’s god.81 The Tenth Commandment, then, 
can be obeyed only by wholeheartedly obeying the First: it is impossible to 
renounce the appeal of another’s false transcendence (i.e. not to covet) without 
re-orienting one’s whole mind toward the authentic and infinite transcendence of 
God. To desire what God desires is in no way a transgression, but rather the 
condition for saintliness. 
Mimetic rivals are easily identifiable, since through their reciprocal 
mimicry they become doubles of one another.82 Once the whole community is 
 
81 Here Girard holds a transparent debt to Jean-Paul Sartre’s concept of mauvaise foi. 
82 It is from Girard’s concept of “doubles,” individuals whose mutual mimesis causes the 
distinction between them to erode, that the French psychiatrist Jean-Michel Oughourlian 
developed, in coordination with Girard, the concept of interdividuality that is part of the common 
jargon of mimetic theorists today (cf. Girard, Things Hidden, 287–92, where Girard and 
Oughourlian lay out these concepts in parallel without recourse to so many words). For 
Oughourlian, interdividuality is the notion that psychological actuality takes place in the space 
between “holons,” Oughourlian’s term that roughly corresponds to the individual (J. M. 
Oughourlian, The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis [Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1991], 15–17). While Girard claimed the term “interdividual 
psychology” as his own, he credited Oughourlian with the fundamental contribution to the 
concept (Girard, Evolution and Conversion, 30). Interdividuality then goes through a second 
iteration in the work of James Alison, who appropriates Oughourlian’s psychological concept to 
ground his theological anthropology: one’s very self, one’s identity, one’s “I,” is constituted at 
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caught up in contagious mimesis, each member seems more or less identical to 
every other. When the violence engendered by envy becomes itself the object of 
reciprocal imitation, the situation is primed to erupt into chaos. Each advance, 
each blow struck by a member of the community against his neighbor, must be 
answered. Everyone becomes an antagonist. 
Sacrifice is a braking mechanism for this uncontrolled animosity, which 
would obviously otherwise be unsurvivable for the community. Girard locates 
the origin of the bloody institution of sacrifice in a collective killing that 
spontaneously results from the community’s universal antagonism. (In the event 
that the collective killing fails to materialize, the community simply remains in 
breakdown.) Through the killing of a single community member, or, where 
obtainable, of a small minority group,83 the all-engulfing violence is quenched. 
 
every moment by the desires of one’s model (Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 15–18). Finally, the 
term “interdividual” is sometimes picked up by Girard himself. If one inattentively reads these 
developments back into Girard’s work indiscriminately, one misses the essential role structural 
anthropology plays in allowing Girard to articulate the steps of his thesis on scapegoating and 
culture as in Violence and the Sacred. In order to address the socially constitutive structural 
implications of Girard’s scapegoating hypothesis, I have hewn closely to Girard’s terminology as 
used in the latter work. 
83 The view that the collective victim may be a minority group rather than an individual is 
particular to Girard’s middle and later work. See the discussion of this question in the early 
“Discussion avec René Girard,” Esprit 429 (November 1973): 528–63. The single victim certainly 
retains an at least implicit priority in Girard’s system throughout his work, however. As Girard 
points out in a late interview, minority groups cannot be presumed to have existed within the 
earliest societies (“Mimesis, Sacrifice, and the Bible: A Conversation with Sandor Goodhart,” 
pages 39–69 in Sacrifice, Scripture, and Substitution: Readings in Ancient Judaism and Christianity, 
eds. Ann W. Astell and Sandor Goodhart [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2011], 62–64). 
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Institutional sacrifice gradually arises as a non-spontaneous means of 
perpetuating the pacifying effect of the original killing. 
The effectiveness of the procedure of killing a single victim, as well as the 
possibility of this procedure’s replacement by sacrifice, lies in the efficacy of a 
certain mechanism of substitution. Because mutual antagonists have lost their 
differences and have become doubles of one another, either individual in a given 
pair of antagonists can be substituted for the other. On a larger scale, any single 
member of a community pervaded by mimetism can be substituted for every 
other member of the community. All are interchangeable.84 The violence that 
results from reciprocal envy can thus be transferred, in a manner that is both 
pure appearance and yet very real, onto a single member; he or she now serves 
as a substitute for all the rivals, and for the envy and violence itself that attaches 
to them. The single antagonist, having been substituted for all the others, is either 
banished, or executed on the spot. This chosen individual is the community’s 
surrogate victim;85 Girard goes on after his early work to refer to him more 
famously as the “scapegoat.” 
There is, then, a pair of substitutions on which the edifice of sacrifice is 
founded. In the first place, the surrogate victim, a single member of the 
 
84 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 159. 
85 Ibid., 79. 
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community, is substituted for all members as well as for each individually. This 
is the procedure of the surrogate victim-/scapegoating mechanism. In the second 
place, a ceremonial sacrificial victim is substituted for the original surrogate 
victim.86 Girard conjectures that the sacrificial victim, while necessarily an 
outsider, or even an animal or plant, so as not to be capable of reinciting 
internecine violence within the sacrificing community, needs also to be able to 
function as a symbolic equivalent to the original surrogate victim in order to be 
able to take his place. The victim must therefore be similar to and different from 
the original scapegoat. If these two substitutions cannot be carried out with 
powerful enough symbolic efficacy, the whole process of sacrifice (and with it 
surrogate victimage) loses its reconciliatory power. Should the substitutions fail 
as such, the killing of the victim will amount to nothing but a transparently 
gratuitous killing, at best ineffective, and at worst sparking a new wave of 
violence (think of the botched offering of Iphigeneia). The logical demands of the 
sacrificial system must be taken seriously. 
Sacrifice sanctions these lawful, unanimous substitutions in order to 
prevent random substitutions from getting out of hand. Each member of the 
community, being a double of his neighbors, could be a viable substitute for any 
 
86 Ibid., 102. 
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and all other persons; there is no a priori reason why substitutions should not 
proceed indefinitely. Only a unanimous substitution can check the process. “The 
role of sacrifice,” explains Girard, “is to stem the rising tide of indiscriminate 
substitutions and redirect violence into ‘proper’ channels.”87 
This is not, of course, the way any practitioner of sacrifice would explain 
what he is doing. The institution of sacrifice has been subjected to a multitude of 
divergent interpretations by both its practitioners and its scientific observers, the 
ethnologists. All these interpretations may be significant, but only one 
interpretation, Girard insists, gets to the heart of this institution; the secondary 
interpretations that may arise in societies possessed of new and more efficient 
mechanisms to restrain violence, such as law and the judiciary, may land 
especially wide of the mark, seeing that these societies are no longer well served 
by archaic sacrifice. Sacrifice may decay in such societies even to the point that it 
is no longer an obvious feature of that society’s life, carrying on an ostensible 
existence only in the harmless and unbloody procedures of Church ceremony, or 
as a metaphor without necessarily any religious significance. But despite its 
capacity to acquire new secondary meanings or lose meaning altogether, 
sacrifice’s most basic and original function remains the same: sacrifice effects the 
 
87 Ibid., 10. 
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polarization of a community in a coordinated manner against a single, vicarious 
victim so as to control vengeance.88 We need not expect those societies that still 
rely on this archaic sacrificial mechanism to evince a lucid understanding of 
sacrifice: on the contrary, the act of substitution of the unanimous victim for the 
community, the transference of violence onto him, and the substitution of the 
sacrificial victim for the original surrogate victim can succeed only as long as 
they remain unacknowledged. Girard’s interpretation of sacrificial rites is thus 
akin to the interpretation of the repressed material in a dream, an extended form 
of psychoanalysis. 
With this theory of sacrifice, Girard breaks from the once-popular school 
of thought that considered the essence of primitive sacrifice to be the 
presentation of a gift to a deity, a notion which all-too-suspiciously evokes 
Christian theologies of the Eucharist. For Girard, such an interpretation is 
precisely the kind of misunderstanding that the mechanism of sacrifice requires 
in order for it to function. Amidst the plurality of views on the meaning of 
sacrifice that have been entertained by ethnologists, Girard prefers to follow 
Godfrey Lienhard’s and Victor Turner’s analyses,89 interpreting sacrifice as a 
 
88 Ibid., 18. 
89 Their fieldwork was performed among the Dinka and Ndembo respectively. See Victor Turner, 
The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1967); idem, The Drums of 
Affliction: A Study of Religious Processes Among the Ndembu of Zambia (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968); 
idem, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine, 1969). 
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“deliberate act of collective substitution” in which the victim absorbs “all the 
internal tensions, feuds, and rivalries pent up within the community.”90 
The validity of Girard’s theory of sacrifice, as far as my purpose is 
concerned, lies in its usefulness for interpreting not the opaque behaviors of 
archaic societies, but the Christian doctrine of redemption (which, to the 
occasional embarrassment of Christians, is no less opaque!). I grant readily that a 
Girardian interpretation of the redemptive work is far from unproblematic. How 
could it plausibly be asserted that the sacrificial death of Christ, realized 
perpetually in the Church through the performance of the holy Mysteries, brings 
a purely negative benefit, namely, that it restrains violence, a function in which 
we should in any event expect it to have been pre-empted by the institution of 
biblical law? This obvious objection against Girard and the Christian use of his 
Mimetic Theory can be addressed by directing due attention to the creative 
potential of sacrifice. If anything in my approach differs from the previously 
ventured Christian appropriations of MT, it is the stress I wish to lay on 
sacrificial creativity, an insistence that is not as far out of proportion with the 
emphasis of Girard’s own writings as the literature on him might lead one to 
 
90 This is Girard’s summary of Turner, in Violence and the Sacred, 7. 
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think. Integral to the significance of sacrifice are its creative effects; this holds 
true in the case of Christ’s sacrifice a fortiori. 
§ 11. The Generation of Structure and the Transcendence of Place 
The sacrificial victim, who holds in his power (if unwillingly) the life and death 
of the community, is the center of religious attention and the generator of the 
sacred. This truth is one, but the ways of misrecognizing it are many. “There is 
only one generative event,” says Girard, “only one way to grasp its truth: by 
means of my hypothesis. On the other hand, there are innumerable ways of 
missing it.” There exists, consequently, a “multiplicity of religious systems,” each 
of which somehow provides the misdirection needed to cover up the reality 
behind the substitution of the sacred victim and the transference onto him.91 The 
excessiveness of Girard’s statement should not stop us from taking seriously the 
truth of his underlying hypothesis: religious misapprehension is precisely what 
allows the victim to become an all-powerful generator of things good and bad. It 
is to the strength of ritual—and of its accomplice, myth—that they can so well 
obscure their own significance, the truth that lies beneath them. Ritual and myth 
have as their original and most basic function the perpetuation of the beneficial 
effects of the surrogate victim mechanism.92 
 
91 Ibid., 316. 
92 Ibid., 92. 
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But ritual and myth signify more than just an archaic safety system. Here 
Girard’s thesis can lead to an underappreciation of ritual and myth as carriers 
and producers of culture. Ritual and myth are, for one thing, complex and 
evolving symbolic worlds; they fall among the manifestations of symbolic 
thought that are responsible for cultural creativity. Ritual and myth are made 
possible by the surrogate victim; and it is from the surrogate victim that they and 
all other symbolic worlds can arise.93 Social structures and even language itself 
are not excluded from the scope of the victim’s generativity.94 
One might think of the function of the victim, then, by comparison with 
the rite of the sacrificial king made famous by Freud’s Totem and Taboo. The king 
has in him supernatural powers for good and evil, i.e. he is held responsible for 
the order and discord of the community, and is thus subjected to the alternating 
lots of high honor and death.95 The same ambivalence inheres in the surrogate 
victim. He or she is deemed responsible for the violent reciprocity that wracks 
 
93 On this point I find it necessary to hedge Girard’s claim, though his position as restated here is 
perfectly suitable for my thesis. The surrogate victim mechanism does indeed provide a possible 
origin for all symbolic thinking. This possibility does not, of course, force one to concede any 
chance of according symbolic thinking a second or even third origin. The adjudication of the 
various possibilities must wait until MT finds broad enough acceptance that it can be synthesized 
with other existing anthropological and philosophical views. The possibility of multiple origins 
of symbolic thinking need not, in any event, impede my effort to make a retrieval of certain 
elements from within Christian theology through MT; Girard’s hypothesis is robust enough to be 
relied upon, provided one uses it with control and precision. 
94 Ibid., 235. 
95 Ibid., 104–11. 
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the community; the victim is thus the embodiment of discord and destruction. 
But through the victim’s death, peace, order, and all forms of cultural creativity 
are obtained. These opposite results of the victim’s slaughter become the victim’s 
opposite faces through what Girard calls the “double transference.” Both the 
beneficent peace and the turbid disorder that mark the two phases of the 
sacrificial crisis are “absorbed” by the victim in the double transference.96 
Should the strength of the victim’s beneficial effects wane over time (as it 
inevitably must), the threat of a new outbreak of violence can be assuaged 
through the performance of sacrificial rites or, should these fail, through a 
complete repetition of the surrogate victim mechanism by the selection of a fresh 
scapegoat. In this case, the death of the new surrogate victim initiates a grand 
renewal, strengthening structure and causing culture to flourish again. 
The victim occupies a place of transcendent power, lying as he does at the 
center of this cycle of decay and renewal, of destructuring and restructuring. “If 
the surrogate victim can interrupt the destructuring process,” Girard infers, then 
the victim “must be at the origin of structure.” The “origin” Girard speaks of 
here, the center of the circle of meaning, should first be understood crudely 
literally, as the actual place of the body of the victim in the midst of his 
 
96 See James G. Williams’ definition of this term, as well as others used in this chapter, in his 
glossary in James G. Williams, ed., The Girard Reader (New York: Crossroad Herder, 1996), 293. 
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executioners; only afterwards should it be taken in a metaphorical sense. Among 
the members of the community, “everything beneficial and nutritive is said to 
take root in the body of the primordial victim.” The victim, in his position as the 
executed or exiled scapegoat, functions as a transcendental signifier; all structure, 
or at least nearly all, refers back to him. His transcendence is primordially one of 
place: it is the dead body, an object that is conspicuously positioned within 
space, that is the origin of the whole system of significations. Truly the violence 
against the surrogate victim can be called “radically generative”!97 
At this juncture, it would not be prudent to elide the steps of Girard’s 
reasoning. We find ourselves faced with a crucial question that demands a 
precise and plausible answer: How is it that the structures emergent from the 
surrogate victim come to be? What is the possible mechanism of their generation, 
if such a thing can be described? 
Girard initially explains the generation of structure by following the 
structuralist route (a preference reflected in his vocabulary), positing the priority 
of arbitrary differences within the system as a whole. Girard defies the structural 
anthropology of such formative figures for him as Lévi-Strauss, however, on two 
levels. First, Girard refers elemental differences to real phenomena. Second, he 
 
97 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 93–94; idem, Things Hidden, 93–98; Robert G. Hamerton-Kelly, The 
Gospel and the Sacred: Poetics of Violence in Mark (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), passim. 
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introduces undifference as a feature of the generative mechanism.98 The latter 
departure calls for detailed elaboration. 
Girard proposes two phases in which difference and undifference emerge. 
The first phase is the transformation of the community members into doubles as 
their reciprocal desire and antagonism become acute. The community members 
become “twins,” “matching images of violence.”99 The twins are all but 
indistinguishable; in this chaotic environment, all becomes a soup of 
undifference. The only way to reestablish differences out of this scenario is for 
one of the doubles to triumph over the other. Such a triumph would then mark 
the difference between victor and vanquished. 
But this difference-making triumph cannot possibly take place on a large 
scale, lest the community end up destroying itself. No more than a fraction of the 
members could be expected to survive this method of resolving internecine 
conflict. The will to triumph is therefore directed instead against the common 
perceived rival, everyone’s double: the surrogate victim, the scapegoat. What 
could have been the all-destroying disorder of every member against his 
neighbor is transformed into the polarization of all against a single victim.100 This 
 
98 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 242. 
99 Ibid., 79. 
100 Ibid., 67. 
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is the second phase of the manifestation of difference and undifference, and in 
actuality it coincides with the first. The scapegoat, as the universal double, 
becomes the symbol and bearer of all the violent reciprocity, that is, the 
undifference, that afflicts the community. In assuming this burden, the scapegoat 
becomes the ultimate transgressor of differences, the one responsible for 
breaking the order that formerly kept the community at peace. He is the ultimate 
sinner.101 Yet in being vanquished, the now dead or expelled scapegoat becomes 
the ground on which difference can be reestablished in the community. He is 
dead; the others are alive. He is cast out; the others remain inside. He, as the 
presumed transgressor, becomes the next lawgiver. The community’s scapegoat 
becomes the symbolization of difference and order as well as of undifference and 
chaos. The scapegoat, like the sacrificial victims who will come to replace him in 
religious ceremony, is thoroughly ambivalent, the object of abuse and cause of 
ills, yet the bringer of peace and fruitfulness through his death. 
All difference, every “significant element,” seems for Girard “to have its 
outline in the sacred”; the victim would “seem to constitute a universal 
signifier.” Put differently, the contrasts arising from the victim lie at the origin of 
all elemental binaries—inside/outside, before/after, life/death, peace/violence, 
 
101 Ibid., 77. 
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good/evil, and to these we may add the binary of place that arises from the 
position of the victim: here/there—making the victim the first generator of 
meanings.102 (The victim, it follows, is responsible even for the binary of 
meaning/meaninglessness that makes possible Girard’s own reflection.) This 
odd, maybe perverse, way of thinking about meaning resonates with the 
deconstructive enterprise with a subtle irony. The victim is, indeed, a 
transcendental signifier of sorts; but, as Girard is aware, this is an entirely false 
“transcendental signifier,”103 one which carries ambivalent connotations, and 
quite deserves to be exposed and cast from the center. This signifier is not true 
God, but an idol, lacking in genuine simplicity and, since there are many victims 
who can never all be quite the same, subtly multiple. Nor need we heed Girard’s 
superfluous hint that there may be a “true” transcendental signifier elsewhere; 
we need follow Girard only in positing the surrogate victim as a transcendental 
signifier “for us.”104 
Having absorbed within himself the overwhelming and unconstrainable 
force of contagious violence, the victim, the physical embodiment of evil and of 
its resolution, becomes equal to a god, holding the power of weal and woe. Of 
the natural forces that constitute the most primitive form of the sacred, the 
 
102 Girard, Things Hidden, 96. 




violence that has been transferred onto the scapegoat is the most awesome, if not 
also the most threatening. His sacrality, which is the same thing as violent 
rivalry, is exteriorized by the community, cast “out there” through its removal 
onto him. The violent sacrality attributed to the scapegoat becomes just as 
exteriorized, just as divinized, as the forces of plague, flood, earthquake, and 
death.105 The safety and sustenance of the whole community depend on this 
exteriorization, which is yet another manifestation of the binary of place. 
“Because of the victim, in so far as it [sc. the victim] seems to emerge from the 
community and the community seems to emerge from it, for the first time there 
can be something like an inside and an outside, a before and after, a community 
and the sacred.”106 
What differences are projected onto the scapegoat by the community is 
immaterial. All differences are homologous on the most basic level, since all are 
founded upon the arbitrary distinction between doubles that the scapegoat takes 
upon himself. There is no difference between differences, not even between 
natural and conventional ones. Nor ought we to expect to find any material 
cause differentiating differences in a strong sense; all these projected differences 
lend themselves to the same function, namely, to uphold society through the 
 
105 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 31. 
106 Girard, Things Hidden, 96. 
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creation of barriers that, one the one hand, minimize the possibility for internal 
rivalry (through the imposition of e.g. class hierarchy) and, on the other, make 
possible the symbolic equivalence that is necessary for the sacrificial substitution. 
Any difference—again, whether ascribed to nature or culture—may be able to 
serve these ends, because any difference can be superimposed on the difference 
between the community and its collective double, the victim. 
The erosion of differences, as happens in the event of runaway mimesis, 
invariably leads to the implosion of the sacrificial system and the decohesion of 
society as a whole—an event Girard terms a “sacrificial crisis.”107 The sacrificial 
crisis can be resolved only by the reinstatement of old differences, or the 
founding of new ones, through the repetition of the surrogate victim mechanism 
and the initiation of a new sacrificial cycle. All of society’s welfare thus depends 
on the differences that flow from the victim. 
Out of the arbitrary differences between doubles that are embodied by the 
victim, symbolic thinking emerges by a certain reflexive action. These primordial 
differences are, paradoxically, the difference between difference and 
undifference. Undifference is strictly unsignifiable, yet undifference itself 
becomes a new—the new—difference as the surrogate victim mechanism plays 
 
107 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 39, 49, 56. 
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out. As the situation is resolved and order is restored, this difference of 
undifference provides the structure for its own transformation and elaboration 
into language (myth), much as a bone gives way to the mineral matter that 
assumes its form to create a fossil. The difference between difference and 
undifference becomes the basis of the new symbolic order.108 The fixed meanings 
that myth invents for this difference that is undifference are nothing more than 
arbitrary substitutions that can serve to distinguish doubles; true to the 
disordered and threatening quality of undifference, these meanings tend to 
exhibit a monstrous character: “plague,” “patricide,” “incest,” are the crimes of 
the scapegoat; while each of these is distinct in language, all are as one in the 
violent chaos. “Cultural significations,” Girard explains, “naturally include an 
arbitrary element, for they establish differences where formerly the symmetry of 
the doubles prevailed and substitute the stability of fixed meanings for the 
vertiginous alternation of violent reciprocity.”109 The surrogate victim mechanism 
is thus able to be the first object of language, and, in proportion to the scope of 
the mechanism’s generative power with respect to all symbolic thinking, sets the 
boundaries on the possibilities of language. All differences flow from the 
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“infinite quality of the sacred” that attaches to the victim, the “inexhaustible 
reservoir” from which differences emerge and to which they return.110 
The ambivalence of the scapegoat, this god, gives rise to the basic logical 
modes of language: the conjunction of better/worse, of superior/inferior; and, 
following these, the basic symbolic functions of discrimination, conjunction, and 
exclusion.111 These are the elements of logos; they emerge from the statement of 
the scapegoat’s divine epiphany and its attending commemorative rites and 
recollective myths.112 
It is no coincidence that the logical operators Girard names, those of 
discrimination, conjunction, and exclusion, are spatial metaphors. By means of 
them terms are divided from one another (discrimination), or set next to each 
other (conjunction), or one term is banished to the “outside” while another term 
remains “inside” (exclusion). Of equal significance is the fact that the binaries 
that emerge from the surrogate victim mechanism can be related to the spatial 
metaphor of superior/inferior, since one element as a rule occupies a higher, 
central, privileged, normative, or more valued position relative to the other: 
good/bad, true/false, inside/outside, health/sickness, etc. Even the basic temporal 
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binaries of before/after (literally signifying in front/behind) and now/then 
(derivative of here/there) conform to the structure of spatial metaphor. The 
transcendence of the victim, the god, is originally always a transcendence of 
place, whether the god’s abode be heaven, the wilderness, or the archaic past. 
The binary and spatial character of symbolic thinking is often 
accompanied by inherent assignments of value. One term of a given binary will, 
as a general tendency, be better than (superior to) the other, reflecting the 
asymmetry of value attaching to the opposite states of order and chaos and to the 
triumph of one double over another. The surrogate victim mechanism thus gives 
rise to value and to the possibility of value judgments; values are in turn 
thoroughly reinforced and rigidly upheld by the sacrificial system, which, in 
Girard’s view, must use them to divide between suitable and unsuitable victims 
as well as to maintain the social distinctions and hierarchies that buffer 
individuals, protecting them from mimetic rivalry.113 These value assignments 
are by no means necessarily untrue, but are nonetheless ineluctably products of 
the system they presuppose.114 This is the case even for a society that has 
transcended archaic sacrifice in favor of a judiciary. Justice, the institutional 
distinction between right and wrong, requires value judgments; Girard remarks 
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that the essence of justice consists not in the balancing of scales as we popularly 
imagine it, but in the imbalance of good and evil. The erosion of imbalances, i.e. of 
the basic differences between good and evil, right and wrong, higher and lower, 
is the cause of the disintegration of social organization and of the decay of the 
sacrificial (or judicial) system, and is thus the forerunner of a sacrificial crisis.115 
The imbalance of value must be maintained at all costs. 
The surrogate victim mechanism, then, together with the sacrificial 
practices that perpetuate its effects, functions for Girard as a highly creative 
generator of meaning as well as an all-encompassing source that determines the 
totality of symbolic thinking. In other words, there can be no facile escape from 
the sacrificial system. Any undoing of this system’s nefarious aspects must work 
from within the system itself, using its own internal logic. 
§ 12. The Possibilities for the Subversion of the Generative Process 
The scapegoating process requires the abuse of some marginal individual or 
group. The procedure is therefore not only a good, but an injustice as well, an 
evil. 
The ability to communicate the recognition that scapegoating is unjust 
requires, however, the selfsame symbolic distinctions that arise out of 
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scapegoating itself. The desire to eliminate the unjust and nefarious factors in the 
scapegoating process thus presents a dilemma: to preserve peace without victims 
is to have one’s cake and still eat it.116 
The dissolution of the scapegoating process is desirable for a second 
reason, however. Not only does the victim mechanism require that an evil be 
done, but it is also unable to keep chaos permanently at bay; sacrifice and the 
cultural institutions that are founded upon it feed upon periodic decay and the 
repetition of the scapegoating process, perpetuating good and evil together in a 
cycle of eternal recurrence. There is good reason to desire an escape from the 
sacrificial cycle: it is a nihilistic process. 
There are two evident possibilities for how such an escape might be 
possible. Each possibility is the object of attention in a different phase of Girard’s 
work. In his early work, Girard vouches for empathy for the victim as the 
decisive factor that neutralizes the efficacy, meaning, and possibility of the 
scapegoating mechanism and the sacrificial cycle. This is the position that has 
been followed most broadly in theological interpretations of MT to date.117 The 
 
116 Slavoj Žižek aptly employs this phrase in a similar vein in Sophie Fiennes (dir.), The Pervert’s 
Guide to Ideology (2012; Zeitgeist Films). Žižek considers the desire to possess conflicting goods to 
be the “goal … of every ideology,” a critique which applies well to the promises made by one-
dimensionally non-sacrificial readings of the atonement. 
117 This position is characteristic of the work of Raymund Schwager, and is most forcefully 
represented by S. Mark Heim. 
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second possibility, espoused by Girard in his late work but never fully 
developed, renounces any attempt to see the sacrificial system plainly and 
simply “for what it is,” but supposes rather that the sacrificial system might 
somehow be susceptible to being undermined through the means of sacrificial 
logic itself. 
If the Christian Gospel really is a means of escape from the sacrificial 
system, as Girard asserts that it is, then it stands to reason that it accomplishes its 
work through the realization of some combination of these two possibilities. 
Judging by surface appearances, both would seem to occupy a central place in 
the Christian system. As I have already hinted, however, it is the second 
possibility which deserves more of our attention than it has heretofore received. 
The possibility of a simple “unveiling” of the victim’s true innocence, 
which we will consider first, seemed evident to Girard on the basis of a broad 
shift he observed taking place in general attitudes toward victims from the 
beginning of the Axial Age to modern times. Our modern civilization possesses 
an ever-increasing ability to perceive the reality of scapegoating, a trend for 
which he holds Judaism and Christianity responsible in the West; the reality of 
this trend is vouched for by the collapse of mythologies and their replacement by 
semi-transparent “texts of persecution,” whose transparency tends to increase as 
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their date of composition approaches the present.118 These texts, which include, 
for example, early modern narratives of witch trials and medieval accounts of 
persecutions of Jews, do not fully obscure the fact that the persecuted victims, the 
scapegoats in these episodes, are not really responsible in any way for the crisis 
that precipitated the violence against them, and in this way they are 
differentiated from myths.119 
The sacrificial system and its mythologies, in contrast to texts of 
persecution, depends on the complete absence of this transparency. Sacrificial 
substitution cannot succeed unless the displacement of the identity of the 
scapegoat (the original victim) onto the sacrificial victim is concealed. Yet, at the 
same time, in order for the identification of the two to transpire, the sacrificers 
must maintain an unacknowledged knowledge of the connection, be it only an 
unconscious recognition. The identity of the substitute is simultaneously a 
known and an unknown. Perhaps a hint at the duplicitousness of the sacrificial 
substitution is to be gathered from the biblical story of Jacob’s theft of his father’s 
blessing. The book of Genesis, Girard observes, deploys an explicit substitution 
(Jacob for Esau) only to half-conceal a second substitution, that of the 
slaughtered goat for Jacob; the second substitution must remain obscured—
 
118 Girard, Things Hidden, 119. 
119 For analysis of the phenomenon of texts of persecution, see René Girard, The Scapegoat 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
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recognizable, but not as such—in order for it to function as protection for 
Jacob.120 Given, then, that the community can and must implicitly recognize the 
sacrificial substitution, one might hold out hope that a revelation of the identity 
of the sacrificial victim could take place, an event which could well succeed in 
rousing the community to recognize that the original victim is, after all, only a 
victim, neither a criminal nor a deity. Were such an event to occur fortuitously 
outside the timeframe of an acute sacrificial crisis, it might result in the 
realization of the first possibility for escape. 
The erosion of differences that periodically reinitiates the sacrificial cycle 
is nothing other than the wearing away of the difference between surrogate 
victim and sacrificial victim, on which the sustenance of differences originally 
depends. This difference is again nothing other than that between the substitute 
and the reality. As the force of repetition leads gradually to the identification of 
the substitute with the reality, says Girard, the hierarchical distinction between 
suitable sacrificial victims (e.g. animals, slaves, prisoners) and unsuitable victims 
(e.g. valued persons) rarifies, and sacrifice loses its ability to conceal the victim as 
such. The substitute, in this case, has manifestly become the real victim. A 
sacrificial crisis may then erupt.121 Is it not eminently possible that a crisis thus 
 
120 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 5–6. 
121 Ibid., 39 f. 
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precipitated may eventually bring about the full and irreversible exposure of 
sacrifice’s own inner workings? Would the people not learn to value the victim 
as they value things of higher worth? These conjectures allow Girard to assert 
that the “cause of the dynamic animating us” in the process of 
demythologization is none other than religion itself. 
Nowhere, in the view of Girard, is archaic sacrificial religion more 
completely undermined via the exposure of the reality of the victim than in the 
case of the scapegoating of Jesus.122 For Girard, the Passion narratives of the 
Gospels bear the structure of a myth, but there is a radically subversive feature of 
their content: the scapegoat, Jesus, who plays the role of the sacrificial victim in 
this “myth,” cannot possibly be responsible for any of the evils of which he is 
accused. The Gospels realistically narrate the process by which a scapegoat is 
collectively killed, while bringing to the fore the salient features of the 
scapegoating process: the isolation of the victim (the disciples flee), the gathering 
of all against one, the reconciliation of rivals in the process of the event (Pilate 
and Herod become friends), the mimetic motive of Jesus’ opponents (his accusers 
envy him). All the while, Jesus’ passivity serves to ironically highlight how little 
of a threat he really deserves to be treated as. Jesus’ manifest innocence reveals the 
 
122 Girard, Things Hidden, 131. 
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arbitrariness of the scapegoat.123 In presenting his death as absolutely unjust, the 
Gospels hold the potential to undermine the efficacy of scapegoating, since these 
depend precisely on a false consciousness that presumes the guilt of the victim. 
Once scapegoating begins to fail as a mechanism for controlling violence, the 
sacrificial system and its institutions begin gradually to erode as well.124, 125 
 
123 One must insistently ask, however, from which perspective Jesus is revealed to be innocent.  
Jesus’ innocence is not neutral: in cleansing the Temple, he engages in liberative violence. 
124 Girard’s reading of the Gospels is developed throughout his corpus from Things Hidden 
onward (see ibid., 160–64). 
125 The gradual recession of animal sacrifice in predominantly Christian societies should not be 
confused with the often unstated theological assumption—to which Girard is seemingly prone—
that Christianity as such proclaims an end to animal sacrifice. Robert Daly, who has written an 
enormous historical study on the evolution of the Christian concept of sacrifice, observes that 
“the Christ event did away with sacrifice in the history-of-religions sense of the word” (Robert 
Daly, “Sacrifice Unveiled or Sacrifice Revisited: Trinitarian and Liturgical Perspectives,” 
Theological Studies 64, no. 1 (2003): 24–42, at 26–27). The reality of Christian understandings and 
practices of animal sacrifice is more complex than the impression both authors give. The practice 
of animal sacrifice is well attested in late antique and medieval Latin, Greek, Armenian, and 
Coptic Christianity. An eighth- or ninth-century Byzantine document, the Διήγησις περὶ τῆς 
οἰκοδομῆς τοῦ ναοῦ τῆς Μεγάλης Ἐκκλησίας, τῆς ἐπονομαζομένης Ἁγίας Σοφίας, details that 
at the consecration of Hagia Sophia, Justinian sacrificed 1000 bulls, 6000 sheep, 600 deer, 1000 
pigs, 10,000 birds, and 10,000 roosters, and distributed the meat to the poor. The account is not 
believable, but, as Ekaterina Kovalchuk convincingly argues, was at least palatable to the 
Byzantine imagination. See Ekaterina Kovalchuk, “The Encaenia of St Sophia: Animal Sacrifice in 
a Christian Context,” Scrinium 4 (2008): 161–203. While animal sacrifices were eventually 
suppressed in the West, they continued to be an integral part of Christian village practice in 
Anatolia and Greece up till modernization, and are still practiced in some villages. These 
sacrifices in honor of saints (kourbania) cannot be easily dismissed as vestiges of ancient Greek 
rituals. They are living Christian sacrificial rites, as Stella Georgoudi demonstrates, accompanied 
by their own distinctive myth: God (or the saint) used to send a deer (or a ram) to be sacrificed 
each year; but the villagers, driven by gluttony, killed the animal mercilessly before it could catch 
its breath. This excess of violence incurred God’s wrath upon the village, and now the villagers 
must slaughter an animal from their own flocks. See Stella Georgoudi, “Sanctified Slaughter in 
Modern Greece: The ‘Kourbánia’ of the Saints,” pages 183–203 in Marcel Detienne and Jean-
Pierre Vernant, The Cuisine of Sacrifice among the Greeks, trans. Paula Wissing (London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1989). This myth is obviously susceptible of a Girardian interpretation as a 
displacement of a mob killing, yet it is rife with Christian thematic elements: the thirsting soul 
represented by the stag, or the ram offered in place of Isaac, the sin of failing to show mercy, the 
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Within the biblical Scriptures, this process of undermining is by no means 
particular to the New Testament. The whole Bible strings together a long 
sequence of stories of conflict in which the victim, the weaker party, is 
exonerated, vindicated, declared a victim as such. This tendency is clearest in 
many if the Bible’s foundation-myths—perhaps, then, they should be called 
“antimyths”—from Cain and Abel onward.126 
The gradually increasing awareness of the scapegoating mechanism that is 
exhibited in the pattern of the oppression and exoneration of successive major 
figures in the Bible (Abel, Joseph, the suffering servant in Isaiah, Jesus, and, not 
least, the Israelite people collectively) is, in Girard’s reading, both the cause and 
the effect of a great sacrificial crisis that had (has) the potential to put an end to 
the cycle that produced it. To this crisis, Girard argues in the closing lines of 
Violence and the Sacred, does Western civilization today, the heirs of the biblical 
tradition, owe its spectacularly violent history, the dizzying breakdown of its 
traditional modes of interpretation, and its profound willingness to engage 
reflectively in the study of culture.127 Peace, meaning, and culture are, after all, 
 
concern to provide food for the poor from the animal’s meat. In the case of the kourbania, 
Christianity has directly colonized archaic sacrifice and myth.  
126 Ibid., 143. See also Girard’s study in Job, the Victim of his People (London: Athlone, 1987), in 
which he reads much of the Old Testament as a witness to the transition from myth to clarity. 
127 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 318. 
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the products of the sacrificial system; and what one is able to call “culture” can 
be only what one no longer sincerely believes in.128 
Let us turn, then, to the second possibility, a self-subversion of the 
sacrificial cycle by means of sacrificial logic. The key to this possibility is the 
sacrificial system’s capacity to symbolize itself and thus become able to exalt or 
condemn itself in binary opposition to some other term, which necessarily 
remains undetermined. This depends, paradoxically, on the symbolization of 
that which cannot be symbolized, not only with regard to the undetermined 
second term, but with regard to the scapegoating mechanism itself, whose 
inclusion of chaotic undifferentiation within its own essence should preclude its 
self-transcendence. This paradox should not flabbergast us: the symbolization of 
the undifferentiated was already part of the scapegoating process from the 
beginning. The mimetic crisis that initiates the sacrificial cycle produces the 
symbolization (in the person of the scapegoat) of its own undifferentiated 
condition, a state which is paradoxically the exemplar of desymbolization as 
already-existing symbolic differences break down. The symbolic differences in 
question would be the difference between the symbolic (society’s conventional 
order) and the concrete (the subterranean reality that is always threatening to 
 
128 Slavoj Žižek, citation unknown. 
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break in from below as radical undifferentiation, but which is restrained by 
sacrifice). Scapegoating permits the symbolization of this undifferentiated reality 
as “everything evil,” which may then be efficiently disposed of by transference 
onto the victim under the form of the sacred. 
An important qualification needs to be emphasized here. The symbolization 
of the sacrificial system can never take place purely in the abstract. The sacred, the 
whole experience of the sacrificial event in its totality, is symbolized in the 
person of the victim. Seen from this perspective, the subversion of sacrifice is the 
same thing as the inversion of its constituent binaries: the victim is vindicated 
and triumphs, while his persecutors are declared to have been in the wrong. 
At the same time, the loss of difference that characterizes the sacred may 
be symbolized more or less as such, with only indirect reference to the person of 
the scapegoat. Such is the case with the symbol of twin brothers, who represent 
all undifferentiated rivals. The significance of the fact that undifferentiation is 
thematically included in such symbols cannot be overlooked. It means that the 
symbolization of reality in the sacrificial crisis, i.e. the becoming-like of reality to 
symbols of undifferentiated rivalry such as enemy brothers, is simultaneously a 
desymbolization of reality, as the difference between the symbolic and the 
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concrete approaches nil.129 “Symbolized reality,” in Girard’s words, “becomes the 
loss of all symbolism.”130 Symbolism and desymbolism are thus rendered 
symmetrical. What is crucial to observe next about the double nature of this 
symbolization (i.e. its inherence in the scapegoat as well as in the more properly 
symbolic themes of twins, monsters, etc.) is that the scapegoat assumes the entire 
symmetry of undifferentiated rivals, of which he is only the losing party, into himself. As 
the symbol of both good and evil, peace and disorder, the scapegoat is the node 
through which all symbolization and desymbolization runs. The entirety of 
values at play in the sacrificial system passes through the victim and inheres in 
him; he is the hub of all circulation of value, the fulcrum of the whole sacrificial 
economy. The victim—whether the original surrogate or his sacrificial 
substitute—contains within himself total power over the system qua system. 
Here, the possibility of a symbolic self-subversion of the scapegoating 
mechanism and of all the binaries that it engenders lies within reach. 
We can observe such a subversion in a pair of biblical stories that we have 
already mentioned and on which Girard frequently comments, though he never 
pushes his interpretation of them all the way. Each of these stories, namely, 
 
129 Concrete instances of undifferentiation can be more than arbitrary “signs” of the sacrificial 
crisis, but even proper symbols of it, since they include (to borrow yet more psychoanalytic 
language) a representative element of the crisis in the fact of their quality of undifferentiation. 
Twin brothers are a strong example of such a case. See Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 63. 
130 Ibid., 65. 
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Cain’s murder of Abel and Jacob’s usurpation of Esau, displays an inversion of 
the sacred. 
Let us cast a glance at Cain and Abel first. Whereas the whole sacrificial 
economy contains within itself a division between the better and the worse, the 
whole sacrificial economy is in turn contained within the better (the god as good) 
and the worse (the god as evil). The capacity to exalt or condemn the sacrificial 
economy as such—which is the same as to say, the whole sacrificial system—
thus lies within the power of the sacrificial economy itself, or, in other terms, 
within the power of the divinized victim. Girard’s interpretation of the story of 
Cain and Abel illustrates the hypothetical inversion nicely. Abel, the offerer of 
animals, is the more effective sacrificer between the two brothers; Cain, the 
offerer of vegetables, has an inadequate sacrificial outlet, hence he murders his 
rival Abel. The story, Girard observes, places God on the side of the better 
sacrificer. “To say that God accedes to Abel’s sacrificial offerings but rejects the 
offerings of Cain is simply another way of saying—from the viewpoint of the 
divinity—that Cain is a murderer, whereas his brother is not.”131 This story is not 
far along in the historical demythification process; God still stands for the sacred, 
he is still the embodiment of the sacrificial system, and he has not yet been 
 
131 Ibid., 4. 
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recognized in his proper transcendence. Girard’s interpretation can be taken 
further, however. In judging between the brothers, the sacred divides in favor of 
the sacrificial economy (Abel); but in doing so, it ends up judging against 
precisely the kind of murder on which the sacrificial economy is based and 
which lies at its center! 
But it would not be right to permit oneself to feel fully convinced yet. 
Should a total self-subversion of the sort we have been talking about really be in 
play in the book of Genesis, we ought to see a certain telltale further result. 
Specifically, we should expect to see an inversion of the ontological power 
relation in the binary, that of killer and killed, exalted and humbled, better and 
worse. This inversion can be observed quite plainly in the episode of Jacob and 
Esau. The substitution of one brother for another translates to the taking of the 
better’s place by the worse, the usurping of the firstborn by the younger. Do not 
Cain and Abel also undergo a similar inversion, with Abel’s justification and 
Cain’s banishment? The sacrificial system, which depends on the survival of the 
stronger or more fortunate against the weaker or unfortunate, and which gives 
form to all our thinking through its production of this distinction as a logical 
principle, can be leveraged against its own original tendency so as to bring about 
the vindication of the lesser against the greater. The possibility of such an 
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inversion, and the probability of my proposed mechanism through which the 
inversion can be actualized, are sustained by these initial data. 
The proposed mechanism lacks one indispensable element, however. A 
motive for the inversion is missing from the explanation. It is not enough to 
demonstrate only that the inversion is a possibility. Why should the inversion 
bother to actually occur? 
A pair of plausible answers to this question present themselves. They are 
mutually compatible, and both may be provisionally accepted. 
The first appeals to the material realities underlying binaries as possible 
sources of instability that can disrupt the symmetry of the binary terms. Suppose 
that binaries arise from material symmetries, and that they continually imply 
symmetry between their terms; they also nonetheless contain an asymmetry, an 
irreducible qualitative difference between their terms. Good and evil may imply 
each other’s existence as ideas, but they are not equivalent, either ideally or 
materially. Nor is truth equivalent to falsehood, right equivalent to left, up to 
down, or before to after. Just as the symmetry of paired terms can be accounted 
for by the undifference of rivals, so their asymmetry refers back to the real 
material difference between the scapegoat and the survivors. MT thus does not 
posit some kind of idealism or pure structuralism, but an interpretation of the 
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genesis of structure from material conditions that are in turn interpretable only 
within said structure, constituting a variation on the hermeneutic circle. It is only 
within this circle that the workings of the sacred can be recognized and 
understood; MT does not posit some foundational principle from which one is 
bound to proceed in one’s reasoning. Much to the contrary, MT pronounces the 
“foundational principle” (the collective murder) to be altogether a falsity. Now, 
as with all cases where knowledge is attained through a circle of interpretation, 
the discovery of the innocence of the victim is by no means a necessary outcome; 
and as with all processes determined by circular chains of causation, no reason 
can be given why the sacrificial cycle should disrupt its own functioning, other 
than to appeal to instabilities inherent to the system. It is these instabilities, then, 
that we may fall back on for an explanation. To assert the existence of these 
instabilities a little differently, the recognition of the truth about the sacrificial 
system depends on a reality transcending the structures that interpret that 
reality; without a reality that feeds into the hermeneutic circle, there would 
certainly be no way out. 
The second explanation is the one invoked by Girard. The transcendent 
source of disruption for the sacrificial cycle may be God himself, the 
transcendent par excellence. The chief historical instance of such an act of 
interference on the part of the transcendent is to be located, according to Girard, 
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in the Gospels. Jesus’ innocence and supreme goodness are made manifest in his 
very act of being sacrificed.132 In this case, the two possibilities for the disruption 
of the sacrificial cycle, i.e. the revelation of the arbitrariness of the victim, and the 
symbolic self-subversion of the sacrificial system by means of its own economy, 
are both included in the same act. The inversion of what is presumed to be better 
and worse can take place only through the revelation of the truth of the victim, 
while the revelation of the truth of the victim can work its effect only through an 
inversion of the symbolic structures that the (disguised) victim generates. Both 
phases of this deconstructive process need to be taken into account at every turn 
in the explication of the founding murder and its relevance for interpreting the 
sacrifice of Christ. 
Christ, by becoming a victim of the scapegoating mechanism, reveals the 
mechanism for what it is, thus subverting it.133 But if this is so, then Christianity, 
and especially the redemption it proclaims, can operate only from within the 
sacrificial matrix of religion; Christianity will have an essential homology with 
myth, despite the fact that its professed interest in truth stands at odds with 
myth’s obscurant nature. No wonder, then, that Christianity has proven so 
susceptible to the criticism that it is merely another iteration of the mythological 
 
132 Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 103 ff. 
133 Girard, Things Hidden, 171. 
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type of religion it claims to supersede! This charge, which has been leveled from 
Celsus to Frazer, is one which Girard goes to great lengths to refute. Christianity 
ends up being denigrated for its mythic character, especially since this character 
is violent and unjust—as we know because of the Christian revelation itself. As Girard 
succinctly puts it: “Christian revelation is the paradoxical victim of the 
knowledge that it provides.”134 
It is precisely at this point that one must oppose the temptation—to which 
Girard himself often succumbs—to boil the Passion narratives down to a 
fetishistically indulgent display of the victim’s innocence. Recognition of Jesus’ 
innocence does not necessarily lead to a lucid awareness of scapegoating as a 
general phenomenon, and can even lead rather to an intensification of 
scapegoating (think of Christians blaming Jews for persecuting Christ). Nor is 
biblical revelation needed in order to attain consciousness of victimization. The 
Gospels therefore are not simply unveiling the truth about scapegoating. The key 
to counter this poor reading is to insist strongly on Girard’s thesis that culture is 
generated from sacrifice. It is Jesus’ death as a generative sacrifice that should be 
regarded as radically transformative. Christ takes the place of the sacrificial victim, 
and thus intervenes directly in the heart of the sacrificial order. It is with respect to the 
 
134 René Girard, Battling to the End, xv. 
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locus of sacrificial generativity, taken over by Christ, that the consciousness of 
his innocence as a victim is effective.135 Christ’s usurpation of the locus of 
generativity is, moreover, necessarily historical, grounded in his temporal 
assumption of sacrificial structures as a really divine being, permeating them 
with the power of his divine virtues, in light of which his manifest innocence is 
to be understood. It is in this way that one may distinguish between the perfect 
revelation of Christ and the shadows and types revealed in Scripture. If it were 
merely the appearance of Christ’s innocence that sufficed for revelation, then the 
innocence of Abel or Joseph would suffice for revelation as well.136 
The death of Christ, in short, overthrows, or rather takes over and 
transforms, the false transcendence of the divinized victim, replacing the idol 
with the true God. The transcendence of place, we shall see, gives way to 
another, more dynamic form of transcendence. 
 
 
135 The formulation given here is mine. Girard’s own varying interpretations of the death of 
Christ are sometimes susceptible of my formulation; at other points in his work, he is best read 
against himself. I have already referred to Scott Cowdell’s superb study The Nonviolent God, 
which rigorously treats Girard’s intellectual development on the question of the sacrificial 
interpretation of Christ’s death. 
136 Moreover, the reality of Christ’s innocent suffering would be inconsequential, but only the 
perception (whether true of false) of it. Such a situation would give rise to a peculiar docetic 
Christology: God would display the innocence of the victim through Christ, but it would be up to 
us to guess whether his suffering were real or a ruse; the success of the revelation would depend 
on the Church keeping it a secret that it might never have really happened. 
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§ 13. The Transcendence of Time 
The transcendence of place is the primitive form of transcendence that arises 
from the sacrificial system. This is the transcendence of heaven over earth, the 
temple over the surrounding land, paradise over the inhabited world, the 
mountaintop over the plain, the center over the periphery, the above over the 
below. Transcendence of this kind cannot survive the destabilization that results 
from the self-subversion of the sacrificial system. Once the process of self-
subversion is set in motion, the spatial transcendence that is functional in the 
system necessarily begins to undergo a radical transformation. It is transmuted 
into a temporal transcendence. 
The transformation of spatial transcendence into temporal transcendence 
opens up the possibility for one of the central features of the Christian 
understanding of transcendence, namely, the eschatological character of the 
transcendence-structure.137 A study on the temporal dimension of redemption 
and its derivation from the priority of place has been written from the viewpoint 
of MT by Hamerton-Kelly, whose conclusions on the themes of spatiality and 
temporality in the Gospel of Mark I will critically appropriate.138 My use of 
 
137 Refer to § 6. 
138 Hamerton-Kelly, The Gospel and the Sacred. 
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Hamerton-Kelly’s analysis of Mark will require, however, a more detailed return 
to Girard’s thesis that the surrogate victim functions as a transcendental signifier. 
The surrogate victim is the single original sign. The multiplication of signs 
takes place through their substitution for the original sign of the reconciliatory 
victim, starting with sacrificial victims who are substituted for the scapegoat. 
Girard explains: 
Since we understand that human beings wish to remain reconciled after 
the conclusion of the crisis, we can also understand their penchant for 
reproducing the sign, or in other words for reproducing the language of 
the sacred by substituting, in ritual, new victims for the original victim, in 
order to assure the maintenance of that miraculous peace. 
 
Though Girard balks at identifying the reconciliatory victim as the “true” 
transcendental signifier, he acknowledges the victim’s status as a functional 
transcendental signifier, as he goes on to say expressly.139 
The sign, then, Girard concludes, is the reconciliatory victim; the signifier 
is the victim’s body; and the signified is all meaning that is conferred on the 
victim’s body.140 The multiplication of signs occurs through the taking of the 
place of the body, initially by new victims. The fact of the body must again be 
emphasized. The victim becomes the em-bodi-ment of order and chaos, and 
 
139 Girard, Things Hidden, 97; see above, p. 108. 
140 Girard, ibid. 
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therefore capable of generating meaning, only once he is dead, a body. He is of 
no importance in the abstract, but only as a physical deposit at the center (or as 
expelled to the perimeter) of the community. He is sacred in his place. The later 
sacrificial substitutes, the derivative signs, “take place” in a quite literal sense: 
they take his place. 
The taking of place cannot be achieved within the old structuralist systems 
of the Lévi-Straussian variety, where difference was conceived purely in the 
abstract. The difference achieved by Girard’s surrogate victim is, by contrast, 
basically material, and radically conflates the universal with the particular. 
The victim’s difference is that he is marked out from the mass, the unique 
“opposite” who stands out from the crowd, from the soup of “nothing,” as a 
monistic creator of signification. Girard aptly likens this type of signification to 
that found in games of chance. One person (the victim) is singled out, 
distinguished, the first difference; all other participants are indeterminate, the 
same, a grand total of nothing as if they had never participated in the first place. 
Only once the winner is distinguished can the indeterminacy of the losers be 
symbolized, and this only by virtue of the difference of that which is 
distinguished from them. One thinks again of the even more precise example of 
the French Epiphany cake or the Greek Saint Basil’s bread; the bean or coin is the 
only difference in the whole bread, while the rest is an undifferentiated mass of 
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dough.141 (To extend the mnemonic utility of this comparison further, it is the 
placement of the bean or coin that matters, not merely its existence.) 
The awe that attaches to the victim, the stupor which he induces, 
constitutes a new type of attention for the early human being. It is an attention 
that lies beyond that for “the purely instinctual object, the alimentary or sexual 
object or the dominant individual.” This attention is held by the victim’s dead 
body. Prior even to being a sign, the victim must first be the exceptional center of 
attention. His corpse holds the power of the sacred, and is the foundation of the 
original sign, upon which subsequent signs shall be laid.142 
Hamerton-Kelly’s expansion of this thesis transfers Girard’s general 
scheme of the transcendental signifier to the particular situation of Mark’s 
Gospel. The overcoming of the priority of the center is, for Hamerton-Kelly, a 
principal achievement of the redemptive work. Jesus, the decisive victim who 
fatally subverts the system of significations, proceeds to the earthly center of 
sacrificial signification, the Jerusalem Temple, and enters it en route to his 
sacrificial death. “Thus, the victim is in the temple and is positioned to interact 
with the sacrificial system in all its manifestations.”143 In order to take control of 
 
141 Ibid., 95. The game of chance and the Epiphany cake are Girard’s examples. 
142 Ibid., 94. 
143 Hamerton-Kelly, The Gospel and the Sacred, 17. 
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the sacred, Jesus must occupy its center. Being in position to direct all of the 
sacrificial system’s channels into himself, Jesus is ready to alter the system. 
The sacred always has a center. Even when spoken of with reference to 
time, the sacred has some focal point, whether it lie in the past, present, or future 
of linear time, or be the axis around which circular time revolves. The sacred 
therefore is always conceivable in a radically spatial manner, such that even time 
possesses a “center” from which the victim works his effects. In the view of 
Hamerton-Kelly, whose thinking on this point is clearly indebted to the 
deconstructionist enterprise, the present marks the center of time in the order of 
the sacred: “In the order of sacred violence, the present is primary; the past and 
the future depend on it because they are the memory and expectation 
respectively of the person at the center.” Just as Jesus removes the geographic 
center of worship in dissolving the primacy of the Temple, he likewise removes 
himself as a presence after his death and resurrection, resulting in a radical de-
centering of the sacred: “The ‘hero’ of the Gospel is crucified and thus removed 
as a sacred presence.”144 
In contrast to the primacy of the present in sacred time, the future is 
primary in the Gospel, according to Hamerton-Kelly’s view. The primacy of the 
 
144 Ibid., 115. Hamerton-Kelly had, unsurprisingly, an acute anti-Fundamentalist bent. 
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future is such that the future becomes characteristic of a qualitatively different 
kind of time, rather than merely a refuge for a new center. Thus, to restate 
Hamerton-Kelly’s position succinctly, there are two qualitatively different kinds 
of time: a sacred time which privileges the center, and a new, authentically 
temporal time, one not reliant on spatiality, which is opened up by the Gospel 
and is determined by futurity. “In gospel, the future is primary, and the present 
is a disappearing moment through which anticipation passes on its way to 
memory.” In the narrative world of Mark, “the movement away from the sacred 
center is a movement from the present to the future, from the Sacred in the 
temple to the hope for the advent of the Son of Man.”145 
The transferal of primacy to the future and the radicalization of time make 
up the temporal aspect of the de-centering brought on by Jesus, the subversive 
victim. The spatiality and temporality of the Gospel are thus ec-centric in 
character. The place of the victim is the original place and original time, the 
center of all, from which all meaning presents itself and takes place; while the 
Son of Man, the suffering servant, in following the eccentric way, reveals the 
emptiness of the center. “To demythify the world,” concludes Hamerton-Kelly, 
“we must move with the scapegoat, away from the center to the new noncoercive 
 
145 Ibid.; “gospel” is Hamerton-Kelly’s term for the antithesis to the Sacred that is proffered in 
Christian revelation and exemplified in the poetics of Mark’s Gospel. 
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meaning of gospel, in whose realm the signifiers are not secured by sacred 
violence.”146 
Transcendence is thus subject to a certain bidimensionality: it is spatial 
and temporal. Hamerton-Kelly sees this in Mark, just as it can be seen in the 
development of the historical notions of divine transcendence. The two 
dimensions are not interchangeable: either space or time will take priority 
depending on conditions in the system that really differ in value. Yet time 
depends on space within the order of our modes of expression; space obviously 
cannot be “tossed out” as a sacrificial relic that we are capable of moving on 
from. Perhaps this is why—as Hamerton-Kelly notes—the apocalyptic genre can 
symbolize transcendence in either spatial or temporal terms in spite of the 
obvious tendency to prioritize temporality that is constitutive of this type of 
literature.147 
The inexorable persistence of space as an organizing principle 
notwithstanding, the reconfiguration of space results in a certain fundamental 
breakdown of order. With the displacement of the source of meaning from the 
center, the entire system of significations, conditioned as it is by a spatially 
arranged binary difference, is cast into disarray. The god at the center may be a 
 
146 Ibid. 
147 Hamerton-Kelly, The Gospel and the Sacred, 114. 
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phantasm, but he is a phantasm that controls all meanings; and when his most 
important form of control, namely, the ability to differentiate between lawful and 
unlawful violence,148 is lost, the way to the downfall of any and all distinctions is 
thrown wide open. The demolition of the idol at the center, brought to pass 
definitively by Christ, removes the transcendence that distinguished good from 
bad violence, introducing in its stead the undifferentiated violence that destroys 
transcendence. This Entgötterung thus opens the way to two possible futures, a 
pair of options which make up the “Girardian apocalypse”: either disorder 
grows unchecked to the extreme, or a new and unforeseeable order emerges 
from the disorder.149 The possibility of the second option is vouchsafed by the 
fact that the removal of the center does not amount to an absolute abolition of 
transcendence, but only to its radical reconfiguration in the mode of temporality. 
There is an authentic transcendence, a higher transcendence that is not a new 
costume worn by the scapegoat, but the revealer of the truth about the scapegoat. 
This transcendence, to paraphrase Hamerton-Kelly’s conclusion, works from the 
future, and the form of its engagement with humans is the transcendence-
structure. 
 
148 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 24. 
149 Apocalyptic is usually regarded as the fourth leg of Girard’s theology, alongside mimesis, 
sacrifice, and biblical interpretation. 
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The hope for this new order rests on no more than faith; no conditions 
guarantee the emergence of anything constructive from the fundamental 
disorder. To the contrary, in the notion of temporality on which this possibility 
rests there is no place for certainty, there being no guarantee of the things to 
come by virtue of the constitutive contingency of an authentic future. 
The sacrificial order follows circular time: from the restoration of order, to 
the sacrificial crisis, and back to order again. There is no real uncertainty in this 
cycle, except for the prospect of total destruction resulting from the eventual 
failure of sacrifice. Circular, sacrificial time is stable, bound to the endless pattern 
of generation and destruction, birth, death, and rebirth, a cosmic cycle of 
reincarnation, as it were. 
The subverted system, by contrast, breaks off on an unstable trajectory in 
free motion. Its time is linear, not circular. This free motion is the sufficient 
condition of radical change. Any appearance from within the sacrificial order of a 
linear progression of history, on the other hand, is the result of limitations on our 
scale of perception; we spontaneously perceive only our local timeframe, as if we 
had zoomed in on a small enough segment of the circle not to notice its curved 
geometry. By contrast, in the case of the linear time that results from the 
displacement of the center, the small scale reveals the truth as clearly as the large 
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scale. A permanent change has taken place; the before is irrecoverable, the after is 
truly uncertain. We are confronted by an open future.150 
The great paradox of this future, the mystery that gives it its special 
apocalyptic flavor, is that the faithful’s assurance of the triumph of the true God 
over his adversaries is delivered within the sheer indeterminacy of this outcome. 
In authentic time, I repeat, there can be no guarantee of a new order; all that is 
guaranteed in this suspension of determinacy is the defeat of the powers and 
principalities that rule the present age. But because there is no new center, 
neither is there any new point from which God exerts control over the system. 
God is not pulling history toward some conclusion that is already laid up in his 
reserves, but moving it by the sole power of his word; the future is not an eternal 
present. Indeed, there is nothing determinate in the progression of history ever 
since the revelation and vindication of the scapegoat. God, the authentic 
transcendent, can only exert a form of control over history that we cannot grasp 
from within our symbolic structures. The assurance of ultimate deliverance, that 
sheer destruction as a natural outcome will be averted, and that a remnant will 
be saved, rests on God’s promise alone. 
 
150 Compare the similar conclusions of Alison in The Joy of Being Wrong, 162–85. 
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The subversion of sacrifice, and the promise of a new peace constructed 
out of its elements, thus heralds the end of the present age, and sets before our 




THE REDEMPTIVE DIVISION AND EXCHANGE IN SALVATION HISTORY 
We have already considered the biblical warrant for the assumption—a highly 
privileged one in Christian theories of redemption—that the redemptive work is 
in some way a sacrificial exchange. The previous chapter’s thesis on the 
generation of the transcendence-structure through the scapegoating process and 
its transformation through the redemptive work can now be developed further 
through an engagement with biblical texts and traditions. 
We can define redemption as the self-subversive creative process through 
which God, in rejecting the sacrificial order, inaugurates the transformation of 
spatial transcendence into temporal transcendence. This transformation, as I will 
show, is accomplished by a process of division and inversion that is the 
operation of the divine economy. This process is itself both the product of 
sacrificial creativity and the subversive means of overcoming the sacrificial 
order, as already described. Conversion is the corresponding process through 
which believers in God engage in this transformative work; by removing the 
object of the transcendence-structure from the creature to the place-less 
transcendent God, the believer is emancipated from the sacrificial order. The 
believer is thus “called” to the promise of the future. 
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These redemptive movements and transformations take place according 
to what I will call the historical dialectic of sacrifice, which may be considered 
the key idea I wish to advance in this chapter: the categories generated by sacrifice 
are the formal cause through which sacrifice can be diminished, and, eventually, 
dispensed with. If we limit our scope to the context of the Bible and Christian 
theology, this thesis can be restated with more detail: in the historical process of 
emancipation from the sacrificial system, the need for sacrifice is circumvented by the 
very means of sacrificial exchange, and is suppressed by the unification of all saving 
power within a radically transcendent Deity, the apprehension of whom is nonetheless 
rooted in a sacrificial structure. 
The role of redemption and conversion in the subversive process will be 
introduced first (§ 14). The pattern of exchange in the divine economy will then 
be given a mechanistic explanation on the basis of MT (§ 15). Biblical material 
will be adduced to illustrate the dialectical presence of these systems and 
processes in the Bible’s underlying traditions (§ 16), source-history (§§ 17, 18), 
and pervasive narrative themes (§ 19). The data will yield a picture of 
redemption that incorporates sacrifice in a much more complex way than 
proponents of MT have usually recognized, thanks to its accommodation of the 




§ 14. The Divine Call at Work Within the Sacrificial System 
In the New Testament, God’s saving power is made effective by means of a 
calling, a phenomenon of auditory nature that summons one to a future and 
therefore partakes of authentic time.151 Is this calling identical with the divine 
saving activity that manifests itself in the accomplishment of redemption and 
conversion? In effect, yes: if redemption is the opening up of an authentic future, 
and conversion is one’s turning toward that future, then the calling is nothing 
more than a name for how one experiences the inbreaking of the redemptive 
work into one’s life and historical situation. 
With the answering of this question, an important relationship between 
the characterization of divine transcendence and Girard’s sacrificial theory of 
culture and signification emerges into daylight. God, in his transcendence, brings 
about in history the work of redemption; redemption is sacrificial in character, 
according to the biblical witness; and sacrifice is the event through which culture 
and signification are generated and sustained. Moreover, if there is anything to 
be said for Girard’s reading of the Gospels, then the events which Christianity 
identifies as the central elements of the redemptive work, namely the Passion, 
death, and resurrection of Christ, effect a subversion of the sacrificial system, 
 
151 Refer to § 6. 
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bringing about a transformation that yields a similar linearity of time and 
orientation toward the future to that implied in the biblical notion of the calling. 
God, in his surpassing transcendence, is the object by which and to which 
believers are called, and the object with reference to which the future is opened 
up, following upon the disruption of the sacrificial cycle. All of this provokes a 
further question: Does the Christian doctrine of redemption point to the same 
transformation as the subversion of sacrifice posited by MT? 
The vitalizing appositeness of Girard’s work for Christian soteriology will, 
I hope, be made clearer through my efforts to paint an affirmative answer to this 
last question in the course of this chapter. Is MT a radically new interpretation of 
the Christian kerygma? Or does it rather present a new opportunity to think 
through the belief that has long been borne in the Church’s bosom? And what 
useful thing can MT contribute to our consciousness, if it is only a new way to 
think the same things? 
These questions serve as waymarks on our path of inquiry. Let us return 
to the step at which the problem currently rests, namely, the question of the self-
subversive potentiality of the sacrificial system and its relationship to the 
emergence of an authentic future. 
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The consequences of asserting that the sacrificial system can subvert itself 
only by means of its own economy can hardly be overstated. Unless one duly 
acknowledges this inescapable material dependence on sacrificial logic, one 
cannot fully appreciate the Girardian apocalypse or the nature of redemption as 
an exchange. Girard’s nuanced concession that redemption is by no means an 
escape from sacrificial logic is developed explicitly only in the late phases of his 
work, and then only in an unsystematic manner. Consequently, this concession 
has not always been heeded in Girardian studies.152 Redemption can work, and 
continue to work, only from within the sacrificial system. Girard comes to terms 
with this truth most openly in a work which, though edited not by his own hand, 
leaves no room to mistake his emphatic view: 
You cannot view [history] from above or get an eagle-eye view of the 
events. I myself thought that was possible when I was writing Things 
Hidden since the Foundation of the World, in which I imagined Christianity 
provided the point of view from which we could judge violence. 
However, there is neither non-sacrificial space nor “true history.”153 
 
 
152 See discussion in Cowdell, The Nonviolent God, 60 f. Cowdell locates the beginning of this 
development in Girard’s thinking at When These Things Begin: Conversations with Michel Treguer 
(East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2014; French original: 1996), and finds it first 
explicit in Battling to the End (French original: 2007). Compare also Girard, Evolution and 
Conversion, 154–56. These developments in Girard will be discussed in detail in Ch. 6. In 
Girardian theology, some authors whose position approximates a subjective view of redemption, 
and who usually depend on Girard’s early materials, correspondingly underappreciate the 
permanence of sacrifice as a systematic determinant in the redemptive work. Some examples will 
be brought into the discussion in the next two chapters. 
153 Girard, Battling to the End, 35. 
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When it comes to the transformation of the sacrificial system, what are the 
coordinates of the sacrificial space in which the transformation is operating? 
What, specifically, is the higher and the lower, the center and the periphery? 
What is banished, what is victorious? The exposure of the founding violence 
constitutes the higher term; this is the truth, the Gospel. The effect of the truth is 
to expose the lie of the founding violence. The lower term is the repression of the 
truth, that which the Gospel exposes, makes manifest, and rejects; this repression 
is the effect of the founding violence, since sacrificial violence cannot assure the 
safety of the community without performing this repression. Truth and collective 
violence are thus engaged in a perpetual struggle—even a properly mimetic 
struggle—between contraries. To put this proposition into explicitly religious 
language, there is an ongoing conflict between the Gospel and the Lie that is 
animated by God’s redemptive activity. “I have not come to bring peace, but a 
sword” (Matt 10:34). The Gospel, like the sacrificial society, cannot exist without 
conflict. But this conflict, this violence of sorts, is not equivalent to the violence of 
mimetic conflict; the Gospel is not a permutation of the violent sacred. The 
Gospel, unlike the founding violence, initiates an ongoing and unpredictable 
conflict for the sake of contingent possibility rather than a periodic, scripted 
violence for the sake of absolute stability. “Truth is in a defensive position. … It 
is thus the one that wants war. Violence reacts to truth, and it is thus the one that 
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wants peace.”154 This two-sided conflict, this difference, which seems like 
symmetrical antagonism from the viewpoint of the sacred, yet appears as 
asymmetrical and liberating from the viewpoint of the Gospel, is the unveiling of 
the sacrificial mechanism. It is what Girard identifies as the effect of the Gospel, 
the process through which redemption is worked out in history. 
If liberation from the sacrificial cycle is the same thing as the redemptive 
work, might it be possible to describe this event using more traditional Christian 
vocabulary? Conversely, might one not be able to render the essence of the 
Christian proclamation more intelligible by recourse to the vocabulary of MT? It 
is not enough to say that the redemptive work of Christ is the exposure of the 
scapegoating mechanism, à la Girard. If Girard’s view of Christianity is 
approximately on the mark, then it should be strictly unnecessary to resort to the 
language and concepts of MT in order to articulate the aspects of redemption 
that MT identifies, since what MT is saying overlaps with the Christian 
proclamation. The task is rather to retrace the logic of redemption, using MT as a 
guide, and thereby to arrive at something that is both new and equivalent to 
what was said before. This is the true meaning of bringing theology up to date. 
To adapt a Heideggerian adage, the task of systematic theology is to keep saying 
 
154 Ibid., 81.  
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the same things over again, a process which ensures that the old and the new 
will flow into each other. 
The most immediate available possibility for this retracing lies in the 
theme of exchange that is common to MT and to the classic theories of 
redemption. The classic theories all display the same fascination with 
mechanistic explanations of the redemptive work: an action by God is the 
condition for an inverse reaction from man—which can only mean an exchange. 
One thing is given for another, and a beneficial reciprocal action transpires 
between God and the human race as Christ takes on our flesh, penalty, passivity, 
whatever affliction a given theory singles out, while we come into possession of 
Christ’s immortality, righteousness, and/or divinity. Seen from below, the 
exchange—a mutual mimesis—never originates in an intentional moral effort, 
hence the need for mechanism. God’s action must produce a reaction. 
This action and reaction takes place within the logic of the sacred. The 
sacrificial economy is thoroughly embedded in it: the binary divisions between 
divine and human natures, God’s righteousness and men’s sinfulness, the divine 
bliss and human suffering, are necessary for the resulting unification to take 
place. The mimetic reading of the Incarnation, then, leads us to the same place as 
the New Testament: the redemptive work is a sacrificial exchange. 
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What, then, are we to make of conversion, the subjective correlate of 
redemption? What exchange takes place in the act of conversion? The answer to 
this question lies at hand. In the process of conversion, with the restructuring of 
relationality that it entails, the idolatrous object of orientation is discarded in 
favor of the true object; one’s life changes from being governed by a deviated 
transcendence-structure to being governed by an authentic one. This exchange, 
like the one that constitutes redemption, bears the outlines of the sacrificial 
economy. Does not conversion depend on the dichotomies of true and false, 
good and bad, higher and earthly, which are in effect traded with Christ in an act 
of mimesis? He becomes sin, the bad, the earthly, and in doing so makes it 
possible for us to appropriate the divine graces: his own truth, righteousness, 
and supra-heavenly nature. And as most theories of redemption recognize 
explicitly, this exchange is dependent on his death above all else. Conversion 
depends upon his act of sacrifice. 
The redemptive work, to repeat, operates through a de-centering of the 
sacrificial order that nonetheless does not eradicate this order as such. This can 
be restated in terms of transcendence and orientation. The sacrificial order 
depends on, and in turn produces, the structures of relationality by which one 
normally lives. I have objects of orientation, and my relationship to them is 
governed by mimesis; they are my idols, and they reproduce not only the pattern 
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of doubles characteristic of the mimetic crisis, but the very relationship of the 
community to its substitute-double-made-a-god. In converting, I remove my 
orientation from these idolatrous objects to the object that is no object, the place-
less, time-less transcendent God. Insofar as I have done this, I have faith—belief, 
fidelity, trust in the true God—and my life is governed by divine transcendence. 
Owing to God’s absolute transcendence over the erstwhile necessary spatial, 
temporal, and other categorical parameters of the sacrificial order, I have escaped 
the grip of the sacrificial system, whatever residual attachments and habits may 
remain in me. Nonetheless, because I can experience God’s transcendence only as 
higher, greater, and central, I must relate to him in terms of sacrificially 
generated binaries. The subversion of the sacrificial system, as always, leads not 
to an escape from itself, but to its own transformation. 
The reality of the persistence of the sacrificial system does not in any way 
diminish the force of the redemptive work. Abraham was called to a place; he 
was brought to the hilltop to offer up Isaac at the location lore identifies as the 
world’s center. Israel was called out of Egypt to the land of Canaan to build a 
Temple on that same place. The Christian, by contrast, though just as much 
called, is called to noplace: the source and destination of the Christian’s 
summons is the heavenly Kingdom. One does not embark on a journey or a 
process of discovery that ends in a homecoming to an ultimate source, as 
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prominently as this metaphor figures in the parable of the prodigal son. The 
Christian is admonished rather to be ever ready; the return to the divine Source, 
that is, repentance, is nothing but a preparation for the impending coming (or 
return) of the Messiah (Matt 3:2; 24:42–44; 1 Thes 5:6–8). The believer is called to 
a future, to become heir to a promise; being deprived for a time of the things to 
come, the Christian knows these transcendents only through faith, by the hearing 
of the ear (John 20:29; Heb 11:1; 1 John 1:1–3). 
The restructuring of human relationality that takes place through the 
redemptive sacrifice, the removal of the center, and the summons to an authentic 
future display this apocalyptic dynamic starkly. The destabilization of meanings 
and their dependent social institutions leads to the destruction and, one hopes, 
rebirth of the world. This destruction and regeneration is not part of the circular 
movement of sacred time; what is reborn is different from what went before, and 
the change is not repeatable or reversible. This alteration in the constitution of 
the world, as it were, is a transformation of time itself, a radical substitution of 
the new for the old that is at the same time the harmonious marriage of the two, 
marked by the rivalry of opposites no less than by their reconciliation. 
The imprint of this pattern upon the biblical imagination will be explored 
after a brief discussion of the exchange-mechanism. 
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§ 15. The Mimetic Exchange and the Mechanism of Redemption 
Exchange is an indispensable thematic feature of nearly all Christian ideas of 
redemption. How, though, can such a saving exchange be expressed in terms of 
MT? Or can MT provide a way of thinking about the saving exchange that is not 
already part of Christianity’s accepted ideas of redemption? MT to date has not 
provided any robust theological theory of exchange.155 In what follows, I 
construct a tentative model of exchange on the basis of MT that provides a 
plausible framework for interpreting the traditional Christian ideas of the 
redemptive exchange. 
Girard visited and frequently revisited the theme of exchange in his 
writings, but did not bequeath to us a synthetic account of his thought on the 
subject. We may nonetheless identify a number of distinct forms of exchange 
posited in Girard’s work that are relevant to mimetic processes. First, there is the 
exchange of blows between doubles in mimetic conflict. The doubles, having 
succumbed to runaway mimesis, appropriate one another’s desire for 
supremacy, and subsequently imitate one another’s actions and attributes that 
seem to them to grant access to the desired superiority. When one twin strikes to 
gain the upper hand, the other imitates by striking back; when one appears more 
 
155 For my critique of Girard’s own efforts to grasp redemption in sacrificial terms, as well as the 
efforts of Raymund Schwager to do the same, see § 24 below. 
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intelligent or wealthier, the other seeks the semblance of intelligence or wealth. 
This is the first type of exchange, what can be called conflictual mimesis.156 
A second type of exchange is involved in the sacrificial cycle beyond that 
of conflictual mimesis: the double substitution. In the redirection of mimetic 
conflict onto the scapegoat, the scapegoat takes the place of a mimetic double; 
one is traded for the other. Later, in the second substitution, a sacrificial victim 
may again exchange places with a proper scapegoat. 
A third type completes this elemental list of exchanges posited by MT. It is 
economic exchange, or trade. Girard’s understanding of trade rests upon his 
theory of the origin of prohibitions. Prohibitions emerge in the wake of mimetic 
conflict as a means of preventing competition for goods. I may not take another’s 
things, wife, land, and so forth, such that I may as well give up desiring and 
competiting for these. The transgressions most internal to the transgressor’s 
personal sphere, such as incest, are the most strictly prohibited, since they 
symbolize the undifferentiated chaos of the mimetic crisis to the highest degree. 
The scapegoat, for this very reason, is accused of exactly these worst acts, and so 
becomes the ultimate transgressor, an Oedipus. Once the crisis has subsided and 
 
156 On conflictual mimesis, see Girard’s discussion of Clausewitz throughout Battling to the End, as 
well as the chapters “Men Become Gods in Each Other’s Eyes,” pages 53–82 in Deceit, Desire and 




the apotheosis of the victim is underway, the victim, in a reversal of the logical 
order of the crisis, becomes the divine lawgiver, the initiator of the prohibitions 
against the conflict-inducing acts of which he is purportedly guilty.157 
Of course, if one must prohibit the use of certain objects, why not make 
things easy on oneself by just putting them out of sight? Alternatively, in the 
absence of a way to conveniently get rid of valuable objects that are produced by 
the community, the threat of competition for these objects necessitates the 
prohibition of their use—a most impractical arrangement. The acquisition of 
goods from a neighboring group, on the other hand, does not pose a substantial 
risk; these goods are “not ours.” Girard is thus led to his speculative hypothesis 
on the origin of trade: we get rid of the objects we produce an abundance of by 
giving them away to the next tribe, since these goods produce an intolerable 
situation so long as they remain among us. 
A special class of objects would seem specially to lend itself to a form of 
trade: human beings (and here there is some obvious empirical support for 
Girard’s speculation). While internally produced goods must be expelled to 
prevent outbreaks of mimetic competition, sacrificial victims must be acquired 
from outside for similar reasons. Internal sources of victims are prohibitively 
 
157 Girard, ibid., 68–88; see also 193–222; compare Freud’s position in Totem and Taboo. Girard’s 
psychoanalytic debt is more transparent here than anywhere. 
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dangerous; one may not safely avert conflict by sacrificing someone’s uncle. 
Trade—or, alternatively, ritual war—is a viable option for acquiring victims 
whose deaths will not incite acts of vengeance. 
Girard supposes that trade may have originated in the exchange of 
surplus goods for human victims. “It is thus reasonable to suppose,” he 
concludes, “that the imperative of ritual led groups to search for victims outside 
the group at the very moment when the imperative of prohibition made any vital 
interaction among members of the group impossible.” Economic exchange thus 
originates in the need for groups to expel objects that could incite a new crisis 
(young women, certain internally available goods, the totem animal), while 
acquiring other goods (including sacrificial victims) from outside. Without going 
outside the group for these goods, members of the group would be restrained 
from doing almost anything for each other by prohibitions, since they could not 
use their own most abundant products.158 
Do conflictual mimesis, the substitution of the victim, and trade represent 
three distinct meanings of exchange, rendering this term equivocal? It would 
seem so. But only seem—a more careful consideration of the mimetic root of 
these three kinds of exchange requires us to posit an underlying homogeneity, 
 
158 Girard, Things Hidden, 73–75. I have emended a typographical error in the quotation. 
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albeit one which Girard never formulated. All three exchanges require two 
asymmetrical parties: conflictual mimesis, while tending toward symmetry by 
nature, is rendered asymmetrical once the substitution of the scapegoat takes 
place; the rivalry of doubles is then subsumed into the polarization between the 
community and the victim, which retains the asymmetry. The choice of sacrificial 
victim is next made possible by the distinctions and classifications arising from 
the original scapegoat. Finally, these very same distinctions are at work in 
primitive trade; there is an inside and an outside, and these determine both the 
dangerous quality of surplus goods and the suitability of aliens as victims. All 
three exchanges are ultimately determined and structured by the binary oppositions 
arising from the collective victim. 
The three types of exchange are homogeneous. They therefore admit of 
certain recombinations; they permeate each other, and more than one of them is 
detectable at a time. The blows exchanged between doubles are transferred onto 
the collective victim, who then acquires the perceived properties of the double, 
taking on his or her loathsomeness, guiltiness, and transcendent superiority, 
while the rivalry of the doubles sinks away into the unitary passivity of the 
victim. The victim thus effectively becomes a “mimic” of the ones he substitutes 
for; they, in turn, being drawn into the victim’s unifying peace, become imitators 
of him. Beyond this, the exchange of victims in trade is of a piece with the 
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substitution of scapegoats for doubles. Finally, we might question, without 
needing to give a definite answer, to what degree one should draw a qualitative 
distinction between the mutual expulsion of goods and the alternation of blows 
between doubles. These are the most direct ways in which the kinds of exchange 
may interpenetrate and recombine. 
We must not allow the implications of these interpenetrations for 
redemption theory to pass by us unnoticed. From the interpenetration of the 
three kinds of exchange emerges a quasi-metaphysics, a sacrificial dialectic of the 
one and the many that seems to determine all real possibilities. Out of the 
community’s differences, the all-unifying victim is spawned, who again is the 
source of the differences he presupposes. Power, meaning, and value move like a 
substance, an essence, or a fluid through the victim. The exchange between 
double and victim almost amounts to a template for substitutionary atonement, 
since the nature of the exchange rises above the level of nominal convention and 
approximates that of a physical law. In substitutionary atonement, the double 
(the Christian) and the victim (Christ) are engaged in a mutual mimesis whose 
ultimate character is not one of rivalry, but of beneficial exchange, one party 
receiving the other’s death and guilt, the other receiving life and absolution as he 
or she appropriates the victim’s properties. 
160 
 
Perhaps this quasi-metaphysical permanence of exchange can help us 
begin to make sense of the apparent inherence of exchange in the biblical ideas of 
substitutionary sacrifice and atonement we have already examined.159 God does 
not extend forgiveness in the Old Testament without exacting a cost. (Whether 
he does in the New Testament can remain an open question.) Nor does 
forgiveness take place in the Old Testament through a gratuitous mitigation of 
the penalty for sin: the Israelite firstborn need not be sacrificed, but only because 
an animal or a payment can be given up instead; the people will not be slain 
immediately for rebelling against Moses, but will receive a delayed death penalty 
before entering the promised land (Num 14:11–23); David shall not die for his 
twofold sin, but his child shall (2 Sam 12:13–14).160 What appears in these cases to 
be the mitigation of the implacable Deity’s penalty is in fact an exchange of one 
penalty for a symbolic or legal equivalent, which may be more bearable than the 
original penalty, but nonetheless counts equally by virtue of the substitution 
function. There is no escape from the necessity of exchange that is left 
 
159 See § 9. 
160 Cf. Jay Sklar, “Sin and Impurity: Atoned or Purified? Yes!,” pages 18–31 in Perspectives on 
Purity and Purification in the Bible, ed. Baruch J. Schwartz (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2008), 21. For 
Sklar, in contrast to my own view, atonement or kopher is a mitigated penalty administered in 
place of the penalty deserved. This partial remission and atonement are what Sklar believes is 
meant by forgiveness (slḥ). 
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uncomplicated by exchange itself. The power of the sacred is ubiquitous in law 
and in nature. 
God’s redemptive work cannot, of course, be a perpetuation of this 
inescapable law; it does, however, operate by taking advantage of it. The divine 
purpose is to extend forgiveness and reunite fallen nature to God; redemption is 
God’s entry into a radical conflict with the inimical divisions and inescapable 
cycles that characterize the sacrificial order. In making this entry, in becoming 
subject to this order in the person of the Son, the Divinity explodes the curse of 
sacrifice and ushers in a regeneration that is not balanced out by any 
corresponding threat of destruction. 
Yet this need not lead us to posit an absurdity, that God is bound by his 
nature to act within the limits of the sacrificial order. Far from being subject to a 
higher necessity that compels him to save by exchange, God’s action is a free act 
of grace arising from the utterly transcendent power of his unity, taking the form 
to which the servants are subject only for the sake of those servants, since they 
could meet him in no other way. 
The problem of forgiveness and necessity will return to us when we 
consider traditional theories of redemption.161 For now, it is time to turn our 
 
161 See Ch. 5, esp. the discussion of Anselm in § 22. 
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attention to the biblical themes that illustrate the redemptive exchange, its 
boundedness to the collective victim, and its creative operation on the binaries of 
the sacrificial order. These data will clarify the operation of sacrificial exchange 
laid out in the preceding theoretical explanations. 
§ 16. The Biblical History and the Sacrificial Dialectic 
If my reading of Girard is on the mark, then we can expect to observe the pattern 
of liberation from sacrifice through the mechanism of sacrifice in the biblical 
history itself, as we already detected in the stories of Cain and Abel and Jacob 
and Esau.162 The pattern ought to be evident at the generative level of the 
construction of the biblical narratives, and possibly also at the thematic level 
insofar as the biblical traditions manifest an awareness of the truth about the 
scapegoat at any given point in their development.163 
Moreover, the transformative process can be expected to include a process 
of conversion, an increasing consciousness of and response to the sacrificial 
system as such and the true God’s transcendence over it. Such a conversion will 
 
162 Refer to § 12. 
163 On the generative and thematic levels of a text, see Hamerton-Kelly, The Gospel and the Sacred, 
13. The generative level is “where the power that produces the text is located,” while the thematic 
level is the manifest content of the text, “where the traces of that generative activity are present.” 
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inevitably dictate the manifest form taken by the biblical account of the 
redemptive division and judgment.164 
Can we find in the biblical history the data needed to flesh out the 
operation of sacrifice in its (pre-)Christian setting? Can we observe a pattern of 
development that would corroborate the existence of the redemptive process as 
we have described it, perhaps correlated with a process of conversion on the part 
of the sacred writers over the course of their historical timeframe? The order and 
circumstances of the development of the biblical texts and the traditions in which 
they are enmeshed are too complex, and our knowledge of them too imprecise, 
to warrant a fully conclusive reading of these texts. But a certain minimal yet 
significant correspondence of the biblical data with MT’s predictions is 
nonetheless unmistakable upon examination. 
An excursus into the biblical data, which will occupy the rest of the 
present chapter, is warranted for two reasons. First, a discussion that failed to 
engage biblical material would lack persuasive grounding. Second, in the biblical 
texts and traditions one may directly observe the traces of the unfolding of the 
saving exchange, with all its nuance and complexity. Redemption is a historical 
process; observation of the historical development of texts and traditions will 
 
164 Refer to § 4. 
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deliver to us a more reliable picture of the exchange mechanism than abstract 
discussion could. 
Where to begin? The Bible is home, of course, to the namesake scapegoat, 
and it is all too tempting to take this sacrificial animal as the launch point for a 
Girardian reading of biblical sacrifice. The traditionally ascribed Christological 
significance of the biblical scapegoat only increases this temptation. Alas, the 
scapegoat of the Bible is not of a kind with what Girard designates by the same 
term (though the biblical scapegoat, as we shall soon discover, has a special 
relevance of its own). Girard is careful to distinguish three meanings of 
“scapegoat”: the biblical, referring to the animal that was expelled into the 
wilderness on the Day of Atonement according to the book of Leviticus; the 
anthropological, referring to the whole class of ritually expelled or sacrificed 
animals or persons found in many cultures, such as the Greek pharmakos;165 and 
the psychosocial, the person or persons blamed for the woes of others through a 
psychological act of transference. It is only the third meaning that is directly 
relevant for Girard: 
[T]he victim or victims of unjust violence or discrimination are called 
scapegoats, especially when they are blamed or punished not merely for 
 
165 The anthropological meaning of the term “scapegoat” would be the one employed, for 
example, by James Frazer in The Golden Bough (Macmillan, 1890). 
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the “sins” of others … but for tensions, conflicts, and difficulties of all 
kinds.166 
 
There is no obvious reason to assume that the biblical scapegoat is an example of 
the psychosocial scapegoat of which Girard speaks. The biblical scapegoat is, 
then, off the table as an entry point for a Girardian interpretation of the 
phenomenon of sacrifice in the Bible. Where might we begin? 
Another potentially suitable case is likely to spring to one’s mind. The Old 
Testament’s most famous sacrifice of all is frequently understood by homiletic 
interpreters of the Bible as the quintessential rejection of human sacrifice167—a 
reading which can easily perceive this story as falling in line with a presumed 
general anti-sacrificial sentiment that waxes ever stronger over the course of the 
biblical history. This is, of course, the binding of Isaac, the Akedah. 
The Akedah appears on its surface to represent an unmistakable move 
away from child sacrifice. Abraham, having been summoned to offer up his 
firstborn son, is then not only ordered not to slay him, but is even provided 
instead with an animal victim, a substitution that readily evokes the law of the 
 
166 René Girard, “Generative Scapegoating,” pages 73–145 in Violent Origins: Walter Burkert, René 
Girard, and Jonathan Z. Smith on Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation, ed. Robert G. Hamerton-
Kelly (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 73–74. One may wish to consult David 
Dawson, Flesh Becomes Word: A Lexicography of the Scapegoat or, the History of an Idea (East Lansing, 
MI: Michigan State University Press, 2013). 
167 An early example: Gregory Nazianzen, Hom. 45.22. Gregory uses this passage as proof that 
Jesus’ death could not have been demanded by the Father. 
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redemption of the firstborn (Exod 13:11–13), and might, therefore, spur one 
toward the now clichéd interpretation of this episode as an etiology of the 
Israelite God’s rejection of child sacrifice. 
But this flat anti-sacrificial interpretation is not at all evident from a close 
reading of the Akedah, at least not as the story is told in Genesis 22. To the 
contrary—God really does ask for the offering of the son, a time-honored point of 
scandal for Christian and Jewish interpreters; and while Isaac is ultimately 
spared, no obvious insinuation is made that the substitution of the ram for the 
child is to be emulated. Nor could the substitution of the ram become a 
requirement on the grounds of this story; as an etiology, the Akedah would 
suggest only that an animal may be substituted electively for a child. The 
Akedah does not by any means rule out the legality of child sacrifice.168 
I do not go so far as to agree with Jon Levenson’s view that this story is 
most fairly read as one iteration among many of an archetypal idea of child-
sacrifice. The Akedah seems to me intentionally to suppress the sacrifice of Isaac, 
warranting the anti-sacrificial reading. My point is that the total content of the 
story is not that simple: the pointed elimination of the sacrifice ensures that the 
sacrifice lingers as a spectral presence. It may also be wrong to suppose that 
 
168 This is, of course, Levenson’s view; see The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 111 ff. 
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passages which, like the Akedah, imply the archaic practice of child-sacrifice 
actually have such a practice within their historical horizon; they may well. My 
point holds regardless of whether the sacrifice of the first born presents itself as a 
memory of an actual practice or only as a typological form or legal fiction within 
the biblical traditions. From a phenomenological standpoint, the sacrifice of Isaac 
is present in the Akedah either way.169 This presence is the first suggestion of 
what I would term a dialectical relationship that holds between sacrifice and the 
historical transcendence and erasure of sacrifice. 
As with all passages of the Torah, the text of the Akedah coordinates with 
a multitude of layered Midrashic traditions, and these, too, need to be considered 
alongside the biblical text if we are to attain an adequate understanding of this 
episode. Midrashic traditions are fluid, and it is perilously difficult to assign 
them a date that would establish a given midrash’s priority or posteriority 
relative to the biblical texts. Midrashim could represent:  (1) remnants of 
antecedent traditions that underlie the Torah text,  (2) later fabulations that were 
developed on the basis of the Torah text, or  (3) a combination of both. Child 
sacrifice nonetheless meets with such categorical condemnation in the rabbinic 
tradition that any hint that Isaac was a genuine blood-sacrifice can plausibly 
 
169 Thanks to Bruce Beck for assistance on these points. 
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represent only the first or third cases. Do such traditions exist? If so, the 
possibility of a sacrificial reading of the Akedah receives strong support. 
Levenson’s now classic study on child sacrifice in the Bible locates four 
Midrashic texts that satisfy our need: three texts that speak of the “blood” of 
Isaac,170 and one more that speaks of his “ashes” (!).171, 172 Since such traditions 
implying Isaac’s slaughter could not plausibly have been fabricated out of 
nothing by the rabbinic imagination, Levenson is able to conclude that these 
traditions are of authentic antiquity, antedating the midrashim that conveyed 
them to us. 
Another tradition about the binding of Isaac is clearly of the third type. 
According to a fifth Midrashic source adduced by Levenson,173 Abraham’s 
offering of Isaac merited God’s promise to bring about the resurrection of the 
dead (cf. Heb 11:19). Levenson conjecturally reads this midrash as a product of 
the context of Jewish martyrdom.174 Despite this midrash’s sublimation of the 
motif of human sacrifice, the actual slaughter of Isaac is unavoidably 
presupposed; since this tradition directs attention away from the presumed fact 
 
170 Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Pisha 7; Mekilta de-Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, Wa’era’; Pseudo-Philo, 
Biblical Antiquities 18:5. 
171 b. Ber. 16b. 
172 Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 192–95. 
173 Pesikta de-Rab Kahana, zo’t habberaka. 
174 Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 197. 
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of Isaac’s death onto the nobler subject of the resurrection of the righteous, one 
must infer once again that the tradition of Isaac’s death considerably antedates 
this midrash. The Christians, Levenson points out, seem quite justified in 
referring to the binding of Isaac unbiblically as his “sacrifice.”175 
If an extra-scriptural tradition of great antiquity would have us believe 
that Isaac was slaughtered, can but our interest be piqued as to the meaning of 
the biblical version of the story? A concept of dialectic is needed here if one is to 
avert an irresolvable contradiction between two meanings of the biblical story. 
Levenson points out that “to say the opposite of scripture is often precisely what 
midrash does.”176 In order to get beyond this unsatisfying judgment, must one 
not assert that Scripture can subsume even the opposite of what it says? 
This is plainly the case with the Akedah. The episode resolves—no reader 
misses it—with the pointed elimination of the expected sacrifice. And if the 
sacrifice really is a part of the story of the binding of Isaac, as the sources attest, 
then surely the departure from this expectation in Genesis 22 should be read as 
nothing other than a suppression of the background, if not the underground, of 
this text—not as just a literary feature. When viewed diachronically, the Akedah 
is perceived to bear its own photographic negative within its positive form. 
 
175 Ibid., 131. 
176 Ibid., 196. 
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Here the shades of a historical dialectic between sacrifice and the 
overcoming of sacrifice are faintly in evidence. (We might call this simply a 
“historical dialectic of sacrifice” for short. When referring to this dialectic 
without specific reference to its historical character, I will use the shorthand term 
“sacrificial dialectic.”) As I will show, the overcoming of the sacrificial system in 
history depends on a new assimilation of the structures generated by sacrifice 
rather than a straight-up rejection of sacrifice. A more deepgoing alignment of 
evidence on the form of this dialectic is needed, however, before these assertions 
can be found coherent and complete. 
How and when does the overcoming of the sacrificial system in the 
biblical tradition function? Sacrifice can be subverted only in a situation of 
sacrificial crisis, never, by virtue of sacrifice’s own way of operating, during a 
period of stability. The majority of the Old Testament books originated during 
just such a major crisis in Israel’s history, beginning from the first historically 
verifiable instance of a foreign invader threatening Israel’s existence (witnessed 
by first Isaiah), continuing through the period of Israelite infighting and 
degeneration during the late monarchy, and lasting at least through the Jewish 
state’s restoration period (witnessed by Nehemiah and the later prophets). The 
localized, sacrificial God of archaic Israelite religion had become implausible as a 
result of this sequence of political events. In Girard’s view, the Old Testament 
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prophetic literature represents a transformative response to this crisis, parallel to 
the response he imputes to Greek tragedy in answer to Greece’s 
contemporaneous sacrificial crisis.177 Greek civilization emerged from its crisis 
with law, philosophy, and a neutered mythical tradition that was never again to 
be sincerely cared for by the literate class. Did the transformative epoch of 
Israelite society yield similar results? 
Much to the contrary, the Israelite religion became possessed of a new 
vitality. Its revitalization was made possible by a twofold evolutionary leap 
among the worshippers of Jehovah: the potentially destructive clarity of 
consciousness brought about by the sacrificial crisis was dissolved by the 
absorption of this new insight back into the still-sacrificial religion; and the 
hierarchical differences inherent to the binaries of the sacrificial order began to 
undergo an inversion, which took place through (and required) the sacrificial 
system itself. The victim—with whom Israel as a nation is sometimes identified 
in the prophetic writings—became manifest as such, and was therefore 
vindicated by the community, while this vindication nonetheless depended 
entirely upon sacrificial thinking. Thus Joseph, the lesser among his brethren, 
holds the status of “shepherd” (Gen 37:2), a designation that conveys the menial 
 
177 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 66. 
172 
 
character of his role as caretaker of the flocks of the sons of Jacob’s two slave-
wives, but also carries divine connotations.178 Joseph’s story, like that of king 
David later in the biblical history, presents a paradigm of the inversion of 
sacrificers and sacrificed as Joseph, the scapegoat, is elevated above his 
superiors. This inversion should not be mistaken for an intuitive moral principle, 
natural though it may seem; its non-intuitiveness is made supremely apparent by 
one of Jesus’ most frequently recorded and patently offensive sayings: “The first 
shall be last, and the last first.”179 
The biblical history does not by any means present a rejection of the 
effects of sacrifice; it offers only a crucial modification of them. For example, the 
primeval history explains the origins of civilization and religion through 
sometimes transparent, sometimes thinly veiled sacrificial events, hinting at 
sacrifice’s culture-founding effects (see Table); the Akedah is presented by its 
biblical redactor as the act upon which God’s promise to Abraham is founded 
(Gen 22:16–18);180 and the Evangelist Matthew, far from doing away with the 
notion of sacrificial foundation, has Jesus declaring Peter to be the foundation 
 
178 Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 144. Levenson considers pastorship to 
have had a royal (rather than divine) denotation, but it must be pointed out that no king is 
explicitly referred to as a shepherd in the Hebrew Bible except king David and the Messiah! This 
fact is noted by Michel Foucault, in Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1977–1978 (New York: Picador, 2007), 124, and I was able to verify it from the biblical sources. 
179 This logion occurs four times across the Synoptic Gospels. 
180 Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 174. 
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stone upon which the new Temple, the Church, is to be built (Matt 16:18).181 
“There can be no doubt,” says Girard, “that the first books of the Bible rest upon 
myths that are very close to those found all over the world”;182 perhaps also the 
essence of sacrifice inheres deeper in the tradition than Girard himself observed. 
  
 
181 James Charlesworth observes that Jesus “transfer[s] the symbolism of the Temple to the 
‘church,’ a noun used by him but by no other evangelist …” (“The Temple and Jesus’ Followers,” 
pages 183–212 in Jesus and Temple: Textual and Archeological Explorations, ed. James H. 
Charlesworth [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014], 185). 
182 Things Hidden, 138. 
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Table. Moments of the founding mechanism in the Pentateuchal narratives 
Based on Girard, Things Hidden, 135–48, and supplemented. 




3. Establishment of 
interdictions & rituals 
Days of creation primordial chaos — nature put in order 
Garden of Eden primal sin expulsion coats of skins; curses? 
Cain & Abel warring brothers Abel Cain builds a city; law 
against murder; mark 
on Cain ( = differential 
system) 
Great flood violence, flood Noah (survival by 
inversion); Ham? 
prototypes of species 
in ark; covenant & 
sacrifice 
Tower of Babel unity of peoples/ 
confusion of 
tongues 
— nations put in order 
Sodom & 
Gomorrah 




Binding of Isaac — Isaac substitution of ram; 
covenant promise to 
Abraham; re-naming 
Jacob & Esau warring brothers one brother is 
denied blessing 
Jacob escapes through 
a slaughtered kid 
(substitution) 
Jacob at Jabbok struggle with man 
(double) 
God/angel hip-meat prohibition; 
re-naming 
Joseph’s coat warring brothers Joseph — 





§ 17. The Sacrificial Dialectic in the Temple Ideologies of P and the D-work 
As founding narratives, the biblical stories carry ideological significance. The 
interplay of the ideologies of their respective sources furnishes some of the 
clearest evidence of the historical dialectic of sacrifice in the biblical content. 
The ideological tendencies of the early biblical tales are invariably national 
or dynastic. The histories of Isaac and Jacob, for instance, serve not only to 
provide a mythic foundation for the Israelite nation, but to legitimate their free 
existence in Canaan. The Joseph story, as Levenson suggests with strong support 
from other scholars of Israelite ritual,183 plausibly serves the purpose of 
legitimating an early Josephite hegemony, perhaps over or against the Davidic 
dynasty; or, alternatively, Joseph’s birth from a barren woman and his two 
“resurrections” from underground imprisonments may be read as analogies for 
the messianic expectation of the rebirth of the Davidic dynasty.184 
These ideological tendencies, moreover, as well as the role of the sacrificial 
cult that underpins much of biblical ideology, can be seen at work in the texts’ 
editorial histories as much as in the received texts themselves. While much about 
the editorial development of the Old Testament books remains uncertain, the 
long-standing consensus in biblical research is that two traditions dominate the 
 
183 Compare the views of Calum Carmichael and Mary Douglas, discussed below (p. 206). 
184 See Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 205. 
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redaction of the central Old Testament books, namely, a Priestly tradition, and a 
Deuteronomistic tradition; the composition of each tradition is complex and 
convoluted, such that contemporary scholarship speaks less often of such sources 
as the Priestly writer (P) and the Deuteronomist (D), as postulated originally by 
Wellhausen (though D is still sometimes used to refer to the author of the 
original kernel of Deuteronomy), than of the P-material, the Deuteronomistic 
material (Dtr) (which exists in several layers across multiple biblical books, and is 
sometimes virtually Priestly in character), and a “D-work,” a conceptual 
synthesis of D, DtrH (the Deuteronomistic History comprising Joshua–Kings), 
and all Dtr editorship.185 The two broad strands of tradition are distinguished by, 
among other things, their respective revisions of the ideology surrounding the 
First Temple—and, by extension, their views on the sacrificial cult and political 
life of Israel. The topic’s relevance to the sacrificial dialectic merits some 
discussion. 
Tryggve Mettinger, in his seminal study on Old Testament conceptions of 
divine power and the emergence of these conceptions from the Jewish experience 
 
185 Julius Wellhausen, Die Composition des Hexateuchs und der historischen Bücher des Alten 
Testaments (Berlin, 1866). In today’s scholarship, the precise meanings of these terms and 
abbreviations are quite fluid, and my use of them consequently cannot claim to be normative. 
Dtr, for example, sometimes is used to emphasize Deuteronomistic editorship rather than 
Deuteronomistic material broadly. I have tried to stay within the range of accepted usages of each 
term, and have taken care to use them consistently. 
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of the Babylonian exile, broadly associates the P-material and Dtr with two 
distinct theologies of God’s transcendence.186 While P is preoccupied with the 
divine glory, the kavod, as the theophanic mediator of the Divinity, the D-work 
minimizes allusions to divine appearances, focusing instead on the divine name, 
the shem, as the locus of the divine presence (cf. Ex 24:9–11; Deut 4:12, 15). 
Mettinger concludes that these “Kavod” and “Shem” theologies are exilic 
developments that appropriated pre-exilic traditions in ways that allowed Jewish 
institutions to cope with the loss of the Temple. 
The Kavod theology copes by drawing on the traditions of the Tabernacle 
and the Tent of Meeting in order to play up the mobility of God’s presence. It is 
all right if God’s people are carried away to a new country, because God can go 
with them.187 Ezekiel, whose theology is similar to that of P, opts for the even 
greater mobility of the divine chariot; although, unlike P, he envisions a future 
return to the Temple, Ezekiel’s divine chariot allows God’s presence to survive 
the interim period unharmed. One might conclude on the basis of Mettinger’s 
hypothesis that the Kavod theology indulges in a fantasy of the archaic 
Tabernacle so as not only to render the divine presence geographically moveable, 
but to retroactively revise the very meaning of the Temple: the Temple is no 
 
186 Tryggve Mettinger, The Dethronement of Sabaoth: Studies in the Shem and Kavod Theologies (CWK 
Gleerup, 1982). 
187 Ibid., 81–83. 
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longer ideologically tethered to the royal capital. P’s Tabernacle-fantasy thus 
serves as a locus in which the ideology of the Temple can be altered. 
The D-work, on the other hand, displays an even more radically revised 
Temple theology, though one which strikes monotheistic sensibilities much more 
favorably. For Dtr, God resides in heaven, and the Temple is merely the place on 
which his Name rests. Dtr accomplishes this transformation by subtly reworking 
the surviving pre-exilic traditions of the Temple as God’s dwelling-place.188 Thus 
the surviving pre-exilic traditions describe the ark of the Solomonic Temple as 
bare-topped, its lid (the kapporet) serving as God’s footstool, while the Cherubim 
on either side of it, facing out toward the court, mark the presence of his throne 
(1 Kgs 6:27; 8:6–8).189 But in the D-work’s portrayal of the ark as it imagines it in 
the Tabernacle period, the Cherubim do not appear to exist at all (Deut 10:1–5)! 
God’s throne has been altogether removed from the earth, and his power is 
communicated entirely through the presence of his Name in the Temple. P, by 
contrast, reduces the Cherubim without eliminating them, placing them on top of 
the kapporet (contrast 1 Kings), now facing inward toward the place of 
 
188 Ibid., 46–50. 
189 Ibid., 19–24. 
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manifestation of the divine presence (the kavod) in the portable sanctuary (Exod 
25:18–20; 37:7–9).190 
 Dtr’s imageless, supra-heavenly God, tied to earth only by his arbitrary 
and nominal designation of a place of worship through the invocation of his 
Name upon it, accords reasonably with monotheistic instincts about what makes 
for a properly transcendent deity. But the D-work’s tendency toward extreme 
transcendence has its limits. Corresponding to the D-work’s repudiation of the 
enthroned presence of God in the Temple is its insistence on Jerusalem as the 
only legal place of worship. Indeed, the election of Zion is a—if not the only—
central creedal element of the book of Deuteronomy in its original form (cf. Deut 
12:1–28). Deuteronomy is presumed to have originated, after all, in the Josianic 
reform that sought to radically centralize all cultic power (2 Kgs 22–23). The link 
between the sacrificial cult, religious ideology, and political organization is here 
strongly apparent; the D-work’s doctrine of divine transcendence, though 
perhaps weakening the place-bounded quality of the sacrificial system, has as its 
goal the strengthening of the system. The D-work transcends the sacrificial order 
only by recourse to the same. 
 
190 Ibid., 50–52, 87–88. 
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The same can be said of the Kavod theology of P and Ezekiel. On the one 
hand, the Kavod theology, in contrast to the Shem theology of Dtr, has rejected 
the localization of God’s power. Nonetheless, P and especially Ezekiel retain the 
visual and spatial character of God’s presence, a mark of the functioning of the 
sacrificial order. (The auditory emphasis of the D-work implied in the privilege it 
grants to the Name stands in contrast to this as a mark of Dtr’s partial 
transcending of the sacrificial order.) Ezekiel’s Kavod theology, however, 
includes a singular feature which, while it is no indication of a transcending of 
sacrifice, provides a suitable receptacle for just such a transcending: Ezekiel’s 
Temple theology is strongly apocalyptic, envisioning a future re-entry of the 
divine kavod into the eschatological Temple (Ezek 40–48). Thus Ezekiel furnishes 
the rudiments of two essential correlates of the reordering of sacrifice: linear 
history and an authentic future. The D-work, not for lack of chances given all its 
genetic complexity, does not betray more than the faintest hint of an 
eschatological conception.191 
In short, the Old Testament’s source-construction bears witness to 
contrary attempts to rationalize and adapt to the crisis of exile, which was, from 
an Israelite theologian’s perspective, first and foremost a crisis of the Temple, 
 
191 The miniature apocalypse of Deut 32:15–43 is the chief counterexample to this trend; but this 
text is archaic, and its status as an exception therefore carries little weight. 
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and consequently of the sacrificial organism on which the nation depended. We 
see in these texts a response to the older sacrificial order. This interpretation of 
the Old Testament’s developmental history would be most unsatisfactory, 
however, if it could not be brought to bear on these traditions’ concern with 
institutional sacrifice itself, not just with the more abstract meanings of the 
Temple. Can we find in the Israelite theology of sacrifice a corresponding 
revision, attesting to the hypothesized historical dialectic of sacrifice? 
§ 18. The Sacrificial Cult in P and the D-work 
The Priestly texts work out their Temple theology through the medium of 
fantasy-constructions about the archaic Tabernacle. These constructions are 
interwoven with a presumably equally fantastic set of ritual prescriptions, 
largely dealing with the institution of sacrifice. 
The D-work, on the other hand, conspicuously avoids discussing sacrifice, 
except when it has in mind the restriction of sacrificial offerings to the locality of 
the Jerusalem Temple, as in Deut 12. If the Temple theologies of P and the D-
work are responses to a crisis in sacrifice, how is one to interpret the minimal 
thematic presence of sacrifice in the D-work? Could sacrifice’s conspicuous 
absence be significant in itself, a presence-in-absence? 
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The Akedah, as Levenson infers, conceals and thereby reveals the 
phenomenological presence of a specific kind of sacrifice, that of the firstborn 
son. The D-work is similar in how it keeps aloof from sacrifice altogether: the 
death of Isaac is conspicuous by its absence, in fact, far more conspicuous than if 
the text stated outright that the sacrifice had been completed; just the same, the 
unimportance of sacrifice in the D-work is oddly out of place. Could the D-work, 
like the Akedah, be suppressing the presence of child sacrifice? 
This guess finds strong justification close at hand in the source-texts. One 
notices in the P tradition the vestiges of the law of the sacrifice of the first 
manchild (Exod 12–13):192 
And when he sees the blood upon the lintel and on the two side-posts, the 
LORD will pass over the door, and will not allow the destroyer to come 
into your houses to smite you (Exod 12:23). 
Sanctify to me all the firstborn, whatever opens the womb, among the 
children of Israel, both of man and of beast; it is mine (Exod 13:2). 
You shall set apart to the LORD all that opens the womb, … the males shall 
be the LORD’s. And every firstling of an ass you shall redeem with a lamb; 
and if you will not redeem it, then you shall break its neck; but all the 
firstborn of man among your children you shall redeem (Exod 13:12–13). 
The LORD slew all the firstborn in the land of Egypt. … Therefore I 
sacrifice to the LORD every male that opens the womb; but all the firstborn 
of my children I redeem (Exod 13:15). 
 
 
192 I build off of Levenson’s research again here. Refer also to § 9. 
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Contrast Deut 15:19–23, which begins: 
All the firstling males that come of your herd and of your flock you shall 
sanctify to the LORD your God. … 
 
followed by not the least mention of human firstborn. Deut 15:19–23 “accords no 
special status at all to the oldest manchild,” a peculiarity which holds good 
throughout Deuteronomy.193 Deuteronomy, that is, completely suppresses the 
tradition that the first manchild belongs to God, and is joined by Jeremiah, the 
sometimes-called Holiness Code of Lev 17–26, and even Ezekiel, a source which 
otherwise aligns with P. All these sources participate in the same revolution, 
expunging and rebutting all hints of God’s claim upon firstborn sons; all omit 
reference to the death of the Egyptian firstborn, all omit reference to the 
apotropaic blood of the paschal lamb.194 
Deuteronomy, the D-work, and all sources promulgating the Shem 
theology (including Jeremiah) show a common set of theological tendencies. God 
is extremely transcendent; the cult is as centralized as possible; the 
anthropomorphic visibility of God and the possibility of his bodily attachment to 
a place are suppressed; any presence of human sacrifice whatsoever is 
eliminated, while the stature of sacrifice in general is reduced. These sources 
 
193 Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 44. 
194 Ibid., 44–45. 
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have traits consistent with a transcending of sacrifice, dissociating God from the 
bloody institution as much as historical circumstances permitted. 
Only one major element of the sacrificial order remains strong in the Shem 
theology—it is, in fact, magnified substantially. Consistent with its atemporal 
outlook, the Shem theology, especially in the D-work, upholds and absolutizes 
the division between heaven and earth, between God’s realm and the lower 
realm. The lower and the upper have an absolute and static difference between 
them, one which the mimetic viewpoint must interpret as generated by the 
Divinity himself, the knowledge of whom is still conditioned by the system of 
binaries arising from sacrifice. Could the knowledge of him have been by any 
other means? 
The D-work and the Shem theology thus follow a historical progression of 
the kind that MT might lead one to predict: as a culture’s sacrificial structures 
and institutions rapidly crumble, it adapts by further sublimating the sacrificial 
structures on which it rests. Yet there is a too easily unappreciated complexity to 
this development. The distancing from sacrifice that pervades these sources goes 
hand in hand with, and requires the strengthening of, the mode of thinking 
generated by sacrifice, rather than weakening it. If God is so far up there, so 
universally powerful, what pleasure can he really take in the blood of goats and 
rams (Ps 49), let alone that of a human being? As “simple” as the transcendence-
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theology of the D-work may seem, there is a dialectical relationship of thesis and 
antithesis at play within it: the categories generated by sacrifice are the formal 
cause through which sacrifice can be minimized, and, in much later times, 
forgotten. 
The strong assertion of divine transcendence that characterizes the Shem 
theology appears, then, to be an analogous development to that of the primacy of 
law and justice in ancient Athens.195 As justice depends on the ultimately 
theological principles of right and wrong, innocence and guilt, that arise from the 
generative scapegoating mechanism, so God’s absolute transcendence over the 
earth depends on the same mechanism. On this difference between God and the 
earthly depend, for Dtr, the truth of the Law of Moses, Dtr’s understanding of 
the institutions of sacrifice insofar as the D-work retains them, and the political 
power that the D-work seeks to solidify. 
Now, what about the other theological tradition, whose characteristic 
feature is the manifestation of the divine kavod, and which is principally 
associated with the P-material? Here the means of transcending human sacrifice 
is more complex; with the exception of Ezekiel, the Kavod theology does not 
 
195 See Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 23–24. 
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extirpate the thematic presence of human sacrifice from the divine Law, but only 
rearranges it such that the slaughter of a human is never actually performed. 
Here, in P, is the best approximation of the model of Christian redemption 
properly speaking. With the redemption of the firstborn by means of a sheep, the 
moral substance of the sacrificial system, its subterranean nefariousness, is 
overcome by internal means, without damage to its essential structure. God 
prescribes the redemption of the firstborn by means of a sacrificial exchange, just 
as Christian atonement doctrines say he does with regard to his firstborn Son. 
Here another level of dialectical relationship crops up. The reliance of P on 
sacrifice as the means of saving life has a dialectical relationship with the D-
work’s strategy of suppressing murderous sacrifice altogether (again, regardless 
of whether the sacrifice of the firstborn existed for the editors as a historical 
memory or simply as a phenomenological counterpoint). The relationship is both 
historical and ideal; whereas the two editorial traditions in question are revising 
similar source materials, shared traditions, and, very likely, at times each other’s 
work, their mutual process of revision is also motivated by factors that are of a 
trans-historical nature. With respect to sacrifice, P, on the one hand, is driven by 
the desire to achieve the characteristic feature of the D-work’s approach, namely, 
the demotion and limitation of the institution of sacrifice. P nonetheless remains 
pervasively sacrificial; it is dependent on an other whose character it does not 
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share, and is so dependent by virtue of its own constitutive features. The D-
work, on the other hand, while promulgating a theology of transcendence that 
(perhaps even self-consciously) demotes sacrifice, is dependent on a veiled 
sacrificial logic that comes to the fore only in P; without this sacrificial logic, the 
Deuteronomistic theology of transcendence would not be possible in the first 
place. These two traditions of response to Israel’s sacrificial crisis did not develop 
together out of the same prolonged crisis by mere chance; they are each other’s 
obverse. 
The historical dialectic of sacrifice and the overcoming of sacrifice takes 
the following form in these biblical traditions: sacrifice is circumvented by means 
of sacrificial exchange on the one hand, and is suppressed by the unification of 
all saving power within a radically transcendent Deity, the apprehension of 
whom is nonetheless rooted in sacrificially generated structure, on the other 
hand. This dialectic, as I will now show before moving on to Christian theories of 
redemption and their continued operation within the same sacrificial logic, 
persists throughout a very great portion of the biblical narrative and its ancillary 





§ 19. Patterns of Sacrificial Division and Exchange in the Biblical History 
of the Creative and Redemptive Work: A Girardian Salvation History 
When God begins to create the world in the book of Genesis, his surpassing 
transcendence consumes the scene. This transcendence performs its creative 
work in an unsettling manner. The creation out of a primordial undifferentiated 
chaos—we could justifiably call it creatio ex nihilo—takes place not, in its first 
stages, by causing things to pop into existence as out of a vacuum, as the popular 
theistic imagination would have it, but by dividing and differentiating (Gen 1:1–
3). The division of light from darkness is the most fundamental and significant of 
these separations; light is a symbol of all that has to do with God; darkness is a 
pure negativity, not said in Genesis to have been created by God. The darkness 
comes into being, rather, through the creation and isolation of the light. This 
division illustrates the sacrificial character of the creative work in such a manner 
as to portray what it signifies virtually on the thematic level. The good 
providence of God does not create evil, ignorance, or absence; yet his manner of 
creativity does not exclude these significands of darkness from the total system. 
The darkness is, one may tacitly presume, consubstantial with the non-created 
primordial chaos in the mythos of Genesis 1. The primordial chaos, which is 
reflected in (or a reflection of) the disorder of the absolute sacrificial crisis, is 
subsumed into the binary pair resulting from the creative act as its lesser term. 
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The subsequent divisions of heaven from earth and earth from sea likewise have 
the nature of sacrificial classifications, though they do not betray the same depth 
of significance as the first division in creation. 
The story of Cain and Abel again portrays the process of division, and 
indicates its sacrificial nature at the thematic level. This story also presents us 
with the first typological instance of inversion in the biblical account of the 
redemptive process. In Girard’s reading, which we have already touched on, 
Cain, the tiller of the ground, has only a weak sacrificial outlet; Abel, who can 
offer blood sacrifices from his flock, is able to conduct himself peaceably toward 
his fraternal rival. Cain’s constraints leave him with a single outlet for his 
mimetic impulses: violence toward his brother. In this society of two, Cain’s 
killing of his “scapegoat” Abel results in the enactment of the first social 
prohibition by God (the limitation on revenge) and the founding of a city—in 
short, the genesis of culture.196 So goes Girard’s reading: Abel is the scapegoat. 
Does the biblical text really point toward this conclusion? I here have a doubt 
that Girard’s reading is complete. Is not Cain, through the narrative’s recognition 
of his crime, also a scapegoat, expelled from the original godly community into 
the land of Wandering, while Abel, by contrast, is transformed from a scapegoat 
 
196 Girard, Things Hidden, 140. 
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into the first martyr, an offering of blood well-pleasing to the Lord not for his 
death, but for the innocence of his life? Does not this story, in other words, invert 
the mythological roles of the two brothers by means of the sacrifice of one of 
them, vindicating and exalting the victim while banishing (albeit with mercy) the 
victorious perpetrator, consigned to wear forever the telltale “mark” of the 
Girardian scapegoat?197 Girard acknowledges that this story, in vindicating Abel, 
is anti-mythological, if we understand myth in Girard’s sense as the narrative 
correlate of archaic sacrificial ritual.198 Girard’s interpretation of Cain and Abel is 
not sensitive enough to the story’s complexity: the Bible’s judgment of the two 
brothers depends entirely on the sacrificial mechanism, whose constraints it 
overcomes. 
This recursive turning-back-in of the process of binary division onto its 
own generative mechanism has this peculiar effect of “splitting” the scapegoat 
entity into two figures. In the biblical narratives, one of these figures is usually 
exalted and vindicated, while one is cast down and condemned, corresponding 
to the original unitary victim’s benign and malevolent aspects resulting from the 
double transference. The Enochic myth of the Watchers, recorded in the 
extracanonical book 1 Enoch thematizes this pattern using the narrative materials 
 
197 The scapegoat is typically selected for some distinguishing characteristic of his person, such as 
a disfigurement. See Girard, The Scapegoat, 17–21. 
198 Girard, Things Hidden, 140–41. 
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provided by the biblical primeval history.199 1 Enoch’s erasure of the traces of 
moral ambiguity in sacrificial generativity, in contrast to the biblical texts, 
renders it a true myth. Enoch, the righteous prophet, is exalted to the heavens, 
while his wicked counterpart, the rebellious angel Asael, is cast down a deep pit 
and buried under a heap of stones, never again to see light (1 En 6–13). Asael’s 
execution, imaged by a combination of stoning and being thrown off a cliff, 
associates him with the Levitical scapegoat of the Day of Atonement ceremony, a 
detail whose relevance we will soon uncover. Reinforcing this connection 
between the Girardian and Levitical scapegoats, Asael and the Levitical 
scapegoat are pushed off the same cliff,200 while the Qumran text of 1 Enoch 
actually alters this angel’s name to ‘azaz’el, the Hebrew designation for the 
scapegoat (cf. Lev 16:8).201 Asael’s punishment, like that of the Girardian 
psychosocial scapegoat, brings fruitfulness and renewal to the earth (1 En 10:7, 17 
ff.). Another manifest element of the Watchers myth oddly adumbrates the 
redemptive substitution, as Enoch takes on the priestly role that had belonged to 
 
199 Upon seeing my use of extracanonical texts, someone has pressed me to define a norm for 
discerning true from false revelation. Since in the Orthodox Church there is no notion of a canon 
of Scripture per se, I can respond only with the scriptural criteria: a false prophet is one whose 
prophecies do not come true (Deut 18:22), but a true spirit confesses Jesus Christ come in the flesh 
(1 John 4:2). 
200 See Archie T. Wright, The Origin of Evil Spirits: The Reception of Genesis 6:1-4 in Early Jewish 
Literature (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 107–109. 
201 See Paul D. Hanson, “Rebellion in Heaven, Azazel, and Euhemeristic Heroes in 1 Enoch 6–11,” 
Journal of Biblical Literature 96 (1977): 195–233, at 222–24. 
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the fallen angels (1 En 12–13).202 The splitting of the figure of the Girardian 
scapegoat into equal and opposite mirror images in this myth is thus imbued 
with pronounced shades of the redemptive exchange; the myth represents the 
substitution of victim for double, but confounds the ordinary power relation of 
Enoch and the fallen angels so as to produce an inversion of the qualities the 
scapegoat acquires in the double transference—a second substitution that inserts 
Enoch in the angels’ place. The elements of the redemptive operation are present 
in 1 Enoch, but the text remains oblivious to its own sacrificial character, so that 
it stays in the realm of the properly mythological. 1 Enoch’s agenda is sectarian, 
and its ends are better served by reaffirming the category divisions between 
“good” and “bad” groups of people than in exploding the possibility of 
victimizing the Other. The reason why the pattern of the redemptive inversion 
may be found at all in 1 Enoch is presumably that the community wished to see 
itself as an oppressed victim, as attested by this text’s abundant jeremiads about 
the persecutions of the saints. 
A later rabbinic elaboration of the Watchers myth renders the division of 
the victim even more explicit. In this rabbinic version, the two leaders of the 
angelic rebellion are said to be the origin of the two goats of Yom Kippur. The 
 
202 See Martha Himmelfarb, Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 20–25. 
193 
 
angel Shemihazah, who is executed by being suspended between heaven and 
earth, is the predecessor to the sacrificial goat, whereas Azazel (Asael) is the 
prototype of the Levitical scapegoat (m. Yoma 67b; cf. Lev 16). The rabbinic telling 
is worth mentioning not only because it brings the Girardian scapegoat of the 
Enochic myth into explicit identification with the Levitical scapegoat, but also 
because it renders the pairing of the victims fully explicit. 
Abraham and Lot are the next pair in the biblical history to cast the 
shadow of the split victim. Abraham takes possession of the barren highland, 
where he is blessed and builds an altar; Lot chooses the fertile and populous 
regions of the lowland for his portion, coming to dwell by Sodom (Gen 13:5–18). 
They are divided and inverted. 
The covenant sacrifice of Abraham (Gen 15) receives a stunning synthetic 
interpretation in another extracanonical work, dating from possibly the 1st 
Century of the Christian era, titled in one manuscript “The Book of the 
Apocalypse of Abraham.”203 In this work, the themes of atoning sacrifice, the 
emergence of the Law, the apocalyptic loss of the Temple, and personal 
conversion are all treated together as one. Abraham, whose viewpoint is 
presented with an uncanny attention to his subjectivity (notably 
 
203 On this work’s dating, see R. Rubinkiewicz’ introduction in Charlesworth, Old Testament 
Pseudepigrapha, vol. 1, 681–88. 
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uncharacteristically of this work’s historical epoch), turns his attention away 
from the wooden and stone idols made in his father Terah’s house and toward 
the one true God, who surpasses all created material. God then calls Abraham in 
response to Abraham’s acknowledgment of him. Abraham’s conversion 
precipitates an episode that echoes the sacrifice on mount Moriah (Apoc. Ab. 9:8; 
Gen 22:2), but with Isaac entirely erased from the story. The sacrificial theme in 
the Apocalypse of Abraham presents once again the Day of Atonement motif 
found in the Enochic myth, as Yahoel, the priestly angel who bears the divine 
Name, raises up Abraham from the mountain top in a consuming burst of 
heavenly fire, while the demonic bird Azazel is imprecated and banished to the 
hellish wilderness (cf. Gen 15:11; Jub 11:11), his garment of incorruption passing 
over to the righteous Abraham in exchange for the saintly patriarch’s earthly, 
corruptible nature (Apoc. Ab. 10–15; cf. 1 Cor 15:53). The Apocalypse of 
Abraham thus exemplifies not only the splitting of the victim, but the recursive 
judgment against the power of the sacrificial and the saving exchange between 
better and worse entailed in the redemptive process, all by means of a fully 
thematized sacrificial mechanism. The sublimation of sacrifice into law is 
represented in this work by the transference of the scene of Abraham’s offering 
from Moriah to Horeb (Apoc. Ab. 9:8; 12:3), a medley of intertextual references 
into which Abraham’s covenant-sacrifice is combined (Apoc. Ab. 9:1–5). The 
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purifying as well as community-constituting nature of sacrifice are in this way 
transmuted into a foundation for justice and redemption. 
The Temple theology of the Apocalypse of Abraham is starkly 
transcendental, mapped out in a strongly sacralized space. The earthly Temple, 
which, in any case, is insinuated to have been idolatrous, is burned up (Apoc. 
Ab. 8), and the anthropomorphic tendencies of the Kavod theology are rejected 
with mockery in favor of a fully transcendent God known only through his 
angelic mediator (Terah’s idol falls into the fire, and, like Ezekiel’s Deity, burns 
from his legs; Apoc. Ab. 5:9; Ezek 1:27).204 But with the repudiation of the 
Temple, the Apocalypse of Abraham does not create a de-centered universe; the 
Temple is instead spiritualized, and expanded to cosmic dimensions: if one 
envisions the Temple tilted on one side, then the highest heaven, a region well 
above the veil of our terrestrial sky (cf. Ps 103:2),205 coincides with the Holy of 
Holies; it is God’s cosmic throne-room. The lower infernal realm, on the other 
hand, corresponds to the court of the Gentiles. 
The Apocalypse of Abraham’s eschatology and theology of conversion 
similarly exhibit a very developed synthesis, but without the full dynamism of 
 
204 I owe this insight to Andrei Orlov. Cf. also Isa 44 as a source of elements of this image. 
205 See Andrei Orlov, Divine Scapegoats: Demonic Mimesis in Early Jewish Mysticism (Albany, NY: 
SUNY Press, 2015), 47. 
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the sacrificial dialectic that occurs in the canonical Old Testament. Like its twin 
text, the Ladder of Jacob, the Apocalypse of Abraham presents a spatialized 
eschatology, the end of things being stored up as a predestined mystery in a 
heavenly ultima;206 through Abraham’s calling and his re-orientation toward the 
authentic Transcendent, the heavenly future meets the earthly present in the field 
of Abraham’s subjectivity. There is not quite an authentic futurity here; the brute 
spatialization of time spoils the possibility for realizing historical contingency. 
And while the Apocalypse of Abraham assigns a prominent place to Abraham’s 
conversion from idolatry toward a recognition of authentic divine transcendence 
(Apoc. Ab. 1–7), and even situates God’s attendant judgment on good and evil in 
the Moriah scene within a bifurcating scapegoating event, good and evil remain 
ensconced in static categories, a dualism typical of apocalyptic ideologies, but at 
odds with the dialectical dynamic of redemption in the Bible, which tends 
instead toward unification and forgiveness even in the act of dividing and 
judging. The Apocalypse of Abraham therefore construes the subject’s 
conversion toward the good only as the result of divine election (Apoc. Ab. 20, 
22). 
 
206 In the Ladder (or Stairway) of Jacob, a work whose stylistic, thematic, and ideological 
similarity to the Apocalypse of Abraham suggest to me identical authorship (cf. H. G. Lunt’s 
remarks in Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, vol. 2 [1985], 406), the successive future ages of history 
are arranged in sequence on the steps of the stairway to heaven Jacob sees at Bethel. 
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To return to the canonical biblical history: Ishmael, the elder son of 
Abraham, is persecuted by his kin and banished to the wilderness; Isaac, the 
younger, assumes primogeniture (Gen 21:1–21). With hardly any delay, Isaac is 
then offered up (Gen 22:1–18). The figure of the victim is again divided between 
the two brothers, as in the tale of the first fratricide. 
Esau, the elder, is proven unworthy, and supplanted by the rule of Jacob. 
Though the brothers are of one origin, Jacob is blessed and exalted before God 
through the acquisition of Esau’s goat-like features, while Esau, the goat-man, is 
exiled to the wilderness, consigned to a benignly second-rate prosperity, much 
like Ishmael (Gen 27). 
A peculiar episode later in the Jacob cycle bears remarking. The rivalry 
between Jacob and Laban is visibly mimetic: Laban’s deceit of Jacob by the 
changing of his brides is redirected back at him by Jacob’s changing of his sheep 
through a reciprocal act of trickery. Once Jacob flees, the rivalry escalates to the 
point of violence, as Laban is prompted to pursue and apprehend him (Gen 29–
31). The parties reconcile, amassing a pile of stones to mark a permanent 
boundary between them. On top of this pile, they eat a meal together (Gen 31:46), 
cementing their peace. The indications of an underlying dynamic of scapegoating 
are readily apparent to a Girardian reader: the heap of stones is the site of the 
killing of the victim, the meal is the founding parties’ participation in the 
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sacrifice, and the result of the procedure is peace and the creation of a difference. 
The only erased element is the victim itself. Can this episode be said to represent 
a positive step in the redemptive history? Or is it an instance of relapse into 
mythic misapprehension? Should the elimination of the putative object of 
violence be taken as an indication of a preference to resist the evil aspect of 
sacrifice? Could such a resistance then be taken as reinforcing the sacrificial 
system by maintaining the reader’s blindness to its processes, or as a step on the 
way to enlightenment? All these possibilities are fair; the uniqueness of the 
episode leaves us with too few points of reference to propose any definite 
conclusion. 
The Joseph cycle displays a whole row of reversals of primogeniture, each 
possibly playing a part in an etiology of Davidic or Ephraimite hegemony.207 In 
the Joseph narrative, the vindication of the scapegoat figure takes center stage, 
serving as the mechanism driving the reversal.208 Joseph is twice cast into a pit, 
both times for envy’s sake, and once with a false accusation; twice he is 
vindicated by the Deity, who, were it an archaic myth, ought to have sanctioned 
his penalty; twice he is resurrected, and exalted above all his brethren, in the end 
using his power to work reconciliation. The vindication of the victim seems 
 
207 See above, p. 175. 
208 On the Joseph cycle, see Girard, Things Hidden, 143–48. 
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logically to require the abasement of the persecutors, in accordance with the 
sacrificial dialectic’s operation of division; but Joseph’s extension of forgiveness 
manifests rather a principle of unification, a pure overcoming of sacrifice that is 
embedded within sacrificial division. Sacrificial division here serves the end of 
evangelical unity. 
The scene in which Joseph is cast into the well (Gen 37) is from yet another 
text that displays rich symbolic connections with the Levitical scapegoat 
ceremony. Like the Apocalypse of Abraham, this first major episode of the 
Joseph cycle centers around a transaction carried out through the changing of a 
garment. Joseph is stripped of his glorious coat before being cast down the well, 
while a kid is slain for the purpose of deceiving Isaac. These two events have a 
mutually causal relationship: the slaughter of the kid effects the symbolic 
transfer of death onto Joseph, and Joseph is correspondingly deprived of his 
garment of glory.209 
The sequence of Genesis 38, embedded within the narrative of Joseph’s 
banishment and vindication, contains further inversions of sacrificial divisions, 
though in every case lacking the ethical overtones of the Joseph cycle. Firstborn 
 
209 On the theme of the Levitical scapegoat in this episode, see Calum Carmichael, Illuminating 
Leviticus: A Study of Its Laws and Institutions in the Light of Biblical Narratives (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 37–52; Andrei Orlov, The Atoning Dyad: The Two Goats of 
Yom Kippur in the Apocalypse of Abraham (Boston: Brill, 2016), 32–42. 
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sons in this sequence are displaced almost as if by divine predestination, each 
successively incurring God’s half-arbitrary displeasure.210 Er, the firstborn of 
Judah, is killed by God quickly with no explanation as to the nature of his 
wrongdoing (Gen 38:7); Zarah and Pharez trade places in order of birth (Gen 
38:28–30). In the latter case, Day of Atonement imagery surfaces again, as Zarah, 
the “first” firstborn, is tied by the wrist with a garment of corruption, a scarlet 
band reminiscent of the one tied to the Levitical scapegoat’s horns according to a 
widespread extrabiblical tradition.211 Zarah then withdraws back into the womb, 
yielding primogeniture to Pharez, the forebear of the Davidic line. The trickery of 
Tamar against the patriarch Judah is the final episode in this sequence that 
evokes the themes of sacrificial exchange and inversion. Judah, sending a kid 
away to nowhere, is deprived by ruse of his symbols of status and identity, 
which pass into the possession of Tamar; she is subsequently sentenced to be 
offered up by fire, though the fortunate revelation that she is in the right saves 
her life. 
As the Genesis narrative shifts back to Egypt, the sacred history witnesses 
a final series of inversions that caps off the primordial history. Joseph is exalted 
above his elder brethren; and Jacob, giving his deathbed blessings, lifts Joseph’s 
 
210 See comments by Robert Alter, in The Five Books of Moses (New York: Norton, 2004), Gen 38. 
211 See m. Yoma 4:2; 6:6, 8; m. Shabbat 9:3; Barnabas 6:7–11; see also Orlov, Divine Scapegoats, 14–24. 
201 
 
sons above the delinquent eldest brothers, Reuben and Simeon (Gen 48:5; 49:3–7), 
blessing Judah likewise above the elder sons of his mother (Gen 49:3–12)212 and 
reversing the respective privileges of Ephraim and Manasseh (Gen 48:13–14, 17–
20). 
Nadab and Abihu, the elder sons of Aaron, are ironically consumed by the 
divine fire in the sanctuary after presenting a parody of the lawful offering; their 
bodies are expelled from the camp as scapegoats in the Levitical sense, and they 
are supplanted by the younger Ithamar and Eleazar, who offer rightly (Lev 10:1–
7). 
We find the pattern of an elevated victim and an expelled victim reflected 
again in the ritual of the two birds, prescribed for the cleansing of various 
impurities (Lev 12, 14–15). One version of the ritual, used for the cleansing of a 
leper, has attracted particular attention from modern scholarship for its 
similarity to the scapegoat ceremony, described in the subsequent chapter of 
Leviticus.213 In the case of leprosy, instead of sacrificing the two birds as a sin 
offering and a burnt offering respectively as in the other versions of the ritual, 
 
212 While Judah is only the fourth of the six sons of Leah, he is, significantly, the least of four in 
the first batch of four sons named in Gen 29:32–35. 
213 See Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 16, in The Anchor Bible, vol. 3 (Doubleday, 1964), 1044–45; David P. 
Wright, The Disposal of Impurity: Elimination Rites in the Bible and in Hittite and Mesopotamian 
Literature (Atlanta, GA: Scholars, 1987), 75–86; Mary Douglas, Leviticus as Literature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 193, 247–51. 
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one bird is killed, while the living bird is dipped in the other’s blood and 
released into the wilderness (Lev 14:4–7). (One thinks at once of Joseph’s coat 
dipped in the blood of the slaughtered kid.) This ceremony of the “scapebird,”214 
alas, lacks the transparency for us to be able to indicate anything more than its 
phenomenological homology with the split sacrificial victim. The birds of 
cleansing only circumstantially reinforce the recurring presence of the split 
victim’s underlying structure. 
The Day of Atonement ceremony presents a much more detailed case 
study. Nearly every instance of the sacrificial subversion we have adduced falls 
within this ceremony’s nexus of significations—hence, perhaps, the ubiquitous 
references to it. In the Levitical scapegoat ceremony, the phenomenon of the 
splitting of the victim is so much foregrounded in the persons of the two goats 
that the difficulty faced by commentators in explaining the need for two goats 
rather than simply one has left the entire ceremony half-veiled to most modern 
interpreters. This despite the relentless attempts to analyze the ritual from the 
 
214 Douglas’ term; see ibid., 193. 
203 
 
diverse perspectives of its philology,215 genetics,216 ideology,217 phenomenology,218 
and even its construction as fantasy.219 Girard, who spent little time on the 
Levitical scapegoat ritual in any event,220 himself stands among those who have 
not managed to address the curious feature of the two goats. 
Yet it is one of the most remarkable elements of this ritual that an 
asymmetrical offering of two goats is performed. The significance of the twoness 
of the offered animals cannot be dismissed, given the recurrence of the same 
asymmetrical pattern and some slight transmutations of it throughout the book 
of Genesis and beyond. The scapegoat ceremony cannot be understood 
parsimoniously as a pharmakos ritual with a second offering coincidentally tacked 
on, as most commentators mistakenly read it.221 
 
215 See Manfred Görg, “Beobachtungen zum sogenannten Azazel-Ritus,” Biblische Notizen 33 
(1986), 10–16. 
216 See Bernd Janowski, “Der Bock, der die Sünden hinausträgt: zur Religionsgeschichte des 
Azazel-Ritus Lev 16, 10.21 f,” pages 109–169 in Religionsgeschichtliche Beziehungen zwischen 
Kleinasien, Nordsyrien und dem Alten Testament: Internationales Symposion Hamburg, 17–21 März 
1990, ed. Bernd Janowski, Klaus Koch, and Wilhelm Gernot (Fribourg, Switzerland: 
Universitätsverlag Freiburg Schweiz, 1993); Janowski‘s view is informed by Girard’s theory of 
sacrifice. 
217 See Douglas, Jacob's Tears; Carmichael, Illuminating Leviticus. 
218 See Wright, The Disposal of Impurity. 
219 See Günter Stemberger, “Yom Kippur in Mishnah Yoma,” pages 121–138 in Thomas Hieke and 
Tobias Nicklas, The Day of Atonement: Its Interpretations in Early Jewish and Christian Traditions 
(Leiden: Brill, 2012). 
220 One of the few references in which Girard acknowledges the relevance of the Levitical 
scapegoat to his thesis is contained in but a single page of The Scapegoat (p. 120). 
221 Citations would be of little use here, as the tendency of scientific interpreters to fixate on the 
single most salient element of the ritual, namely the expelled goat, at the expense of all other 
elements such as the immolated goat, is nearly universal. Some modern commentaries that have 
been composed with a more religious bent, such as those of Baruch Levine (Leviticus: The 
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Much is made of the bare fact of two atoning goats in the Levitical account 
itself, which presupposes the pair of goats as such through its regulation that lots 
shall be cast to determine their respective roles (Lev 16:8), as well as in the 
extrabiblical traditions. Among the latter, the most important rabbinic work on 
the ceremony, Mishnah Yoma, attests that the goats are to be identical in size and 
appearance (m. Yoma 6:1), implying that they have an intrinsic, and not merely 
circumstantial, connection. Moreover, the Levitical text introduces the goats with 
morphologically parallel designations: the one whose blood will cleanse the 
adytum and whose carcass will be burned is lYHWH, while the one who will bear 
the community’s sins into the wilderness is l‘z’zl. Does the combined weight of 
this evidence not imply that juxtaposed, and not merely complementary, 
functions for the goats are to be imagined? 
 
Traditional Hebrew Text with the New JPS Translation [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 
1989], 150–53), Jacob Milgrom (Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, 
in The Anchor Bible [New York: Doubleday, 1991]), and Baruch Schwarz (“The Bearing of Sin in 
the Priestly Literature,” pages 3–21 in Pomegranates and Golden Bells: Studies in Honour of Jacob 
Milgrom [Eisenbrauns, 1995]), manage to keep clear of this tendency altogether, yet without 
offering any rationalization of the fact that two goats were required. All the named commentaries 
construe the two goats as complementing each other by addition: there are two kinds of impurity, 
so two animals are needed, or some such thing. Wright, who is sensitive to the problem of the 
two goats, settles for such a solution, concluding that each goat removes a different type of 
impurity (The Disposal of Impurity, 16–21). Nothing is to be said against the fact that the two goats 
evidently remove different impurities; yet that the Levitical text unavoidably lays significance by 
the fact that the two animals are twins, and not merely that there are two of them, is a fact to 
which these commentators do not, in my view, give adequate attention. Wright’s comparative 
study of the Israelite Day of Atonement ceremony and its Ancient Near Eastern analogues 
furnishes enough examples to prove that the use of two animals instead of one is significant. 
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Recent scholarly interpretations of the scapegoat ritual can be classified 
into five approaches, with some researchers straddling more than one of them.  
(1) In the work of a great many researchers, especially those who wrote in the 
final phase of the 20th Century, the influence of Religionsgeschichte can be 
distinctly felt. These scholars treat the Levitical ceremony as a historical artifact, a 
point on the line of human religious development, but now evacuated of 
palpable significance; they seek to explain the ceremony genetically by deriving 
it from Near Eastern antecedents,222 or phenomenologically, by positing 
magical223 or metaphysical224 categories that allow these scholars to ascribe a 
primitive rationality to the ceremony.225 The pairing of the goats tends on the 
whole to be a matter of indifference to these writers.  (2) Other researchers look 
for a static, ahistorical meaning in the scapegoat ceremony, interpreting it as an 
 
222 David P. Wright traces the ceremony’s elements to parallels in numerous adjacent cultures; 
Görg controversially derives the ceremony from Egypt; see references in n. 213 and n. 215 above. 
223 See Levine, Leviticus, 99–110, 250–53; cf. Milgrom, Leviticus 16. 
224 See Schwarz, “The Bearing of Sin in the Priestly Literature.” 
225 Mary Douglas, in Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept of Pollution and Taboo (London: 
Routledge, 2005), theorized that this ceremony was constructed with reference to a system of 
categories that, when considered from a total structural standpoint, could be considered to 
represent a primitively scientific universal rationality (51–71). Douglas later repudiated much of 
this view, but a parallel to Girard in her original reading is worth pointing out. Dirt notably 
functions in Douglas’ structuralist anthropology in an analogous manner to the scapegoat in 
Girard’s anthropology: dirt is the excluded element that holds the key to destabilizing and 
reorganizing the social system. Douglas originally mistakenly identified unclean animals as the 




aggregate of metaphors226 or symbols (a favorite option among Christians),227 a 
liturgical parable,228 or an analogical demonstration of Priestly cosmology.229 The 
tendency of those who take this approach has been, with some exceptions, to 
underplay or ignore the slaughtered goat.  (3) We owe thanks to Daniel Stökl ben 
Ezra, whose Saussurean approach brings before us the possibility of interpreting 
the Levitical account with reference to the play of significations in a greater field 
of ideas and practices traceable in its reception history.230  (4) The approach of 
Günter Stemberger is, to my knowledge, unique. Stemberger alerts us to the 
hermeneutical fact that the scapegoat ceremony exists in a complex of received 
texts, not as a physically enacted performance. The ritual is, historically at least in 
part and, as we know it today, entirely, a textual (re)construction, not an event 
that can be subjected to scientific observation.231  (5) Finally, Mary Douglas, in her 
late work, capitalizes on Calum Carmichael’s ideological interpretation of the 
ceremony.232 This approach clears the way for the reading I advance here, if the 
 
226 See C. L. Feinberg, “The Scapegoat of Leviticus Sixteen,” Bibliotheca Sacra 115 (1958), 320–31. 
227 See Dominic Rudman, “A Note on the Azazel-goat Ritual,” Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche 
Wissenschaft 116, no. 3 (2004): 396–401. 
228 See Carmichael, Illuminating Leviticus, 37–52. 
229 See Douglas, Leviticus as Literature, 241–51. 
230 This field of ideas and practices is termed by Stökl the “imaginaire.” See Daniel Stökl ben Ezra, 
The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity: The Day of Atonement from Second Temple Judaism to 
the Fifth Century (Mohr Siebeck, 2003). To this approach add also much of the work of Andrei 
Orlov; see all references to him in the bibliography. 
231 Stemberger, “Yom Kippur in Mishnah Yoma.” 
232 See Douglas, Jacob's Tears, 38–60; see also idem, “The Go-away Goat,” pages 121–41 in Rolf 
Rendtorff, Robert A. Kugler, and Sarah S. Bartel, The Book of Leviticus: Composition and Reception 
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former is taken in conjunction with the historical relativization of the Levitical 
text accomplished by approaches (3) and (4). 
Douglas’ ideological interpretation, the culmination of a lifelong evolution 
of her views on this text, deserves its own expanded summary. The ceremony 
described in Leviticus 16 is, for Douglas, a political parable of the Priestly writer. 
The purpose of the ceremony is to foster the wholeness of the community and to 
prevent harmful divisions from emerging, both internally, within the Judahite 
nation, and externally, with its neighbors. The internally oriented aspect of the 
ceremony, Douglas notes, functions unusually compared with typical 
purification ceremonies from around the world. “Religious purity generally 
emerges as an ordering principle which a community has spontaneously evolved 
to sort and sanction its social relations”;233 but, Douglas observes, the internal 
class divisions that are typically reinforced by purity laws are entirely absent 
from Leviticus.234 The Levitical laws, including the ordinances for the removal of 
the impurities of Israel and the sanctuary on the Day of Atonement by means of 
the goats, effectually suppress class divisions, since Leviticus makes no class-
related distinctions when it comes to deeming persons clean or unclean. Douglas 
 
(Leiden: Brill, 2003); Calum Carmichael, “The Origin of the Scapegoat Ritual” (Vetus Testamentum 
50:2 (2000): 167–182); and n. 228 above. 
233 Mary Douglas, “Atonement in Leviticus,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 1, no. 2 (1993), 109–30, at 111. 
234 Ibid., 112–14. 
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infers that this Priestly egalitarian theology is directed against Ezra’s exclusivist 
resettlement project.235 As for the community’s external relations, Douglas 
characterizes P’s agenda as “liberal” and “universalistic” (in contrast to Ezra, P 
sees the Josephites to the north as brothers rather than apostates);236 she follows 
Carmichael in identifying the goat lYHWH as the representative of Judah and the 
“Go-Away Goat” (her rendering of “goat l‘z’zl”) as the representative of Judah’s 
brothers (the Josephites) and cousins (Edom).237 Even these outcasts have a place 
in the locality of Judahite dominion; they are not rejected altogether. Hence, 
Douglas emphasizes, the Go-Away Goat is left unharmed after its expulsion.238 
One can discern clearly, on Douglas’ reading, the conciliatory feeling of 
Leviticus’ version of the day of Atonement ceremony. And never were it more 
crucial to keep at the front of our consciousness that the Levitical ceremony is a 
text, nothing more or less. We can readily contrast its features with the numerous 
indications that the scapegoat was abused and killed, or with the simpler Day of 
Atonement sacrifice prescribed by Jubilees 34:18–19, which calls for only a single 
goat and aligns with the more archaic ordering functions of sacrifice and purity, 
as exhibited in this text’s exclusionary attitude toward the Northern tribes.239 
 
235 Ibid., 129–30, and eadem, Jacob’s Tears, 63–87. 
236 Ibid., 130. 
237 Douglas, Jacob’s Tears, 54–58. 
238 Ibid., 58–59. 
239 The contrast between Leviticus and Jubilees is discussed by Douglas in ibid., 39–40. 
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Now, is not the crucial piece of evidence for Douglas’ reading—which I do 
not disagree with as far as it goes—the peaceful treatment of the second goat? 
And is it not at this very point that the fantastic construction of the text becomes 
most obvious? Allowing that the scapegoat, contra all the extrabiblical accounts, 
was not executed, must it not still have been abused most horrendously, lest it 
retain the will to make its way back to civilization? 
Moreover, does not the interpretation presented by Douglas, convincing 
as it is, imply that the Levitical account conceals its contrary, a threat of disunity, 
the division of brother against brother? And is there no irony in Leviticus’ use of 
priestly, Judahite hegemony as the means of bringing about this unity, soothing 
Israel’s internal and external divisions with precisely the effect of maintaining 
them? The openly divisive tactics of apocalyptic texts such as the Apocalypse of 
Abraham and Jubilees, by contrast, undermine such hegemony, allowing for the 
generation of change and the overturning of norms through sacrificial division 
and inversion, while P, like Deuteronomy in this case, puts sacrifice directly to 
anti-sacrificial ends, suppressing dialectically requisite divisions, and supplying 
the principles of reconciliation and unity. Both halves of this ideological struggle, 
in the fashion once again of the historical dialectic of sacrifice, contribute 
necessary components to the complex historical unfolding of redemption; both 
also realize the transcendence of sacrifice only very incompletely. 
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The inclusion of extrabiblical, especially apocalyptic, texts within our data 
is of crucial importance for illuminating the Day of Atonement ceremony; a 
Biblicist approach would mislead us. The motif of the two goats shows up in 
certain of these texts, such as 1 Enoch, as the signifier of a division between good 
and evil, light and darkness, the infernal side mirroring its heavenly counterpart 
with a thoroughgoing yet false symmetry.240 The latent ideological features of the 
earliest major Day of Atonement texts (viz. Leviticus, 1 Enoch, and Jubilees) 
favors a reading of the scapegoat ceremony as a privileged witness to a greater 
process, situated within the redemptive arc of biblical history. While attempts to 
flatten the text-ritual of the Day of Atonement into a frozen system of 
signification (à la approaches (1) and (2) above) prove unable to explain the motif 
of the two goats, by expanding the field of play to include the full range of 
applicable texts (à la (4)) one can discern a pattern in the various narrative 
analogs of the two goats. The goats must be two in number because they signify 
an irreducible complexity, a division of better from worse, of elect from 
reprobate, yet within a total systematic order. They form an image of the 
redemptive dialectic at work in the dualities in creation (beginning from the 
division of light from darkness) as well as in the theological and political monism 
 
240 See Andrei Orlov, Dark Mirrors: Azazel and Satanael in Early Jewish Demonology (Albany, NY: 
SUNY Press, 2011), 1–8. 
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that informs Isaiah (“I make weal and I make woe”), the Deuteronomistic 
materials, and the Priestly texts. It is these two tendencies which, though 
contrary, necessarily coexist in the biblical history. They constitute together, and 
contain within themselves severally, the historical dialectic of sacrifice. This 
dialectic is the scheme of the redemptive work as we are able to experience it. 
Let us bring this illustrative excursion into the scapegoat ceremony to a 
close, so as now to complete our tour of redemptive inversions in the biblical 
history. 
Gideon, the smallest in his house, is appointed by divine grace to smite 
the Midianites (Judg 6). 
David, though the least among his brethren, is put before them through 
divine election (1 Sam 16). 
Solomon, like his father, becomes king instead of his elder brother, 
Adonijah (1 Kgs 1). 
The high priest Joshua, though clothed with filthy garments, is stripped of 
these upon the rebuke of Satan who stands against him; the removal of Joshua’s 
raiment is the passing of his iniquity from him, and is followed by his receiving 
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new clothes and a fair miter (Zech 3:1–5). Joshua and Satan are the twin figures 
in this exchange of garments.241 
Jesus of Nazareth, in an evident Day of Atonement typology, is stripped 
of his garments, and clothed in a royal robe (a scarlet one according to Matthew, 
like the “garment” tied to the scapegoat’s horns); his elevation on the Cross is a 
counterpoint to the release of his homonymous twin, the criminal Jesus Barabbas, 
whose surname means in Aramaic “son of the father” (Matt 27:15–31).242 
Christian interpreters, it should be pointed out, have never missed the 
opportunity to apply the scapegoat typology to Christ, Origen having done it as 
presented here, while the Epistle of Barnabas, Justin, and Tertullian identify the 
two goats with the two parousiai, one signifying Christ’s ignominious expulsion 
from the people, the other his exaltation in glory.243 
We may adduce one further occurrence of the motif of the redemptive 
exchange in the New Testament. The episode marks off the transition from the 
sufferings of Christ to the witness of the martyrs. Stephen is accused and stoned, 
 
241 I have already noted that the motif of a changing of garments occurs in the Apocalypse of 
Abraham and in the birth of Zarah, and reflects the crimson band said by tradition to have been 
tied to the scapegoat’s horns. A deeper exploration of this important detail would be excessive 
here, but one may refer to the references in n. 211 above, as well as to Orlov, The Atoning Dyad, 
43–48, 95–106, for a deeper analysis of this connection, and for further examples of it. 
242 See Stökl’s observations in The Impact of Yom Kippur, 165–71. 
243 Origen, Homily on Leviticus 10:2; Barnabas 7:9; Justin, Dialogue with Trypho 40:4; Tertullian, 




like the rebel angel Asael; but in contrast to his mythological prototype, whose 
vision is forever darkened by a heap of rocks (1 En 10:5a), Stephen is vouchsafed 
a vision of God, and is transformed with a bright appearance, “like the 
countenance of an angel” (Acts 6:15; 7:55–56). While Stephen is clothed in this 
glorious light,244 his persecutors are stripped of their garments (Acts 7:58), a clear 
reversal of the mythological motifs that manifest in this episode’s Enochic 
antecedent.245 The redemptive process has reached the point of breaking through 
and breaking out; the vindication of the scapegoat—the Girardian and the 
Levitical ones coincide here—has been rendered explicit in the persecution of the 
expanding Church, and, with the paradoxical result of a non-divisive forgiveness 
(Acts 7:60), the positions of persecutor and persecuted have been wonderfully 
inverted. 
§ 20. Gift and Economy: The Necessity and Contingency of the Redemptive Exchange 
For Girard, the Bible is a progressive reversal of myth, beginning from the Law, 
the Prophets, and the Psalms, and culminating in the Passion narratives of the 
Gospels. “Throughout the Old Testament,” Girard comments, “a work of 
 
244 Compare the findings on Adam’s luminous garment in Silviu Bunta, “One Man (φως) in 
Heaven: Adam-Moses Polemics in the Romanian Versions of The Testament of Abraham and 
Ezekiel the Tragedian’s Exagoge” (Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha 16 [2007]: 139–65). 
245 The connections between Stephen and Asael I arrived at jointly with David Burnett in a 
seminar discussion. Cf. Schwager, Must There Be Scapegoats? Violence and Redemption in the Bible 
(New York: Crossroad, 2000), 189–90. 
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exegesis is in progress, operating in precisely the opposite direction to the usual 
dynamics of mythology and culture.”246 The Bible’s inverted myths represent an 
ongoing, reflexive act of interpretation leading toward a demonstration of the 
innocence of the surrogate victim. The progress in today’s moral consciousness 
of persecution, to which this hermeneutic process is both cause and witness, is 
not, Girard emphasizes, brought about by any seminal thinkers; it is an 
uncontrolled process on which MT merely comments.247 Jesus’ execution is the 
pivotal event wherein the dominance of the sacred, signified by the Temple and 
the occlusive function of its inner veil, is irreversibly overcome: 
The veil of the Temple conceals the mystery of sacrifice—it makes material 
and concrete the misrecognition at the basis of the sacrificial system. For 
the veil to be rent, therefore, is tantamount to saying that by his death 
Jesus has triumphed over this misrecognition.248 
 
The view Girard presents here is, like those of many of his interpreters, monistic. 
A simple truth is revealed by a transcendent revelation. As previously 
mentioned, this type of view was overcome by Girard in his late phase.249 
Against Girard’s early position, but as a logical extension of his later views, I am 
arguing for an internally complex account of the redemptive operation. The 
 
246 Girard, Things Hidden, 151. 
247 Ibid., 127. 
248 Ibid., 225. 
249 See § 12 above, pp. 115–16. 
215 
 
redemptive process manifests itself as having both a monistic and a dyadic 
structure at once; it is involved in an overarching transcendent good that exceeds 
the possibility of totalization within the limits of historical possibility, yet it 
operates in history on the basis of sacrificial divisions. It is the monistic element 
that saves this theory from falling into a merely idealist dialectical conception, 
which could allow for such infelicitous results as a division in the nature of the 
Godhead.250 The dyadic principle, on the other hand, allows us to go beyond an 
only weakly trinitarian idea of the redemptive work as a “pure excess of gift”; it 
furthermore provides insurance against the relativization of all rational and 
physicalistic theories of redemption as metaphors to be appropriated on the basis 
of their convenience for whosoever’s arbitrary ideological needs. The redemptive 
work is, as dyadic, a work of economy; though it exceeds the capacity of reason 
and resists any reduction to immanent concepts, it at the same time impinges 
upon us from within the domain of the real. This theory of redemption models a 
hard reality. It is firmer than materialist approaches to atonement that can accept, 
modify, or dispense with theories depending only on their aesthetics, the 
desirability of their consequences, and their sanction by tradition. 
 
250 À la Žižek; see “The Fear of Four Words: A Modest Plea for the Hegelian Reading of 
Christianity,” pages 24–109 in Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or 
Dialectic? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009). 
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Redemption is, of course, strictly impossible within the limits of economy, 
and it requires the “impossible gift,” so much sought after by today’s religious 
phenomenologists, that exceeds economy’s bounds. The sacrificial order admits 
of no escape from its power, yet it is through this power of the enemy that the 
Power on high acts to save his creatures. This duplicitousness of redemption, 
together with the possibility for sacrificial binaries to operate recursively through 
the redemptive process’s duality, is what I have termed the sacrificial dialectic 
throughout this chapter. The notion of the sacrificial dialectic reaffirms the 
economic side of the problematic of redemption, which has fallen today into 
neglect, but is an obvious and essential feature of the most prominent traditional 
theories of redemption. Because the redemptive work operates according to 
economy and materiality, it is both absolutely contingent and, paradoxically, 
bound by necessity. 
It is at this point, having laid down the theoretical foundations of my 
mimetic approach to redemption, that I will proceed into the proper sphere of 
Christian doctrine, critically rereading the paradigmatic theories of redemption 
that have long provided the Church with the coordinates for its thinking on the 
subject. I do this not for the sake of novelty or doctrinal innovation, but with the 
aim of retrieving certain elements latent in these theories. Such an effort can, I 




THE TRANSCENDENCE-STRUCTURE, THE SACRIFICIAL EXCHANGE, 
AND CHRISTIAN PARADIGMS OF REDEMPTION 
As I discussed in Chapter 1, one who has received the saving gift of divine grace 
also holds an implicit soteriology. Additionally, I asserted that soteriology is 
knowledge that is in part constitutive for one’s salvation. Redemption is the 
means of salvation, and without it salvation could not happen. An 
understanding of redemption, then, will (or at the very least may) be included 
within this (implicit) knowledge. Understandings of redemption are formalized 
in Christian theology as theories. It is to these theories of redemption that I now 
turn. 
Christian redemption theory is not uniform, and has never undergone a 
process of official creedal formulation in many of the largest Christian bodies. It 
thus remains a realm for freedom of expression within the latitude granted by 
communal consent. In spite of the freedom and diversity to be observed in this 
area of theology, most theories of redemption may be found to conform to one of 
three general types: first, “subjective” theories, which locate the efficacy of the 
redemptive work primarily in the spiritual and moral conversion of the sinner; 
then two types of “objective” theory, which attribute the efficacy of the 
redemptive work to a transaction between Christ and God the Father, or to a 
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transaction between God and the devil, respectively, Christ’s death being the 
price paid to redeem humanity in either case.251 To the first type belong so-called 
moral influence and exemplarist theories, as well as numerous riffs on these that 
stress the morally transformative power of the Second Person’s participation in 
human suffering. To the second type belong the satisfaction theory of Anselm of 
Canterbury and the widely believed penal substitution theory. Broadly speaking, 
these theories and others of their class hold the status of orthodoxy within 
Western Christian traditions today, while theories of the first type are often 
demarcated as innovative or radical. The third kind of theory, suggesting a 
ransom agreement in which God allowed the devil to take Christ’s life in 
exchange for the liberation of humanity, is widely attested across Christendom 
prior to the middle ages. Today it is discredited in Western traditions. The theory 
has been resuscitated with some success, however, by such widely read figures 
in contemporary Western theology as Gustav Aulén and J. Denny Weaver, in the 
form of a dramatic theory known as Christus Victor that emphasizes Christ’s 
triumph over evil as the centerpiece of redemption.252 In the Eastern traditions, 
the ransom theory has sometimes been rejected,253 sometimes repeated, but most 
 
251 This is approximately Aulén’s typology given in Christus Victor, whose view has been followed 
in many manuals on atonement theology since its publication. 
252 See ibid., 143–59, and Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement, 13–128, 306–320. 
253 Refer to n. 167: Gregory Nazianzen rejected at once the ransom view and the proto-Anselmian 
view that Christ was a propitiatory offering to the Father. 
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often benignly ignored. Since the fourth century, the East has shown relatively 
little interest in theories of redemption, opting instead for the philosophically 
agreeable language of deification.254 
In what follows, I will examine representatives of each of the three types 
of theory. Without taking any of these theories at literal face value, I will 
demonstrate that what I called in Chapter 4 the sacrificial dialectic is strongly 
present in each of them. Each example, that is to say, serves as a paradigm for 
how sacrifice and the structures it generates are utilized by God to constitute the 
destruction of the sacrificial system, and the transcending of it toward the 
possibility of a new order. Further, each theory considered clearly displays the 
operation of the sacrificial exchange and the conversion of the believer that frame 
 
254 One has a good right to ask why deification ought not to be considered a fourth type of theory 
of redemption alongside the others. Indeed, Stephen Finlan seems to imply that deification can 
function in place of traditional (from his Western perspective) notions of atonement, a position 
which raises the possibility of counting it among them; see Finlan, Problems with Atonement: The 
Origins of, and Controversy About, the Atonement Doctrine (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2005). 
Furthermore, deification posits an exchange (in the form of a transfer of natural properties) of the 
sort that I have insisted is characteristic of the New Testament language of redemption (see Ch. 
2). I nonetheless find this extended typology inadvisable. As is widely recognized by now, 
proponents of all three major types of redemption theory, ancient and modern, have embraced or 
implied deification as part of their teaching. Moreover, in the Greek-speaking tradition by which 
deification has been made famous, deification and redemption do not compete with each other at 
the level of doctrine, as different theories of redemption always do in some fashion. The ransom 
theory exists frictionlessly alongside deification in Gregory of Nyssa; the Anselmian theory 
incorporates organically into the deification-centered doctrine of Nicholas Cabasilas. The 
language of deification may substitute rhetorically for theories of redemption and in this sense 
compete with them, but it never displaces them in the system of doctrine. It thus seems best to 
consider deification a feature of Christian teaching that overlaps and intersects with theories of 
redemption, without being of a kind with them. In circumstantial support of this conclusion, 
deification lacks two important features typical of theories of redemption: it is not in itself violent 
or sacrificial, and it is not intrinsically mechanistic. 
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the sacrificial dialectic. So, rather than treating the three types of redemption 
theory as mutually contradictory, or playing them against each other in creative 
tension, I will be effecting a common retrieval from all three. While it is not my 
intention to recommend any or all of these theories on their own terms, my 
procedure will surely have the collateral effect of rehabilitating each example I 
examine. 
As representative specimens of each type, I have chosen figures and texts 
that are widely considered common points of reference for redemption theorists. 
For the first two types of theory, the choices were obvious. Peter Abelard’s 
theory of redemption, displayed in the infamous quaestio on Romans 3:26 in his 
Commentary on Romans, has been received as the prototype of subjective theories, 
and will be examined in conjunction with some illuminating passages in his 
Ethics (§ 21). Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo, with its closely related work Meditation on 
Human Redemption, is the common point of reference, and probably the historical 
high point, for theories of the second type. I have chosen to focus on the briefer 
Meditation for reasons that will be explained (§ 22). For the third type, the choice 
was more delicate. No one figure stands apart as the favored representative of 
the ransom theory, while the many great minds who have applied themselves to 
it make for a variety of worthy options to choose from. I have selected Gregory of 
Nyssa’s version of the ransom theory, articulated in the Great Catechism and On 
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the Three-Day Interval between the Death and Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, 
and featuring his influential metaphor of the fishhook, because of its elegance 
and elaboration (§ 23). In all three cases, other choices could have been made. 
Nor is it the case that any theory of redemption would have served as a suitable 
subject. Doubtless many theories of redemption fail to display any sensitivity to 
the sacrificial dialectic whatsoever. Many others, such as popular versions of the 
penal substitution theory, are aberrant with respect to norms of Christian 
teaching, despite being widespread. But through the narrow selection of theories 
I present, the possibility and fact of sensitivity to the sacrificial dialectic in each of 
the three main phenotypes of redemption theory can be demonstrated. The 
whole breadth of Christian redemption theory can thus be shown susceptible of 
the retrieval to which I wish to direct attention. 
§ 21. Peter Abelard: Commentary on Romans 
Peter Abelard’s Commentary on Romans seems at first glance a difficult launch 
point for a demonstration of the sacrificial dialectic’s relevance to redemption 
theory. On a cursory reading, Abelard appears to totally ignore the notion of 
sacrificial exchange. On top of this, he has been received as the arch-opponent of 
sacrificial-substitutionary theories.255 It was largely because of Abelard’s putative 
 
255 Two of the most widely read and cited scholars on atonement theory, Hastings Rashdall and 
Aulén, interpreted Abelard this way. Rashdall championed him for it. In Rashdall’s view, 
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rejection of vicarious sacrifice, apparently voiced by him in an excursus (or 
“quaestio”) on redemption following his commentary on Romans 3:26, that he 
was denounced by Bernard of Clairvaux, condemned at the Council of Sens in 
1140, and revived in later times as the diametric alternative to Anselm. Since the 
great Protestant debates between liberal and orthodox viewpoints on atonement 
that took place in the 19th and early 20th Centuries, relatively little substantive 
literature has been produced on Abelard. 
Abelard is indeed a proponent of what is now termed the moral influence 
theory of redemption. But Abelard’s texts are studied far less often than they are 
refuted, and an attentive reading of them reveals an understanding of 
redemption that, while coinciding with some elements of his caricature as a 
proto-liberal, displays the sacrificial exchange and the sacrificial dialectic with 
high resolution. What we shall find is that, far from proposing a non-sacrificial 
theory of redemption, Abelard does retain the element of vicarious sacrifice 
within his soteriology; but, as if repeating the redemptive operation within his 
own ideas, Abelard banishes the sacrificial element to the margins, sacrificing the 
 
Abelard “sees that God can only be supposed to forgive by making the sinner better, and thereby 
removing any demand for punishment” (Hastings Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement in Christian 
Theology, being the Bampton Lectures for 1915 [London: Macmillan, 1919], 359). As I shall 
demonstrate, this view has not much to be said for it, and is the result of superficial reading. 
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sacrificial for the sake of the ethical. The sacrificial thus uncannily conserves itself 
in his theory, not unlike how it does for the Deuteronomist. 
The theory presented in the aforementioned quaestio will be my focal 
point.256 The Commentary on Romans is interspersed with numerous such excursus 
on doctrinal problems, each presented as a question followed by Abelard’s 
answer. The text of Romans 3:23–26, on the last verse of which the concerned 
quaestio comments, reads as follows: 
[23] For all sinned, and fall short of the glory of God, [24] being justified 
freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; [25] 
whom God put forth as an atonement through faith in his blood, to be a 
demonstration of his righteousness, because God in his forbearance 
passed over the sins of the past [26] for the demonstration of his 
righteousness in the present time, that he might be just and the justifier of 
those who are of the faith of Jesus. 
 
Before tackling Abelard’s dense commentary on this verse, it will be necessary to 
backtrack in order to give some context to his usually misrepresented position. 
Thanks to waning interest in Abelard over the last century, the most 
complete study of his theological works is still J. G. Sikes’ 1932 publication.257 
Sikes reads Abelard as basically an exemplarist: Christ’s Passion saves people by 
 
256 The text of the quaestio may be found in Petri Abaelardi Commentaria in Epistulam Pauli ad 
Romanos, in Petri Abaelardi Opera theologica, Corpus Christianorum 11 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1969), 
113.124–118.274. 
257 J. G. Sikes, Peter Abailard (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1932). Sikes, like Aulén, 
writes in conversation with critiques of Abelard that saw him as the archetype of the liberal, 
subjective position on atonement. 
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demonstrating to them God’s goodness, and so turning them away from their 
sins. Without going so far as to endorse Abelard’s view, he legitimizes his 
exemplarism by indicating its antecedents in both Augustine and Anselm.258 
Sikes additionally claims to locate inspiration for Abelard’s exemplarism in a 
citation from Isidore of Seville, quoted directly in Abelard’s writings, stating that 
“the divine Wisdom became man so that wisdom should lighten the world.”259 
Richard Weingart’s full-length study on Abelard’s soteriology departs somewhat 
from this exemplarist reading. Weingart reads Abelard as proposing a 
soteriology of moral influence with a significant objective inflection. Refuting the 
usual assessment of Abelard’s theory as subjective, Weingart demonstrates how, 
for Abelard, salvation depends entirely on an act of grace on God’s part that 
brings about a change in the Christian. Commenting specifically on the quaestio 
on Romans 3:26, Weingart asserts that “the whole tone of the passage is set by 
the theme that God is moved by love to take the initiative in transforming 
men.”260 Abelard nonetheless makes frequent use of transactional and hieratic 
metaphors in his sermons and in the Commentary on Romans itself. Weingart 
 
258 See Augustine, de Catechizandis Rudibus 4.7–8 (PL 40:314), and Anselm, Meditationes (PL 
158:771–2), cited and discussed in Sikes, Peter Abailard, 205–6. 
259 Sikes, Peter Abailard, 207; the original citation is found in Abelard’s Theologia Christiana, Book 
IV. (PL 178:1278C). 
260 Richard E. Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love: A Critical Analysis of the Soteriology of Peter 
Abailard (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), 120–32; so also Paul Fiddes, Past Event and Present Salvation: 
The Christian Idea of Atonement (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1989), 140–68. 
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resolves this tension between Abelard’s moral influence theory and the literal 
language of redemption by deducing that the Cross is for Abelard “the symbol of 
the painful cost borne by God to redeem men,” and that this “cost” is 
represented by metaphors such as redemption in Abelard’s homiletic rhetoric. 
Moral influence thus assumes the role of the prime motive according to 
Weingart, as exemplarism does for Sikes. J. Patout Burns, on the other hand, 
gives a concise but undeveloped summary of Abelard’s position that takes 
seriously his frequent language of vicarious punishment, which is all too often 
overlooked.261 
What, then, is Abelard’s real understanding of redemption? Despite the 
notoriety he achieved when it came to this point of doctrine, Abelard, unlike his 
recent predecessor Anselm, never laid out a thorough and comprehensive 
explanation of his view. The assumption that Abelard held a coherent and 
systematic view of redemption is nonetheless warranted by some statements he 
 
261 J. Patout Burns, “The Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory,” Theological 
Studies 36, no. 2 (1975): 285–304, 289–91. Philip Quinn overstates Burns’ tightly argued assessment 
in declaring that Abelard includes penal substitution within his interpretation of atonement; see 
Philip L. Quinn, “Abelard on Atonement: ‘Nothing Unintelligible, Arbitrary, Illogical, or Immoral 
About It,’” pages 282–300 in Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman 
Kretzmann, ed. Eleanore Stump (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). Thomas Williams 
similarly attempts to rationalize Abelard’s model as objective and transactional through an 
overextended reading: Christ delivered us from sin, to which we had sold ourselves for the 
pretium of pleasure; see Thomas Williams, “Sin, Grace, and Redemption,” pages 258–78 in The 
Cambridge Companion to Abelard, ed. Jeffrey E. Brower and Kevin Guilfoy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
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makes in his treatises. Specifically, the occasional statements about redemption in 
Abelard’s Commentary on Romans that have generated most of the controversy 
can be systematized quite easily when taken in conjunction with passages in his 
Ethics, a work to which he refers the reader of the Commentary on Romans on 
several occasions for more detailed discussion of complex topics.262 Though the 
Ethics is a later work and, at points, reflects a more mature development of some 
of Abelard’s ideas, the Ethics clearly cannot postdate the final version of the 
Commentary on Romans, which must have been revised over an ongoing period of 
time.263 The Ethics can, then, be read together with the controversial quaestio in 
the latter work. It is to the theology of sin and redemption expressed in the Ethics 
that I now turn. 
Abelard’s Ethics bears the alternate title Know Thyself (Scito Seipsum), and 
these two names indicate the double spirit in which the work is written. On the 
one hand, the treatise is dry and academic, defined by Abelard’s preoccupation 
 
262 Consider, e.g., the typical citation at the end of Comm. Rom. 4:8 (141). 
263 There is general agreement that while Comm. Rom. and Ethics both represent Abelard’s mature 
thought, Ethics is the later work. The chronological relation between them, however, is clearly 
more complicated, as attested not only by the mentioned references to Ethics in Comm. Rom., but 
by manuscript evidence indicating that portions of Ethics predate its writing in the form of oral 
teaching. Between the options that present themselves from this evidence, it is sounder to 
conclude that Comm. Rom. was revised to include ideas from Ethics than that Ethics’ ideas date 
from the time of Comm. Rom. and were incorporated into the latter’s original version. For 
example, the notion of consent is a development in Abelard’s teaching that appears only in Ethics 
and other very late works, never in Comm. Rom. See John Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter 
Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 68, 259–60. 
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with the question of culpability that runs through much of his corpus; on the 
other hand, the Ethics reads like a spiritual guidebook, concerned always with 
existential religious questions, and specifically with the discernment of virtue 
and vice.264 One cannot quite decide which of these two tones predominates, but 
religious concerns appear to be what frame the work as a whole. Book I, 
comprising most of what survives of the Ethics, is concerned chiefly with the 
definition of sin and the conditions for its remission. It is here that Abelard lays 
out most explicitly his understanding of sin, conversion, and the purpose of the 
sufferings of Christ. 
Sin, for Abelard, has no necessary correlation with bad will,265 nor does it 
consist in a bad act or in pleasure.266 Abelard gives instead the following two 
definitions of sin: sin is scorn for God,267 and sin is one’s consent to do what 
ought not to be done or to omit to do what ought to be done.268 The factor of 
consent, though articulated only very late in Abelard’s thinking, is crucial for 
 
264 It is for this reason that I reject Paul Kemeny’s interpretation that Ethics pitches the virtuous 
life as something in which all people are meant to share, without respect to faith. Abelard’s 
emphasis is more definitely Christian than that, notwithstanding his consistent academic tone 
and display of pagan learning. See Paul C. Kemeny, “Peter Abelard: An Examination of His 
Doctrine of Original Sin,” Journal of Religious History 16, no. 4 (1991): 374–86, at 380. 
265 Ethics I.10 f., in Peter Abelard, Ethical Writings: His Ethics or “Know Yourself” and His Dialogue 
between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), 3. Page references in this 
edition will be given in parentheses. 
266 Ethics I.35 f. (8). 
267 Ethics I.8 (3). 
268 Ethics I.7 (3–4). 
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understanding his theory of redemption,269 as it means that sin is defined not by 
one’s relation to things or to acts per se, but by one’s relation to God. This 
distinction will assist us in making sense of Abelard’s understanding of 
conversion, which is the crux of his soteriology. A similar kind of distinction is 
drawn by Abelard in his definition of right and wrong: right and wrong reside 
only in intentions, not in acts. This distinction, too, will prove relevant. 
The antidote for sin is what Abelard terms penitence, a concept that he 
configures as the counterpart to sinful consent and the essential condition for a 
true change in intent. True penitence is motivated by love for God rather than by 
fear of punishment, and therefore wipes out even conditional consent to evil; a 
true penitent would not do wrong again, even if there were no penalty. True 
penitence draws God’s charity, and the penitent then receives reconciliation for 
his or her penitence.270 
So far, Abelard’s soteriology fits well with his putative exemplarist or 
moral-influence doctrine of redemption. The usual readings of him hit a major 
snag, however, once brought up against his clear statements on the punishment 
(poena) due for sin, which are to be found in the Ethics as well as in the 
 
269 Though consensus appears late in Abelard’s terminology, the concept it designates may be 
applied retrospectively to his earlier thinking. Consent serves for him only to differentiate the 
various senses of voluntas/velle in his earlier works. See n. 263 above. 
270 Ethics I.164–165 (37–38); cf. Comm. Rom. 3:26 (118.258–59), quoted below. 
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Commentary on Romans. Right intention and refraining from sinning are not 
sufficient conditions for salvation in Abelard’s view; those who never hear the 
Gospel preached but live without fault (i.e. without wrong intent), for instance, 
will be damned regardless.271 If we assume the least modicum of consistency in 
his thinking, Abelard cannot have construed salvation as resulting solely from 
moral influence or exemplification, since salvation is not strictly the result of 
what these achieve, viz. a change in intention. 
Abelard does not directly state any reasons for this divergence between 
salvation and faultless living in the Ethics. To the contrary, he seems to contradict 
his position when he asserts that penitence will necessarily result in the 
remission of the eternal penalty of damnation.272 These tensions are left 
untreated, but can be explained by a distinction running through both the Ethics 
and the Commentary on Romans between salvation as the direct result of 
penitence—what Abelard precisely terms justificatio/justification in the 
Commentary on Romans—and forgiveness, i.e. the remission of eternal 
punishments. The latter always coincides with penitence by virtue of God’s 
predestination, but is not formally tethered to it.273 It is because of God’s 
predestination that Abelard can say, for example, that someone who lives with 
 
271 Ethics I.126–128 (28–29). 
272 Ethics I.169 (39). 
273 Ethics I.171 (40). 
230 
 
penitence but dies without baptism is deprived of salvation. This person 
inevitably will not persevere in penitence, and so will die in sin.274 The strong 
doctrine of baptism implied by this reasoning again precludes the charge that 
Abelard is a plain and simple exemplarist. 
One further indication that Abelard operates with an understanding of 
forgiveness as autonomous from penitence and justification is to be found in his 
discussion of the senses of the word “sin.” In a passage of the Ethics, Abelard 
distinguishes four such senses: sin is properly understood to mean scorn for God 
or consent to evil, but it can refer also to a sacrifice for, the penalty or 
punishment (poena) for, or the deeds that follow from sin proper.275 Abelard 
surmises that when we say Christ bore our sins, we speak of sin in the third 
sense: he took the punishment for our sins so that the punishment could be 
excused. Moreover, adds Abelard, when we speak of original sin, we do not 
mean any fault (since this is impossible in the case of children), but only a 
hereditary punishment for Adam’s sin.276 Clearly Abelard does not view 
forgiveness and justification as coinciding either conceptually or in fact; clearly 
also, then, sin proper and punishment do not always coincide. This is even more 
emphatically the case if Abelard intends by the above statements a distinction 
 
274 Comm. Rom. 3:27 (120.334–121.344). 
275 Ethics I.113–116 (25). 
276 Ethics I.115 (25). 
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between Christ bearing our punishment and Christ taking away our sin proper. 
Since sin proper is a matter of intention or consent, Abelard cannot possibly 
advocate for salvation by exemplification or moral influence except insofar as 
salvation does not subsume forgiveness. The bearing of sin by Christ is not a 
metaphor for the change of heart instilled in the faithful by his Passion; he 
believes that Christ literally suffered the punishment due us for our sins. 
A few passages in the Commentary on Romans confirm and elaborate on 
Abelard’s position just discussed from the Ethics. Abelard maintains that the 
term “sin” has a distinct sense in which it really means only “punishment.” Since 
iniquity cannot be imputed to infants, but they are damned nonetheless, he 
reasons that original sin must mean the punishment for Adam’s sin.277 Though 
“sins are forgiven through the sigh of penitence,”278 a distinction between 
justificatio, brought about through penitence, and the remission of punishment is 
operative in the Commentary as in the Ethics, and is even made explicit: justificatio 
and justitia depend on the acquisition of charity,279 but only after justification does 
baptism effect the total remission of punishment, i.e. forgiveness (though in 
 
277 Comm. Rom. 5:19 (164.354–165.395). 
278 Comm. Rom. 4:7 (124.73–75). Quotations in English are adapted from Commentary on the Epistle 
to the Romans, trans. Steven R. Cartwright (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2011). I have modified the translation for intelligibility, when necessary, after comparison 
with Corpus Christianorum’s Latin text. 
279 Comm. Rom. 3:27 (121.356–62). 
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children the chronological sequence is reversed).280 Hence, no one who has lived 
since the institution of baptism can be saved without it, barring martyrdom.281 
Again, the reason penitence guarantees forgiveness is that God assures, through 
his predestination, that one will receive neither or both. Only for this reason is 
penitence said by Abelard to blot out eternal punishments.282 Temporal 
punishments for sin, those to be inflicted on earth and in purgatory, remain in 
any event, and require satisfactio.283 As for the relationship between temporal and 
eternal punishments as they pertain to the suffering of Christ, this question 
remains unexplored by Abelard.284 
The distinction between justification and forgiveness plays a central role 
in structuring Abelard’s understanding of the Passion. Each of these components 
of salvation is effected separately. Justification is effected—that is, penitence is 
brought about—through God’s “demonstration of his righteousness,” and it is 
this aspect of the saving work alone that is the subject of the controversial 
quaestio on Romans 3:26. Forgiveness, on the other hand, is bestowed by reason 
of Christ’s assumption of the penalty for sin.285 Abelard shows my interpretation 
 
280 Ibid. (121.345–55). 
281 Ibid. (119.299–300). 
282 Comm. Rom. 4:7 (124.81–83). 
283 Ethics I.166 (38–39). 
284 Comm. Rom. 4:7 (124.80 f.); see Burns, “The Concept of Satisfaction,” 290. 
285 Abelard does not seem to have any explanation for why this vicarious suffering was necessary 
in the first place, nor does he explain how Christ’s suffering is adequate to the penalty sinners 
owe; see Burns, ibid. 
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is correct when he pairs these two components of salvation together in his 
commentary on Romans 4:25. Here, he explicitly distinguishes Christ’s “bearing 
of our penalty” from the metaphorical “cost” of redemption that Weingart 
erroneously concludes is the real meaning of Abelard’s penal language. The 
relevant lines on Romans 4:25 are here quoted in full: 
[Christ] is said to have died “on account of our transgressions (propter 
delicta nostra)” in two ways: on the one hand because we transgressed, on 
account of which he died, and we committed sin, the penalty of which he 
bore (cujus ille poenam sustinuit); on the other hand, that he might take 
away (tolleret) our sins by dying, that is, he swept away the penalty of our 
sins by the price (pretio) of his death, leading us into paradise … 
 
Next, having spoken of the penalty borne by Christ, Abelard adds at once the 
aspect of redemption that he previously called justification: 
… and through the demonstration of so much grace—by which, he says, 
“No one has greater love” [John 15:13]—he drew back our souls from the 
will to sin (voluntate peccandi) and kindled the highest love of himself 
(summam sui dilectionem).286 
 
The “demonstration of grace” that results in penitence and justification is 
precisely distinguished from the penalty borne by Christ. Moreover, the order in 
which these ideas are introduced in the quoted passage suggests that for 
Abelard, the former is dependent on the latter. The “demonstration of grace” that 
brings about the subjective change in the sinner is presumably the demonstration 
 
286 Comm. Rom. 4:25 (153.992–1000). Abelard goes on to define justificatio as the perseverance in 
justitia, in which Christ’s resurrection is meant to confirm the believer (ibid. [153.1001-6]). 
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of Christ’s willingness to bear our penalty! Abelard’s theory is a moral influence 
theory, but it clearly cannot be boiled down to exemplarism or subjective 
influence alone; the relation between exemplification and the vicarious bearing of 
punishment is more complex than that. 
We are now in a position to approach the quaestio on Romans 3:26. 
Abelard seeks to address in this quaestio the problem of what exactly is meant 
when Christ’s death is called a redemption. He makes room for his new view by 
demonstrating the incoherence of the ancient ransom theory. God can forgive 
without honoring any rights supposedly held by the devil;287 God could free 
mankind from the devil by the power of his command alone (cum sola jussione).288 
The ransom payment made in Christ’s blood could therefore have been due to 
God alone, since he is the rightful proprietor of all creatures at all times.289 
Indications in Abelard’s text suggest also a subtle refutation of the new 
satisfaction theory.290 
What, then, could the meaning of the blood ransom be? Abelard answers 
that the blood ransom should be understood as the cause of justification; 
 
287 Comm. Rom. 3:26 (115.174–91). 
288 Ibid. (116.192–209). 
289 Ibid. (117.227–30). 
290 See H. Lawrence Bond, “Another Look at Abelard’s Commentary on Romans 3:26,” pages 11–
32 in Medieval Readings of Romans, eds. William S. Campbell, Peter S. Hawkins, and Brenda 
Schildgen (New York: T&T Clark, 2007). 
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justification is defined by Abelard in this passage as the acquisition of love for 
God.291 Justification is said to be “through the blood of Christ” (cf. Rom 3:25) in 
that Christ offered a demonstration of God’s love by his perseverance to the 
point of death: 
Nevertheless it seems to us that in this we are justified through the blood 
of Christ and reconciled to God, that it was through this matchless grace 
shown to us that his Son received our nature, and in that nature, teaching 
us both by word and by example, persevered unto death and bound us to 
himself even more through love (amor), so that when we have been set 
aflame by so great a benefit of divine grace, true charity might fear to 
endure nothing for his sake [i.e. we be made just].292 
 
Justification is thus achieved by a grace that is realized in the fact of its 
manifestation, its “demonstration” (Rom 3:26), marking Abelard’s doctrine of 
justification as decidedly exemplarist and, in my Girardian terminology, 
centered on conversion. Abelard goes so far as to identify conversion, this 
enkindling of love for God and forsaking of desire for the earthly, with 
redemption itself. Thus: 
… our redemption is that supreme love in us through the Passion of 
Christ, which not only frees us from slavery to sin, but gains for us the 
true liberty of the sons of God, so that we may accomplish all things by his 
love rather than by fear. 
 
 
291 Comm. Rom. 3:26 (117.242–43; 118.253; and vicinity). 
292 Ibid. (117.243–48). 
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The central work toward the imparting of such love is the Passion and 
Crucifixion: 
He showed us such grace, than which no greater can be found, by his own 
word: “No one,” he says, “has greater love than this: that he lay down his 
life for his friends” [John 15:13]. … He witnesses, therefore, that he has 
come to increase this true liberty and charity among men.293 
 
Thus, the quaestio on Romans 3:26, the only location where Abelard inquires 
about the meaning of redemption as such, identifies redemption with the 
demonstration of grace in the Passion and on the Cross, which turns the believer 
toward God by infusing a just and justifying love. 
What are we to make of the quaestio’s account of redemption, which 
appears quite incomplete when placed in the context of Abelard’s whole 
soteriology? And in what ways does it manifest the logic of sacrificial exchange? 
These two questions deliver their answer into our lap if we ask both of 
them together. The theory of the transcending of the sacrificial economy that has 
been worked out over the preceding chapters can efficiently explain the striking 
absence from this passage of Abelard’s teaching that Christ assumed the penalty 
for sin. 
 
293 Ibid. (118.256–65). 
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The absence of the punitive aspect of Abelard’s soteriology is not a 
peculiarity of the quaestio on Romans 3:26. A complete reading of the Commentary 
on Romans as well as the Ethics shows that Abelard’s ethical preoccupation, that 
is, theologically speaking, the theme which he calls “justification” in the 
Commentary on Romans, predominates almost absolutely in these works. This is 
undoubtedly the reason why secondary accounts of Abelard’s soteriology have 
so often marginalized or missed his inclusion of vicarious punishment in his 
system. Abelard himself marginalizes this part of his thinking in his major 
theoretical treatments of sin and redemption. It turns out that there is something 
to be said for the propensity to treat him as a proto-liberal. Being himself an 
ethicist, Abelard is far more interested in the ethics of salvation than in anything 
else having to do with it. 
It is in this marginalization, this striking separation of the subjective and 
objective dynamics of salvation, not only in the form in which Abelard presents 
his ideas, but in the very structure of his soteriology, that one perceives the 
double aspect of the transcending of the sacrificial system, which manifested 
itself in certain biblical texts in the form of a historical dialectic. The overcoming 
of sacrifice is itself irrevocably dependent upon sacrifice. In Abelard, the thesis 
and antithesis of this dialectic are posed side by side, each represented fully 
independently of the other, such that their relationship appears ruptured. The 
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unifying re-orientation toward the Divinity and away from the multiplicity of 
created being stands out at the heart of Abelard’s soteriology, while the sacrificial 
element, the vicarious victim, is peeled off and left to the side; the two 
components of the dialectic have almost no interaction with one another. The 
sacrificial exchange and the unifying process of conversion are split apart by 
Abelard in his texts. 
Conversion takes center stage in Abelard’s theory. In this aspect of his 
soteriology—for which alone, in contrast to Anselm and to Abelard’s critics, 
Abelard reserves the term “redemption”—there is no trace of the sacrificial. The 
sacrificial exchange, the vicarious suffering of the scapegoat, has been expelled to 
the margins of his system of thinking. At its expense, Abelard emphasizes love 
for the Creator and the intention of the redeemed to do right, the ensigns, as it 
were, of the turn of the Christian toward the singularity that is God. Reciprocity, 
substitution, division, all the features of the sacrificial economy, have no place in 
the conversion of the Christian for Abelard. For him, redemption possesses 
singularly the character of such a conversion purified from sacrifice, defined only 
by an orientation toward God’s transcendence over earthly goods. 
Then, on the obverse side of Abelard’s soteriology, lies his teaching that 
Christ accounted for the penalty due for sin through his suffering. This accounts 
for the sacrificial dimension of salvation. The sacrificial exchange is similar to a 
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bank transaction: Christ accepted the punishment that was due the sinner, and 
that punishment may therefore now be lifted. The bifurcations generated in the 
symbolic order by the scapegoating event leave their mark in the transaction 
between Christ and the sinner, the transfer of punishment from one to the other. 
In contrast to the workings of conversion, the assumption of the sinner’s penalty 
by Christ is thoroughly economic, redolent of the unloading of evils onto the 
scapegoat and the inescapable order of necessity that follows from that archaic 
victim. 
Separated as these two sides of Abelard’s soteriology may be in his 
manner of presenting them, they nonetheless conjoin logically. The assumption 
of sin’s penalty by Christ changes nothing until the sinner merits it through 
penitence and is washed clean in the Sacrament. Only then is the sinner’s debt 
forgiven, and all restored. The economic transaction serves only as the means for 
bringing the sinner back into the simplicity of the love for God. 
God’s use of the sacrificial economy in order to subvert the sacrificial 
order thus finds representation in Abelard’s theory, obliquely, inelegantly, 
perhaps unconvincingly, but with great clarity. He repeats the redemptive 
operation in his own ideas. Rejecting the purely economic model of redemption 
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that claimed Christ was a payment to the devil,294 Abelard preserves the ethical 
integrity of his theory of redemption by banishing (sacrificing) the unethical and 
therefore undesirable sacrificial exchange. He repeats the mechanism of 
redemption, in an awkwardly Christian manner, by scapegoating scapegoating. 
By doing so, he forges a soteriology that respects God’s transcendent goodness, 
which cannot be bound by the necessity of economy,295 while retaining the 
transcended sacrificial act, which makes this transcending possible in the first 
place, at the margins of his soteriology. 
Abelard goes so far as to eliminate the sacrificial from his definition of the 
term “redemption.”296 But despite this, Abelard does not, and cannot, extinguish 
the presence and functioning of the sacrificial in his ideas; to the contrary, he 
renders the sacrificial aspect of redemption explicit on several occasions, without 
ever stating outright the dependence of redemption and conversion upon it. The 
sacrificial can never be kicked out of soteriology. 
The sacrificial dialectic thus achieves representation in Abelard’s theory of 
redemption in the broken form of a near-total splitting apart of the two contrary 
aspects of the redemptive operation, viz. sacrifice and the transcending of 
 
294 The rejection of the devil’s jus, it should be noted, is a typical premise of theories of 
redemption in the century following Anselm. See Weingart, Logic of Divine Love, 84, n. 3. 
295 Comm. Rom. 3:26 (116.200–204). 
296 A reading of the full quaestio at Comm. Rom. 3:26 bears this out. 
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sacrifice. The two aspects nonetheless remain logically dependent on one another 
in Abelard’s theory, just as they do in the Girardian mechanism of redemption 
developed in this dissertation. All this is true in spite of Abelard’s preference to 
treat the two aspects separately and without any explicit indication of their 
mutual dependence. His effort to separate them and suppress the sacrificial 
aspect can be understood as a sign of the functioning of the dialectic itself, a 
presentation of the antagonism inherent in it. 
It would be neither reasonable nor pertinent to venture historical or 
psychological explanations about what led Peter Abelard, and not anyone else, to 
produce this peculiar manifestation of the sacrificial dialectic, or why its traces 
appear in his texts in precisely the configuration that they do. Such is not my 
concern. Nor can the operation of this dialectic in Abelard’s theory be considered 
much compelling or interesting until one sees the pattern repeated, in different 
configurations but with all the same elements and dynamics, in very different 
theories. It is to the best known of all theorists of redemption, then, that I now 
turn for a second demonstration. 
§ 22. Anselm: Meditation on Human Redemption 
Anselm of Canterbury’s satisfaction theory of redemption is famously deduced 
in his major work Cur Deus Homo and recapitulated in summary form in his 
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Meditation on Human Redemption. I will take the lesser known Meditation as the 
primary point of reference for discussing Anselm’s theory for two reasons. First, 
the Meditation exactly repeats the essential steps of the argument made in the 
earlier Cur Deus Homo, with no apparent development of ideas in the interval 
between the two works. Second, the Meditation sets Anselm’s satisfaction theory 
directly in the context of conversion. This latter reason for preferring the 
Meditation is strongly reinforced when one considers the relation of Anselm’s 
total thought to meditation and prayer, activities that pertain to the subjective 
orientation of the Christian toward God that I have designated as conversion. As 
Dániel Deme observes in his study on Anselm’s Christology, the literary form of 
meditatio is of central importance to Anselm’s whole dialectical method. Anselm’s 
series of Meditations resemble prayers, albeit innovative ones with respect to the 
rigor of their theologizing; for Anselm, prayer is “the theological method itself, 
the hermeneutic framework, to which any subsequent point will have to refer.” 
Meditation is the intellectual and affective activity whose goal is to attain God, 
an act of orientation toward the supreme Transcendence.297 One will see that in 
Anselm’s Meditation on Human Redemption, the orientation toward God considers 
God precisely in his attribute of transcendence. 
 
297 Dániel Deme, The Christology of Anselm of Canterbury (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2003); quotation at 
p. 4. The word meditatio, Deme notes, occurs right in the prologue to the Monologion. 
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Anselm’s argument has been thoroughly studied, and does not bear full 
repetition and analysis here.298 I will only follow the major steps of Anselm’s 
 
298 Anselm’s complex argument has been analyzed in a number of ways, but the most convenient 
breakdown that sticks to Anselm’s assertions concisely and completely is the twenty-one-step 
analysis by David Brown, in “Anselm on Atonement,” pages 279–302 in The Cambridge Companion 
to Anselm (Cambridge Companions Online: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 281–82. Brown’s 
analysis is given here for convenient reference, quoted verbatim, with references to the relevant 
loci in Cur Deus Homo included: 
(1) All human beings have sinned: passim. 
(2) Eternal salvation and reconciliation with God is not possible without freedom from 
the effects of sin. 
(3) These effects cannot be eliminated by an act of divine forgiveness: I.11 (cf. also I.15; 
I.24; II.5). 
(4) So either punishment must follow, or else compensation/satisfaction be paid: I.13. 
(5) But God does wish some human beings to be saved: I.16–18. 
(6) So compensation must sometimes be the chosen alternative. 
(7) But “to sin is nothing other than not to render God his due”: I.11. 
(8) So, compensation must consist in giving to God what is not his due: I.11. 
(9) But, “if in justice I owe to God myself and all my powers even when I do not sin, I 
have nothing left to render to him for my sin”: I.20. 
(10) Therefore, compensation must be paid by an act, not owed to God, performed by a 
person other than one of whom (9) is true. 
(11) But, given what we owe to God, any sin is of infinite extent: I.21. 
(12) So compensation “cannot be achieved, except the compensation paid to God for 
human sin be something greater than all that is beside God … Therefore, none but 
God can make this satisfaction”: II.6. 
(13) But it is necessary that the person paying the compensation be also a man: II.8 
(“Otherwise, neither Adam nor his race would make satisfaction for themselves”). 
(14) “If, as is certain, it is therefore necessary that the heavenly community be made up of 
human beings and this cannot be effected unless the aforesaid satisfaction be made, 
which none but God can make and none but a human being ought to make, it is 
necessary for a God-man to make it”: II.6. 
(15) But it is not fitting for the Father or the Holy Spirit to be incarnated: II.9. 
(16) Therefore, the requisite compensation must be achieved by the incarnation of God 
the Son, and, from (8), such compensation will involve that “he somehow gives up 
himself, or something of his, to the honor of God, which he does not owe as a 
debtor”: II.11. 
(17) But “every reasonable being owes his obedience to God”: II.11, cf. (9). 
(18) “Therefore, it must be in some other way that he give himself, or something 
belonging to him, to God”: II.11. 
(19) But mortality is not an essential attribute of human nature “since, had man never 
sinned, and had his immortality been unchangeably confirmed, he would have been 
as really man”: II.11. 
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argument that are relevant to my purposes. The chief point to focus on is 
Anselm’s concept of debitum, on which hang both the sacrificial and sacrifice-
transcending aspects of Anselm’s theory. The two contraries of the sacrificial 
dialectic are to be found in Anselm’s use of this word. But, unlike with the case 
of Abelard, the contraries are not resolved into distinct phases of the redemptive 
work, but are instead interwoven and undivided. In this sense Anselm is a more 
successful theologian than Abelard; his theology of redemption is more 
integrated. 
Debitum is what every creature owes to God. In some common 
interpretations of Anselm’s thought, this term has been understood to mean a 
debt, in the financial or feudal sense. It is this reductive and imprecise 
understanding that accounts for Anselm’s oft-presumed connection with the 
historically subsequent penal substitution theory. For Richard Campbell as well 
as Lisa Cahill, Anselm’s concept of debitum is “deeply rooted” in a “Christianized 
teleology,” to be understood not just in terms of feudal obligations, but as a 
metaphysical concept.299 Others have identified the nature of debitum as the 
cohering force in a social cosmology; God’s justitia is the right ordering or right 
 
(20) “Therefore, one who wishes to make atonement/satisfaction for human sin should be 
such a one who can die if he chooses”: II.11. 
(21) So compensation/satisfaction/atonement will be made by the innocent death of God 
the Son. 
299 See Lisa Cahill’s systematic theological paper, “The Atonement Paradigm.” 
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relationships of creatures.300 Both of these interpretations are valid. From the 
metaphysical standpoint, things do what they “ought” insofar as they are 
fulfilling the end of their created nature; and justitia, a concept that is too easily 
associated with retribution, is to do what one debet for the sake of that debitum 
alone (hence for God’s sake).301 One should therefore read the feudal undertones 
in Anselm’s use of this medieval Latin concept as grounded in a medieval-
Platonic feeling of the order and harmony of the universe, not as an aberrant 
“Germanicization” of redemption theory.302 
Our relationship to God, insofar as sin and redemption are concerned, is 
defined by this metaphysical-cosmic debitum, which is in the first instance an 
economic, sacrificially grounded idea. Since one’s whole existence is thanks to 
(debitum) God, one ought (debet) to render back to God one’s whole will.303 
 
300 Alister McGrath emphasizes that Anselm’s justitia is not a legal or juridical concept, nor is it 
feudal; justitia is moral rectitude. See Alister McGrath, “Rectitude: The Moral Foundation of 
Anselm of Canterbury’s Soteriology,” Downside Review 99, no. 336 (1981): 204–13. Flora 
Keshgegian, exploring problems of human responsibility and empowerment in Anselm’s theory, 
charts satisfaction and justice as being about right order and right relationship, not the tyranny 
and abuse imaged by an offended lord or a creditor; see Flora A. Keshgegian, “The Scandal of the 
Cross: Revisiting Anselm and his Feminist Critics,” Anglican Theological Review 82, no. 3 (2000): 
475–92. 
301 See Richard Campbell, “The Conceptual Roots of Anselm’s Soteriology,” pages 256–63 in D. E. 
Luscombe and G. R. Evans, eds., Anselm: Aosta, Bec and Canterbury: Papers in Commemoration of the 
Nine-hundredth Anniversary of Anselm’s Enthronement as Archbishop, 25 September 1093 (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic, 1996), 262. 
302 Campbell cites Paul Fiddes and G. R. Evans as representatives of the reading of Anselm as a 
feudalist; see Campbell, ibid., 256–57, n. 2, 3. “Feudalist Anselm” can be discovered quickly by a 
perusal of the scholarly or popular literature on his satisfaction theory. 
303 Cur Deus Homo I.11, in Anselm, Opera omnia, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1940–1961 
[1946], pages 39–133), 68–69. 
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The sacrificial and sacrifice-transcending dynamics in Anselm’s theory 
intersect at the point of sinful humankind’s breached debitum toward God. 
Debitum functions, on the one hand, as an economic principle: creatures must 
render to God his due in reciprocation for his creative beneficence. But because 
sin cannot be repaid given our finite means, some surplus, a gift in excess of 
economy, must be offered to God. This surplus restitution paradoxically gets 
away from the reciprocity generated by sacrifice, while being necessary precisely 
because of it. Once this redemption-payment has been given—and here the 
refined metaphysical sense of debitum is crucial—Anselm finds himself freed 
from the impossible obligation imposed on him by his sin, yet still subject to a 
debitum toward his Creator on account of the redemptive sufferings undergone 
by Christ on his behalf. He who ought to have fulfilled his end as a creature by 
praising and glorifying God is now restored to such a state where he can do just 
that, unconstrained by the inequalities constituted by sin. So goes the calculus of 
Anselm’s Meditation on Human Redemption. 
Debitum, then, is the precondition of what I have called, in my Girardian 
terminology, the sacrificial exchange, as well as of conversion. The sacrificial 
economy is operative in both the objective and subjective aspects of Anselm’s 
247 
 
theory of redemption. Yet the concept of debitum is utilized, in all its economic 
force, for the purpose of exceeding this very economy.304 
This point can be demonstrated through an examination of the Meditation 
in detail. Anselm begins, like Abelard, with a refutation of the pure economy of 
justice embodied in the ransom theory.305 According to the then-widely followed 
version of this theory that had been inherited from Augustine, God used Jesus’ 
divinity as a concealed weapon, duping the devil into accepting Christ’s flesh in 
return for captive humanity, only for the devil to discover that this flesh was a 
Trojan horse; Jesus’ divine blamelessness meant that the devil had overstepped 
his rights by slaying him, and his contractual right over humanity was now 
forfeit.306 Anselm rejects this view, explicitly on the grounds that it supposes the 
existence of an economy of reciprocal justice that God could not overcome: 
Did the devil justly have against God or against man some claim which 
obliged God to act against him on man’s behalf [by concealing Jesus’ 
divinity] before acting by open force, so that, when the devil unjustly 
killed a just man, he would justly lose the power he held over unjust men? 
But surely God did not owe the devil anything except punishment. Nor 
 
304 Anselm, on this reading, evades the common objection, raised by Fiddes, that the satisfaction 
theory is overly objective because it lacks a strong doctrine of exemplification; see Fiddes, Past 
Event and Present Salvation, 96–104. 
305 Meditatio redemptionis humanae, pages 84–91 in Anselm, Opera omnia, vol. 3 (Edinburgh: Thomas 
Nelson, 1940–1961 [1946]), 85–86. 
306 Augustine, De Trinitate, Books IV and XIII. This obviously muddled view was a conflation of 
several ancient motifs used to portray the redemptive work: the descent into hell, the devil’s 
ransom, the Messianic secret, and a penal metaphor; see Schwager, Der Wunderbare Tausch, 32–53. 
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did man [owe the devil anything] except requital. … But even this [viz. 
requiting the devil] man owed only to God. …307 
 
The economy of justice is, therefore, entirely subordinated to God, and not 
something which God is bound to respect by any antecedent obligation. His 
jurisdiction is infinite, not governed by any higher necessity, a point which 
Anselm had already developed in detail in Cur Deus Homo.308 
Anselm relativizes economy by referring the totality of it to God. 
Necessity, in this case the need to uphold justice, is not a constraint on God, but 
is subject to his will, since all things are altogether transcended by him in every 
way, as Anselm makes explicit with his ontological argument in the Proslogion. 
Thus, “all necessity and possibility are subject to his will.”309 
Yet the subjection of all necessary reciprocity to God’s unbounded will 
implies equally the persistence of the sacrificial economy within this unipolar 
cosmos. The default on debt by sinners must be set aright; it is just that this 
necessity serves God’s ends, rather than constraining him: 
 
307 Meditatio redemptionis humanae, 85–86; translated passages of this text are adapted from 
Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, trans. Jasper Hopkins and 
Herbert Richardson (Minneapolis, MN: Banning, 2000), and have been revised for accuracy and 
readability after comparison with the Latin text in Opera omnia. 
308 Cur Deus Homo I.12–15 (69–74); Marilyn McCord Adams, “Satisfying Mercy: Anselm’s Cur 
Deus Homo Reconsidered,” Modern Schoolman 72, no. 2/3 (1995): 91–108. Compare my own 
remarks in § 20, where I confront the same problem of economy and God’s freedom faced by 
Anselm. Anselm, as we shall see, does not entirely escape its grips. 
309 Meditatio redemptionis humanae, 86. 
249 
 
Man is not restored to the end for which he was created unless he attains 
to the likeness of those angels in whom there is no sin. This cannot 
possibly be done unless the remission of all sins is obtained, which does 
not occur without an antecedent complete satisfaction (integra 
satisfactione).310 
 
The adjective integra bespeaks the economy-transcending wholeness that is 
obtained by satisfaction for sins; at the same time, this wholeness, qua 
wholeness, is the symptom of a closed system, a circular economy. Satisfactio 
indicates the reciprocal act necessitated by the economy of justice; but since 
humankind has not the means to offer an adequate satisfaction for its sins, the 
restitutive act must come as a free gift that the Father did not ask for,311 a gift that 
transcends the logic of the sacrificial system. This free gift is Christ’s own life, the 
undemanded offering of which on the Cross subsumes, yet rises above, the 
economy of retaliation. 
Girardian analysts of Anselm’s theory are divided into those who see him 
as privileging economy and mimetic reciprocity, and those who consider Anselm 
to have taken a basically anti-sacrificial, economy-transcending stance.312 Anselm 
 
310 Ibid., 86. 
311 Ibid., 86–87; Cur Deus Homo I.9 (61–64). 
312 Schwager, taking a lead from Michel Corbin’s commentary on Anselm (Michel Corbin, ed., 
L’Oevre de S. Anselme de Cantorbéry [2 vols.; Paris, Cerf, 1986]), excessively characterizes Anselm 
as escaping the bounds of economic thinking, particularly (and Schwager is right on this point) 
with regard to his ontological argument; see Schwager, Jesus in the Drama of Salvation, 197–201; 
Girard and Schwager, Correspondence, 168, 171. Cowdell, drawing on Lisa Cahill’s reading, tries to 
partially rehabilitate Anselm by contrasting the “later” reading of him that is tinged with the 
false sacred with Anselm’s original emphasis on cosmic and social harmony; see Cowdell, The 
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is a more subtle interpreter of redemption than his critics are willing to concede. 
For Anselm, sacrificial economy is subsumed into the goal of referring all things 
back to God’s unbounded power, while in this very act of referral, carried out by 
Christ in his self-offering, economic necessity returns with unmistakable 
bluntness. 
Cur Deus Homo argues for the preservation of economy in the form of 
necessity, while maintaining at once God’s absolute superiority over any 
necessity. Does God need to punish sinners? Can he not simply forgive them? 
Why not? These questions are answered in the following way: God is not 
constrained by the necessity of punishing sinners; this necessity exists, rather, to 
serve him, by subjecting all things to his domain.313 God is not subject to the 
limits imposed by economy, because he is, approximately speaking, identified 
with them; God is both economy’s source and its limit, transcending necessity 
while equated with it. The deep pervasiveness of economy in Anselm’s text 
becomes even broader as his discussion of necessity continues. The purpose of 
redemption is that humankind may fill the perfect number of the elect, most of 
 
Nonviolent God, 223 f. What Cowdell crucially fails to recognize is that cosmic order and the 
violent sacred go hand in hand. Bartlett, coming down on the other side of the matter, correctly 
sees Anselm’s satisfaction theory as a representation of mimesis, but reduces the concept of 
satisfaction to a mere “deferral of violence”; see Bartlett, Cross Purposes, 73–89. Bartlett thus 
misses the economy-breaking nature of Christ’s satisfaction-offering. 




whose seats have been waiting vacant in the heavenly kingdom since the fall of 
the angels;314 as far as the divine response to sin is concerned, sin must be 
punished with a just reciprocity;315 but salvation is impossible, Anselm reasons, 
so long as man is unable to give more than all he possesses.316 This is a system 
that does not compromise on the mystical need to restore exactly what was taken 
away. The strictness of the economic principle of reciprocal exchange is borne 
out by the following passage: 
If man sinned through pleasure, is it not fitting that he should give 
recompense through pain? And if it was in the easiest possible way that 
man was defeated by the devil, so as to dishonor God by his sinning, is it 
not justice that man, in giving recompense for sin, should, for the honor of 
God, defeat the devil with the greatest possible difficulty? Is it not fitting 
that man, who, by sinning, removed himself as far as he possibly could 
away from God, should, as recompense to God, make a gift of himself in 
an act of the greatest possible self-giving?317 
 
In such passages, the Deity is to be identified unequivocally with the god at the 
center of the sacrificial economy, the transformed scapegoat. God’s government 
of the universe is absolutely conservative, just like the absolutely conservative 
metaphysics of the sacrificial victim, from whom meaning flows and to whom it 
 
314 Cur Deus Homo I.16–18 (74–84). Katherine Sonderegger frames Cur Deus Homo such that the 
need to replace the fallen angels, so as to restore the original state of creation, becomes its basic 
premise; see Katherine Sonderegger, “Anselm, Defensor Fidei,” International Journal of Systematic 
Theology 9, no. 3 (2007): 342–59. 
315 Cur Deus Homo I.19 (84–86). 
316 Cur Deus Homo I.20 (86–88). 
317 Cur Deus Homo II.11 (109–112), quoted from Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, ed. Brian 
Davies and G. R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 330–31. 
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always refers back in a Platonic circuit of exit and return; all good and evil that 
had been attributed to the victim’s powers will then descend from him again, he 
being perceived as their source by the act of transference. Anselm’s God likewise 
gets back everything he gives, and has given everything he gets, yielding a 
balance of zero in the total system subordinated to him. In the closed economy of 
the scapegoat’s binary generativity, a symbolic give-and-take amounting to 
perfect justice is the only possible outcome. Sin must be made up for. 
Yet it is within and through this economy of perfect justice that Anselm 
reasons an escape from its constraints must be sought. Only a gift in excess of all 
that man owes to God can suffice as satisfaction for man’s sins. This unowed gift 
can only be Christ’s life. To give it was necessary insofar as it was the only means 
to man’s salvation; it was gratuitous in that it was never required by divine 
justice.318 This pure gift is made in the service of economy, and economy is the 
cause of the pure gift. 
Thus, that man redeemed all other men when he freely gave to God the 
debt that they owed. Through this payment (pretio), a man is redeemed 
from his faults not once only; rather, he is received as often as he returns 
again in worthy penitence.319 
 
 
318 Ibid.; Meditatio redemptionis humanae, 86–87. 
319 Meditatio redemptionis humanae, 88. 
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Thus, the price of redemption answers to the finite conditions of economy, while 
the fruit of redemption is infinite. 
The fruit is not distributed automatically, however. The benefit of the 
offering is not secured by algebraic fact, but by the Christian’s conversion toward 
God for whose sake the gift was given: 
Therefore, those who will come to this grace with worthy (digno) affection 
are saved; but those who despise this grace are justly condemned, because 
they do not pay the debt they owe (debitum quod debent non reddunt).320 
 
The redemption payment, then, is actualized through faith, the collection of the 
Christian’s whole being and the rendering of it to God, to whom it ought to be 
given back. The unity of God, as opposed to the multiplicity of binaries that 
organize the sacrificial economy, is the final object of the believer’s orientation, 
restored by the redemptive offering of Christ’s life. 
The double aspect of the redemptive movement, its inability to decide 
absolutely between the one and the many, must be held accountable for the 
difficulty Anselm’s evaluators have had in assigning priority to the transaction 





This tension resurfaces toward the end of the Meditation, where Anselm 
gives a first-person account of his turn toward the Creator. Anselm’s conversion 
operates according to the same dialectical principle as the objective dimension of 
his theory of redemption, which finds its content in Christ’s necessary yet 
excessive gift to the Godhead. Anselm’s faith is no less a matter of debitum than is 
Christ’s satisfaction payment, encompassing both the constraints of reciprocity 
and the freedom of Anselm’s pure self-givenness to his Redeemer. Anselm owes 
himself to God insofar as he owes more than himself to God. 
Conversion in its double aspect is not only the offshoot of the twofold 
nature of the redemptive work, but its precondition. The prolonged discourse on 
conversion that concludes the Meditation, narrated in real time and in the first 
person, drives Anselm’s whole meditation on redemption as well as the structure 
of his theory. This is a meditation on human redemption, and the human 
subjective perspective is duly emphasized. 
Stooped over as I was, you set me upright to face you, saying: “Be 
confident, I have redeemed you, and given my life for you. …” You cast 
aside the leaden weight, the heavy burden, and the impelling foes who 
drove me onward; for you removed the sin in which I had been conceived 
and born; you removed also the condemnation for this sin; and you 
forbade the evil spirits to constrain my soul. You caused me to be called 
“Christian” from your own name, by which I confess, and you 
acknowledge, that I am among your redeemed. You set me upright, and 
lifted me to the knowledge and love of you.321 
 




Anselm’s entire discourse on redemption is finally revealed in this passage to 
have been an act of prayer all along, a turning of his whole mind upon his 
Benefactor. 
Just as the Deuteronomist uses the localization of sacrifice at Jerusalem to 
refer the whole debt of Israel to their absolutely supreme God, so Anselm’s 
meditation on Christ’s sacrifice culminates in a self-conscious referral of his 
whole being, formerly scattered by the impelling force of demons and by original 
sin, back to the unity of God. To God alone Anselm offers up his whole self, as he 
only ought: “Yea, Lord, because you created me, I owe (debeo) my entire self to 
your love; because you redeemed me, I owe my entire self; because you promise 
such great things, I owe my entire self.” But Anselm quickly corrects this needful 
yet inadequate statement of his moral boundedness by the justice of economy, 
turning it into an acknowledgment of God’s surpassing transcendence: “Indeed, 
I owe to your love much more than myself—as much more as you are greater 
than I, for whom you gave yourself, and to whom you promise yourself.” 
Anselm still owes an infinite debt, and it is this infinity which marks a total 
escape from the limits of economy. The infinity of debt is the sine qua non of a re-
orientation toward the transcendent oneness of God. All the while, Anselm 
reinstates economy, insofar as the entirety of his conversion, including his 
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unending reaching toward transcendence, materializes as a debt. “I owe more 
than my entire self, but I have no more to give. …”322 
Anselm’s sophisticated emphasis on conversion redeems his theory from 
charges that it is implausibly objective or obsessed with economy. It is, at the 
same time, important to point out that the theory valorizes economy and 
sacrifice. The inherence of the sacrificial economy within the redemptive act is 
not always benign, with Anselm’s theory being a case in point. Notably writing 
near the time of the First Crusade,323 Anselm wonders in the Meditation whether 
his debt to God obliges him to grieve for the cruelty of Christ’s sufferings at the 
hands of his persecutors. The passage gently elides the implication that he is 
weighing the value of revenge on Jews and Saracens. No, he decides, their 
cruelty ought to be left to the judgment of God. Instead, he will fulfill the debt 
incurred on him by the redemptive work by grieving over Christ’s persecutors in 
imitation of his Passion, detesting their cruelty, and meditating on what he 
 
322 Ibid., 91. The subjective turn toward God in Anselm’s theology has sometimes been connected 
with the role of exemplification in his theory of redemption. In Sonderegger’s reading, against 
which I have nothing to say, redemption consists in both satisfaction and exemplification. 
Christ’s self-offering is the model for that of the Christian. It is no wonder, says Sonderegger, that 
Anselm spends so much time in Cur Deus Homo arguing that there is a sense in which Christ’s 
death was unnecessary, and that this discussion seems preoccupied with problems relating to 
Christ’s will; his free-will offering is the prototype for the conversion of the believer. So 
important is exemplification for Anselm, that the desire for God and the ability to recognize and 
follow him are the critical human powers in his view. See Sonderegger, “Anselm, Defensor Fidei,” 
347, 352–59. 




himself owes to his Savior.324 The passage’s unsettling undertones serve as a 
reminder that theories of redemption should not be presumed to be equivalent, 
even when they exhibit felicitous structural homologies. While Anselm’s 
satisfaction theory displays substantial insight into the operation of the 
redemptive work, the fundamental attitudes and assumptions he draws on to 
construct this operation are prone to this deviancy, if not to others as well. Such 
is the fine line one walks when one embraces the sacrificial. 
In conclusion, we may assert that Anselm’s satisfaction theory consists of 
the same essential sacrificial and sacrifice-transcending elements as Abelard’s, 
only with some differences as to these elements’ configuration. Like Abelard, 
Anselm refutes the existence of an overarching necessary justice by referring all 
things to God’s uniquely and absolutely transcendent power. God cannot be 
bound unwillingly by any principle, or by a contract with any being. Yet the 
sacrificial economy represented by the idea of necessity resurfaces in both of 
their theories. But whereas Abelard, the ethicist, banishes the sacrificial to the 
perimeter of his doctrine—despite its indispensability for his system—and denies 
it any explicit interaction with what he terms redemption, Anselm melds the 
sacrificial directly into the core of his theory. The sacrificial and the sacrifice-
 
324 Meditatio redemptionis humanae, 89. 
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transcending can be distinguished in Anselm’s thought only by attentive 
reading. 
In constructing his theory this way, Anselm instantiates in it the recursive 
binary structure of the redemptive operation. God, in demonstrating that the 
sacrificial economy is subject to his will, subjects the whole sacrificial system, as 
it were, beneath his surpassing transcendence. The same arrangement structures 
God’s solution to the problem of sin, as Christ’s free gift to the Trinity proves 
adequate to the need to make satisfaction to the offended Deity.325 The free gift, 
given in excess, negates the reciprocity of economy that required the punishment 
of sinners, while nevertheless maintaining economy as the lower term of a 
binary; the upper term is the free gift. The same can be said for Anselm’s account 
of conversion, whereby Anselm, collecting his whole being into one as an 
offering for his debt, brings himself into correspondence with God’s 
transcendent unity, and thereby comes to understand the excess demanded of 
him by that very transcendence and uniqueness. The satisfaction theory thus 
reflects the vindication of Christ, the scapegoat, and the manifest subjugation of 
the sacrificial system to him, in these sacrificial yet sacrifice-transcending 
binaries of freedom/necessity, gift/economy. 
 
325 That Christ’s sacrifice is made to the whole Trinity, see Cur Deus Homo II.18 (129). 
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The mutual dependence of both terms of these binaries is built into 
Anselm’s theory, illustrating the manner in which God, seeking to set his 
creatures free from the conditions of the sacrificial, works from the sacrificial for 
this very end. The redemptive work of Christ and the conversion of the believer 
mark an escape from the sacrificial system, while reinstating its economy in the 
need for satisfaction and in the redeemed believer’s debt to God. Yet it is through 
these same economic principles that Anselm establishes God’s freedom and the 
believer’s reestablishment in the authentic transcendence-structure. 
So much, then, for these two representatives of the archetypal atonement 
theories of the Western tradition. Let us now turn toward a prominent theorist of 
redemption from the Christian East. 
§ 23. Gregory of Nyssa: The Fishhook 
Gregory of Nyssa’s influential metaphor of the fishhook represents an instance of 
the ransom theory that, in its later forms, was to be refuted in the West by the 
likes of Anselm and Abelard.326 Gregory’s iteration of this theory is 
 
326 The fishhook metaphor appears also in Rufinus, Commentarius in Symbolum Apostolorum 16, in 
Gregory the Great, Moralia 33.7, and in John of Damascus, de Fidei 3.27; see James Herbert 
Srawley, ed., The Catechetical Oration of Gregory of Nyssa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1903), 93, n. 2. Srawley’s Greek text will be referred to throughout. The fishhook is still sung 
about in the Greek hymnography for the Feast of the Cross. The heirmos of the fifth ode of the 
canon for the feast reads: «Ὦ τρισμακάριστον ξύλον, ἐν ᾧ ἐτάθη Χριστός, ὁ Βασιλεὺς καὶ 
Κύριος· δι᾿ οὗ πέπτωκεν ὁ ξύλῳ ἀπατήσας, τῷ ἐν σοὶ δελεασθείς, Θεῷ τῷ προσπαγέντι 
σαρκί, τῷ παρέχοντι, τὴν εἰρήνην ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν». “O thrice-blessed Tree, upon which was 
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recommended for its wide dissemination and relative simplicity. Gregory fuses 
the primitive Christian motifs of the descent into hell and the deceit of the devil 
with the motif of a payment to the devil, yielding a theory that is made up of a 
complicated array of subordinate images and ideas. Yet, this complexity 
notwithstanding, Gregory’s version of the ransom theory remains 
unencumbered by the legalistic and moralistic considerations introduced into it 
by Augustine and Gregory the Great. For Augustine, Christ’s blamelessness is 
the active reagent that causes the forfeiture of the devil’s rights; Augustine leaves 
unclear why the bargain with the devil was necessary in the first place, or what 
role Christ’s divine nature plays in relation to his innocence. For Gregory of 
Nyssa, the transaction between God and the devil is a straightforward quid pro 
quo, the Trojan horse of Christ’s divinity serving to break the power of the devil, 
namely death (cf. Heb 2:14), after he has accepted the exchange. Gregory’s 
theory, by involving fewer moving parts, is easier to systematize, though 
Gregory’s narrative admittedly still leaves questions of internal consistency. 
Gregory’s ransom theory, presented most systematically in the Great 
Catechism, is multi-layered and eclectic. The fishhook metaphor, which would 
appear to be Gregory’s original contribution to the general family of ransom 
 
stretched Christ, the King and Lord; through which fell he who deceived through a tree, baited 
by the God who was nailed to you in the flesh, who grants peace to our souls!” 
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theories, is treated only very briefly in the aforementioned work. As elsewhere in 
Gregory’s corpus, the fishhook is motivated in part by an apologetic purpose, as 
Nicholas Constas has noted.327 The metaphor is simple and elegant. God offered 
Jesus as a ransom to buy the freedom of the human race, who, since Adam, had 
been sold under the devil’s power by means of a deceitful contract.328 Since the 
miracle-working Messiah seemed a greater prize than all that the devil already 
possessed, the devil accepted him as a redemption payment, and granted 
humanity its freedom.329 But beneath the veil of Christ’s flesh lay his divine 
power, concealed from the devil’s perception as a hook is concealed under a 
worm. When the devil swallowed the divine bait by slaying Christ, the power of 
death that he held was exploded, since his nature could not withstand the 
presence of Christ’s deity.330 God thus broke the devil’s power by means of a 
ruse, ensnaring him in his own lust. As apologetics, the fishhook turns the shame 
and folly of the Cross into a vindication of God’s intelligence. As systematic 
theology, it helps Gregory justify the rationality of the ransom theory. The 
ransom motif was not original to Gregory—he seems to have imported it from 
Origen—and the idea may not have completely satisfied him.331 That the ransom 
 
327 Nicholas Constas, “The Last Temptation of Satan: Divine Deception in Greek Patristic 
Interpretation of the Passion Narrative,” Greek Orthodox Theological Review 47 (2002): 237–74. 
328 Great Catechism 22 (Srawley, Catechetical Oration, 84.16–85.19). 
329 Great Catechism 23 (85.20–90.14). 
330 Great Catechism 24 (92.16–93.6). 
331 Origen, Commentary on Romans 2.19.29. 
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theory causes Gregory some anxiety is made clear by the great lengths he goes to 
in order to obfuscate the question of how a deceitful God can possess the divine 
quality of justice.332 Nonetheless, as Rashdall notes, the ransom theory seems to 
have been for Gregory more than just rhetoric.333 And Gregory’s use of the 
fishhook metaphor elsewhere in his corpus334—without direct reference to the 
ransom payment—suggests that he took his contribution to the ransom theory 
fully seriously. 
In total, the fishhook metaphor occupies a mere two lines of text in the 
Great Catechism, the work from which it is chiefly known. But the comprehensive 
breadth of this treatise, which covers the entire circuit of foundational Christian 
doctrine, allows a great amount of determination to be ascribed to the fishhook 
by way of contextualization. When taken in conjunction with Gregory’s use of 
the same metaphor in his homily On the Three-Day Interval between the Death and 
Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, its determination becomes even richer. As I 
will demonstrate, the metaphor presents the essential features of the redemptive 
work that I have already argued for on the basis of MT: the sacrificial exchange, 
 
332 See Great Catechism 26 (96.10–101.9) and throughout. 
333 Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement, 303. 
334 See On the Three-Day Interval between the Death and Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, 
published as De Tridui inter mortem et resurrectionem Domini nostri Jesu Christi spatio, ed. Ernest 
Gebhardt, pages 270–306 in Gregorii Nysseni Opera, vol. 9, eds. Werner Jaeger and Hermann 
Langerbeck (Leiden: Brill, 1967). 
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in the form of a scapegoating event, that subverts rather than reinforces the 
circulation of meaning, and the re-orientation of the believer toward God’s 
absolute transcendence that is made possible by the exchange. 
The context needed in order to properly appreciate the fishhook metaphor 
comes in three levels. First there is the social-political context in which Gregory is 
writing the Great Catechism. The whole treatise serves an apologetic purpose. As 
noted by Constas, Gregory lived in a time of tremendous religious, intellectual, 
and political upheaval, a liminal zone between two epochs of history. Gregory, 
fully conscious of the transformation that is occurring around him, is occupied in 
the Great Catechism with the task of rationalizing Christian belief in its new 
setting. Doctrine had to establish a stable relationship with its Hellenic 
intellectual milieu and, more unsettlingly, find its role within a political order 
that had persecuted the Church shortly before.335 The fishhook metaphor allows 
Gregory to defend God’s goodness, wisdom, and justice, and so make a 
compelling case for that which the Greeks derided as the “folly of the Cross” (1 
 
335 In illustration of how acutely self-conscious the Christian community must have been of the 
societal transformation taking place around it, consider the following widely circulated 
Byzantine saints’ tale, a Rip van Winkle story recounted in the liturgical synaxarion for August 4. 
Seven Christian boys fleeing the persecution of Decius take refuge in a cave. After a miraculous 
sleep, they awaken during the reign of Theodosius. The boys encounter their new, Christianized 




Cor 2:7).336 We might say that Gregory performs the trick of the fishhook in the 
act of writing it: he introduces the subversive principle of the Cross into the 
stream of Greek political rationality. In Girardian terms, his metaphor 
destabilizes the sacrificial order from within. It appears rational, it acts rationally, 
but it undoes the rationality that accepts it. So much meaning we might surmise 
the fishhook to carry with respect to its social-political context. 
The second level of context is the theological cosmic scheme outlined in 
the Great Catechism. Gregory’s account of redemption is situated within his 
understanding of creation and the fall. His teaching on creation and fall is 
framed, in turn, by the notion of conversion, which he forefronts as a major 
theme: the Great Catechism is ostensively addressed to the needs of the evangelist, 
the custodian of baptism, who must be able to persuade others to turn from their 
many gods and from their sins.337 Thus the treatise opens with a declaration of its 
purpose as the turning of minds from many gods to the One, and closes with a 
lengthy discussion of baptism and an exhortation on the need of the baptizand to 
change his/her way of life.338 Within this anthropological framing of his subject 
 
336 See Constas, “The Last Temptation of Satan,” 237–40. In the Great Catechism, the concern over 
God’s goodness, wisdom, justice, and power is articulated first in the prologue (12.13–14), and 
recurs throughout as a principal theme, especially in the discussion of redemption in 20–24 
(78.11–94.21). On the fishhook as a direct response to the “folly of the Cross,” see Great Catechism 
24 (90.15–94.24) and throughout. 
337 Great Catechism, prologue (1.1–5). 
338Ibid. (1.1–6.11), Great Catechism 33–36 (123.1–140.13), 40 (159.6–164.8). 
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matter, Gregory introduces a strongly unipolar cosmology depicting man’s 
original orientation within the transcendence-structure. Evil is the insubstantial 
negation of good; all of the world’s original goodness has its source in God. God, 
Gregory argues using a primitive form of the ontological argument, absolutely 
transcends all visible being, and is a totally unitary principle; there is no 
difference (διαφορά) between the Persons of the Godhead.339 Sin, then, is not a 
turn towards a second principle, but the negation of one’s natural apprehension 
of the good. “Thus, if the light shines from a clear sky, and someone willingly 
covers his sight with his eyelids, the sun is not responsible for him who does not 
see.” Sin and evil result from dis-orientation before the divine presence.340 
Alongside this doctrine of original orientation, Gregory introduces a 
depiction of the primordial sacrificial principle that structures the universe. 
Creation is fundamentally divided into the noetic and the sensible, which 
function together as a binary opposition. The noetic has greater affinity with 
God, and it is by diverting his attention to the sensible that man becomes dis-
oriented. Man’s original dis-orientation—his “original sin”—is a cosmic crisis, 
because man was created to be that which stands at the junction of the noetic and 
the sensible, and, from that fulcrum, to keep the whole sensory world in order.341 
 
339 Great Catechism, prologue (5.10–6.11). 
340 Great Catechism 7 (37.11–41.2). 
341 Great Catechism 6 (29.12–37.10). 
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We find, then, a strong sacrificial organization undergirding Gregory’s creation, 
which becomes disorganized (i.e. falls into a sacrificial crisis) through the fall. 
The third level of context is given by Gregory’s whole theory of 
redemption, in which the fishhook metaphor is proximally situated. The 
immediate occasion for Gregory’s discussion of redemption is the pressing 
question, Why did God become incarnate and die on a Cross when he 
presumably could have saved his creatures without humiliating himself?342 After 
making an apology for the Incarnation, Gregory defends God’s choice to 
undergo crucifixion as a manifestation of his wisdom and justice (τὸ σοφόν, τὸ 
δίκαιον). A problem arises here, since the ransom theory can be impugned 
precisely on the grounds that it portrays God as dealing unjustly, perpetrating an 
act of deceit. Gregory, however, will cleverly utilize the ransom theory to the 
opposite effect, using it to illustrate how supremely just and wise God really was 
in choosing death as his method of redemption.343 To this end, Gregory adopts 
and adapts the tradition of the Messianic secret. Here enters the fishhook, 
Gregory’s inventive metaphor for the concealment of Christ’s divinity.344 
 
342 Great Catechism 18–19 (74.8–78.10). 
343 Great Catechism 26 (96.10–101.9). 
344 Cf. Mark 1:25; 8:30; Ignatius’ Ephesians; Ascension of Isaiah. 
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Through this complexly laden metaphor, Gregory will be able to respond 
to the problems occasioned by all three levels of context, to each in a way that is 
readily interpretable by the Girardian theory of sacrifice. First, Gregory’s 
deployment of the metaphor will cast the ransom mechanism as a mimetic 
reciprocation of the devil’s work; since it is reciprocal, it is quintessentially just. 
Second, the fishhook metaphor allows Gregory to situate the redemptive work 
within his doctrine of sin and conversion, explaining through it how God undoes 
original dis-orientation. Finally, the fishhook makes an effective apology for the 
folly of the Cross, able to vindicate God’s wisdom and justice, and thus reconcile 
the Christian narrative of the redemptive work with its new, post-Constantinian 
political order; at the same time, the metaphor serves to destabilize values and 
power relations, and so retains the Cross’s potential to undermine the sacrificial 
social order. All of this now needs detailed examination. 
Gregory’s understanding of salvation is tied to a metaphysical 
hamartiology that forms the backdrop of his presentation of redemption. God 
has absolute and true being; he is the Ὤν of Exodus 3:14 and, in Gregory’s 
Platonizing metaphysics, the ultimate real (ὄντως ὄν). Being, for Greek thought, 
implies stability, and is therefore reserved to the uncreated nature; all that is 
created, on the other hand, is subject to perpetual change (ἀλλοίωσις, τροπή), 
since it came into being by a change, namely, that from non-being into being. The 
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fact of being created thus subjects any entity, including the human one, to 
perpetual change. In these metaphysical terms, Gregory explains baptism, the 
sacrament of conversion, as the entry into affinity with the uncreated and 
unchanging nature.345 In ethical terms, Gregory explains the human subjection to 
perpetual change as the conversion of the will. We perpetually change in that our 
will is always in motion, either toward the good, or toward the bad under the 
semblance of the good. There is no end to this change, situated as it is within the 
transcendence-structure. The absolute good is absolutely transcendent, 
unattainable, while the bad is likewise unattainable, because it is non-being. The 
motion of the will is thus without limit in either moral direction.346 
It is in the context of this anthropological ontology, this metaphysical 
ethics, that Gregory first mentions the fishhook. Since man’s will is motivated by 
the good, the devil had to use the illusory appearance of good to bring about 
man’s fall: 
Since, then, the mind was cheated by the desire for the truly good (ὄντως 
ἀγαθόν) and led aside toward that which has no being (τὸ μὴ ὄν), having 
been persuaded through deceit by the counsellor and inventor of vice that 
the opposite of the good (τὸ καλόν) was good—for the deceit would not 
have worked, had not the sheen (φαντασία) of the good been spread like 
bait over the hook of vice—man having willingly come into this condition 
of his own accord, then, subjecting himself through pleasure to the yoke of 
the enemy of life— 
 
345 Great Catechism 39 (154.3–159.5). 




The devil’s fishhook trick will be reciprocated by God as he mirrors the devil’s 
deception in the redemptive work, using a trick to undo the devil’s trick, and 
thereby displaying God’s own justice: 
… seek for me in all this the qualities belonging to our notion of God, 
namely goodness, wisdom, justice, power, incorruptibility, and 
whatsoever else has the mark of superiority. For as good, he takes pity on 
him who had fallen; as wise, he knows the means of his recovery. And the 
judgment of the just is wise; for no one would ascribe true justice to 
folly.347 
 
It is by means of this judgment (κρίσις), this division of right from wrong, and 
the decision between them, that God will turn the sacrificial operation of division 
on its head, utilizing mimetic reciprocity against its own architect so as to turn 
the sacrificial system against itself, and toward God’s own ends. God will make 
Christ into his own deceptive fishhook in order to repay the author of vice by his 
own devices. 
Here we are confronted with a potential pitfall in the theory. The mimetic 
reciprocity of God’s saving work raises the problem of whether Gregory has, in 
effect, implicated God in mimetic rivalry with the devil, making him the devil’s 
moral equivalent. A close and sensitive reading shows decisively that he does 
 
347 Ibid. (84.1–15). The suspended sentences in my translation retain the halting and elliptical 
construction of the original text. 
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not. Gregory interprets God’s deceptive act as God’s refusal to use violence; by 
offering Christ as a ransom, God liberates humanity with the devil’s consent. “In 
the same way that we had sold ourselves, so was it needful that the one who for 
goodness’ sake delivered us back to freedom should devise not a tyrannical, but 
a just means of recovery.”348 Gregory thus avoids implicating God in mimetic 
rivalry. The devil envies God and man, and for this reason he tries to usurp their 
honor; God, by contrast, acts lawfully, and solely out of virtue. Furthermore, God 
cannot possibly be acting out of competitiveness, because he profits nothing from 
the redemptive work. God is motivated by eleos and philanthropia, not by honor. 
Finally, God cannot be acting acquisitively, because—and here Gregory is much 
more radical than his Western counterparts, Anselm and Abelard—he is not 
purchasing back his human bondservants, but restoring them to their original 
freedom. (There is, therefore, no problem for Gregory of how the devil could 
have justly obtained rights over humanity, since Adam and Eve were free beings 
who sold themselves willingly, not property of God who could not be purchased 
without the Master’s consent.)349 The embrace of mimesis and sacrifice on God’s 
part thus does not imply that God perpetuates the violence of sacrifice. To the 
 
348 Great Catechism 22 (84.16–85.19). 
349 Ibid. (85.4–17). 
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contrary, he turns the vicious aspects of the sacrificial system to good, using 
them non-violently. 
Another difficult question arises. Is the ransom paid to the devil to be 
considered a sacrifice, and not just a market transaction? It is the mimetic 
reciprocity inhering in the transaction and the cosmic centrality of the Christ-
signifier that make the payment a sacrifice. Without these, no sacrificial quality 
would be apparent. This assertion requires that we walk a fine line. Gregory does 
not speak of Christ’s death as a sacrifice to the devil, nor to anything else, in this 
text. The metaphor of ransom is purely legal and political, free of explicit cultic 
meaning. But given the mimetic reciprocity of the exchange (ἀντάλλαγμα) with 
the devil, the transaction can and should be interpreted as the thematization of a 
scapegoating substitution. Gregory’s own interpretation of the exchange as a 
work of justice (τὸ δίκαιον) is only a step removed from the scapegoating 
interpretation, and falls squarely within the logic of the sacrificial system, since 
justice is a form assumed by the sacrificial order, constructed from the material of 
sacrificial binaries.350 
 
350 Great Catechism 23 (90.11–13): «τὸ δὲ συναλλαγματικὴν ποιήσασθαι τὴν τοῦ κρατουμένου 
λύτρωσιν τὸ δίκαιον δείκνυσι.» “The performance of the transaction refers one to the attribute of 
justice belonging to him who had the ability to redeem.” 
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The justice of the transaction, for Gregory, is twofold. On the one hand, 
Gregory emphasizes that the exchange of Christ for captive humankind is a valid 
economic transaction, since the devil willingly agreed to the trade. On the other 
hand, since the transaction took advantage of the devil’s envy, by which he had 
originally induced Adam to sin, it is also just as an act of reciprocity: 
He who … for envy of the blessed [Adam] shut his eyes to the good, and 
in doing so begot in himself the murk of vice, becoming sick with the 
desire to be chief (φιλαρχίαν), that principle and foundation of the 
inclination toward the worse, and mother, as it were, of all other vice—in 
return for what might he be willing to exchange (ἀντηλλάξατο) that 
which he possessed, if not a higher and better ransom (ἀνταλλάγματος), 
that he might further feed his own vain passion, profiting by the trade of 
the lesser for the greater? 
 
God thus reciprocates the devil’s deceit, while it is the devil’s envy and rivalrous 
temper that account for the mechanics of the process the whole way through.351 
Once the devil swallows the pharmakon, the scapegoated entity who is 
both a poison and a cure, he discovers beneath the flesh of Christ the divine 
power that he is unable to resist: 
For since … the opposing power did not have such a nature as to mingle 
with the undiluted presence of God, and to withstand his naked 
manifestation, in order that our ransom might be easily accepted by him 
who required it, the Deity (τὸ θεῖον) was concealed beneath the veil of our 
nature, that, as with greedy fish, the hook of the Godhead (θεότητος) 
might be gulped down because of the bait of the flesh, and so life might 
 
351 Ibid. (85.20–90.14). 
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enter into the house of death and light shine in darkness, causing that 
which is understood to be contrary to light and life to vanish.352 
 
And so the saving dispensation is accomplished. 
One can see from these summaries just how overdetermined the symbol 
of the fishhook really is. It can now be related back to each of the three levels of 
context in which it was introduced, in each case in a way that is efficiently 
interpretable through my assumptions about redemption that are founded on 
MT. The relationship of the fishhook to the problem of justice posed by the 
ransom theory has already been addressed. We are now prepared to give a 
mimetic interpretation of the fishhook within the theology of the Great Catechism 
as a whole, as well as within Gregory’s social-political context. 
The whole content of the Great Catechism is framed, as I have alluded to, 
by an anthropology of dis-orientation and re-orientation, serving Gregory’s 
exhortation to conversion to the divine faith. One may tentatively presume that 
each part of this work refers back to its overall stated purpose and framing. In 
the case of the redemption narrative, Gregory draws no such connection 
explicitly. A close reading, however, proves that Gregory does have conversion 
in mind. For as Adam—always named by Gregory using the generic title ὁ 
 
352 Great Catechism 24 (92.16–93.6). 
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ἄνθρωπος—sinned through lust, desiring what appeared to his senses to the 
neglect of what was accessible to the intellect, so was the devil deceived by what 
he saw, and overthrown by what was invisible to him. Both went astray after 
bodily appearances; both overlooked the presence of the Divinity. 
The protological error of the devil and the first man portrays the workings 
of mimetic desire with nuance. Mimetic desire operates in a deviated 
transcendence-structure, looking for fulfillment in the creature, whose form 
becomes a matter of obsession. The substance that one vainly wishes to 
appropriate from one’s mimetic object is not really there; the object is a surrogate 
for the truly Transcendent, God. The divine nature can never be correctly 
apprehended until one acknowledges its radical invisibility; one can never 
intelligently relate to the appearance of the flesh until one acknowledges that it 
cannot be identified with the divinity one wishes to acquire. Only behind the 
sign of Christ’s body does true Divinity become accessible through the medium 
of a created nature. 
No wonder, then, that Gregory identifies the primeval fall into a deviated 
transcendence-structure with the sin of envy (φθόνος), which passed from the 
devil to humanity: 
There was a certain power that was appointed to govern and command 
the earthly region, given power for this very purpose by the Power that 
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administers the universe. Then was fashioned the earthly creature, a copy 
of the higher Power. This living creature was man. … He who administers 
the earthly realm takes it as something terrible and outrageous if any 
essence from the nature that is subject to him should be shown to be like 
the transcendent dignity. … Since [the aforementioned power] closed his 
eye to the good and ungrudging (ἄφθονον), just as one who covers his 
sight with his eyelids before the sun sees darkness, so did he, by the very 
act of not desiring (θελῆσαι) to apprehend (νοῆσαι) the good, fix his 
vision (κατενόησε) on the opposite of the good. Now this is envy. … As, 
then, dispassion is the principle and foundation of the life according to 
virtue, so is the inclination to vice, which comes to pass through envy, the 
sure way to all known evils that follow from it. …353 
 
The devil’s instigation of envy, a negative act performed by closing his eyes to 
the solar radiance of the good, is repeated by man, as shown in one of the 
citations given above (p. 265).354 The work of redemption, then, taking advantage 
of the devil’s rivalrous lusts, not only reciprocates his deed in kind, but mirrors 
the mimetic character of the primal sin itself. 
Gregory is less elliptical in On the Three-Day Interval between the Death and 
Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ. In this homily, the relation between 
conversion and redemption is expressed directly. The devil is a great “wicked 
mind” (πονηρὸς νοῦς) that rebelled against God through envy of his divine 
status. The wicked mind’s thoughts (νοήματα) are of pride, the wish to rival 
God. Gregory addresses him: 
 
353 Great Catechism 6 (28.12–37.10). 
354 Refer to Great Catechism 7 (40.15–41.2). 
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You said in your heart: I will go up to heaven, I will set my throne above 
the stars, I will sit upon a high mountain, I will go above the clouds, and 
be like the Most High.355 
 
The devil is a master of wisdom (σοφία). But Christ, concealing his divinity 
under the bait of his flesh,356 uses his own wisdom against the wicked mind: 
The all-powerful Wisdom, having entered into the heart of the earth, was 
able to make foolish the great mind that dwelt therein; for so the prophet 
[Isaiah] names him, calling him “great mind” and “Assyrian.” 
 
Νοῦς, mind, apprehends σοφία, the knowledge of the referentiality of beings 
(what was called τὸ σοφόν among the pre-Socratics).357 Wisdom, that is to say, is 
here the ordering of beings within the sacrificial economy. Christ used 
economy’s workings (τὰ σοφά) against itself, redeeming by outsmarting the 
great mind, using wisdom to overthrow wisdom: 
Since, then, the heart is the seat of the mind, as it were (for this is where 
the governing faculty is thought to reside), the Lord entered into the heart 
of the earth, which is the dwelling place of that wicked mind, so that he 
might render his counsel foolish, as the prophecy says, and catch the wise 
 
355 De Tridui spatio, 282.1–4; Isa 14:13–14. 
356 Ibid., 281.6–19. 
357 See Martin Heidegger’s essay, Was ist das—die Philosophie? (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1956). 
Girard’s distinction between the Heraclitean Logos and the Johannine Logos is germane here. In 
Girard’s perceptive reading of Heidegger, Heraclitus’ Logos is the generative sacrificial center on 
which all cultures depend. The Johannine Logos, argues Girard contra Heidegger, is the true 
absent center of culture, the forever expelled (in Jesus’ case, a literal victim), which discloses the 
truth by its very expulsion (Girard, Things Hidden, 252–65). Gregory’s theory nicely illustrates the 
kinship between the two Logoi that is overlooked by Girard: the Johannine Logos can work his 
truth-revealing expulsion only from the generative center of the sacrificial system. The identity-
in-difference of the two Logoi is analogous to the identity-in-difference of Christian and archaic 
sacrifice that Girard comes to acknowledge in his late work. 
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one by his own machinations, and turn his own wise devices against 
him.358 
 
For Gregory, as for the whole line of Patristic thought stemming from Origen, the 
end of Christian ascesis is the contemplation of the divine through the νοῦς. The 
Christian life is correspondingly an exercise in the purification of this faculty.359 
Christ’s entry into the great νοῦς in the heart of the earth cannot but invoke the 
ascetic practice of the purification of the mind, which resides in the heart. Even 
within the limited field of references given by Gregory in this passage, Christ’s 
use of divine wisdom to usurp the wisdom of the “great mind” inescapably 
connotes the redemption of the Christian’s mind. Christ’s redemptive operation 
against the devil corresponds analogically to the conversion of the believer’s 
mind, which, in putting away its orientation toward created things, acquired 
through the passion of envy and diabolical deceit, now begins instead a return to 
the singular contemplation of the uncreated nature. 
Turning to the final layer of context in which Gregory’s fishhook 
metaphor is embedded, we find the double role of wisdom to be the key to 
unlocking the significance of his theory within its social-political context. The 
subversive use of wisdom against wisdom, the utilization of the referentiality of 
 
358 Ibid., 280.16–281.6. 
359 The significance of noetic contemplation for Gregory is brought out most dramatically in his 
Life of Moses. 
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beings against itself, is a subtle declaration that Christ’s death has disrupted the 
sacrificial order. Since God has refused to act tyrannically, he has, in overcoming 
the Tyrant over our nature through ingenuity rather than strength, inverted the 
elementary binaries that lay at the heart of the sacrificial economy (that is to say, 
in Gregory’s way of thinking, in the seat of the mind). A non-violent wisdom has 
proven superior to the wisdom that enforces order through threat and violence. 
This inversion in Gregory’s theory corresponds to Paul’s declaration that God 
triumphed over the wisdom of this world through what was folly in the world’s 
sight, strength through weakness. Gregory’s shift of emphasis from the folly and 
weakness of the Cross to its justice and ingenuity renders Paul’s inversion more 
able to function in an Imperial political order, without robbing it of any of its 
subversive energy. The Empire within which the fishhook metaphor is meant to 
function is also that which the metaphor is best suited to undermine. 
Most commentators on theories of atonement treat Gregory’s ransom 
theory as a grotesque and incongruous stepping-stone on the way to the more 
sophisticated atonement theories of medieval and modern times. I believe this is 
because they take Gregory’s theory too much as if it were a product of dialogical 
reasoning like the Scholastic theories. It is not. The theory is a textualization of 
the unravelling of the order of things that Girard links to archaic sacrifice, replete 
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with representations of the mimetic processes that undergird scapegoating.360 
Any dialogical argumentation that plays a part in Gregory’s theory, such as the 
proofs of God’s justice, is built on top of this textualization, and saves its 
plausibility post hoc. The same, in fact, should be said for the Scholastic theories 
of Anselm and Abelard: despite their stronger emphasis on dialogical method, 
they, too, are textualizations of the overcoming of sacrifice. All three theories 
construct a symbolic universe that allows one to navigate the processes described 
by Girard in an analogical fashion.361 Even Raymund Schwager, who evaluates 
Gregory’s ransom theory from the standpoint of MT, misses the opportunity to 
appreciate it properly, because he fails to consider the contextual factors that 
make its analogical nature obvious.362 
Positive modern evaluations of the ransom theory have generally argued 
for its favorability on the basis of the image of Christus Victor, Christ victorious 
over the devil. The favorable reviews have sometimes come from those 
concerned about the role played by Anselmian-type models of redemption in 
upholding oppressive power relations.363 The search for a liberative model in the 
 
360 Cf. Ray’s appraisal of the ransom theory: “Its narrative character opens rather than closes 
discussion, invites rather than discourages participation, question, and innovation” (Ray, 
Deceiving the Devil, 130). 
361 One might compare ch. 2 of Douglas, Leviticus as Literature. 
362 Schwager, Die Wunderbare Tausch, 93–97, 99–100. 
363 Rita Nakashima Brock, “The Cross of Resurrection and Communal Redemption,” pages 241–
51 in Cross Examinations; Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement; Ray, Deceiving the Devil. 
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ransom theory is, I think, more than sensible. But the transformative power of 
redemption that is encoded in this theory, or at least in Gregory’s version of it, is 
accessed only by appreciating its effect of representing the sacrificial dialectic. 
Constas, to whose sensitivity as a reader of Gregory’s texts I owe the basis 
for these insights, makes headway in the direction of the analysis I have given. 
He is properly sensitive to the play of signs. The shame and folly of the Cross, 
ungraspable to the Imperial order and its semi-official Stoic philosophy, turns 
out to be the hidden wisdom of God. Christ’s body is the sign under which their 
destabilization takes place; to him attaches all the duplicity and more of Plato’s 
pharmakos. The deception wrought by the sign of Christ’s body serves, in 
Constas’ language, to destabilize its theological referent, and in doing so exploits 
the categories constructed by desire and power.364 
Constas’ unorthodox reading of Gregory, which shows obvious parallels 
to deconstructive philosophy that he himself acknowledges,365 is grounded in a 
reading of Gregory’s hamartiology that parallels the interpretation of mimetic 
desire I have advanced: 
[T]he mind can fail to grasp the true nature of the world, fall prey to 
deception, and mistake the appearance of the sign for that which it seeks 
to render present. In response, the deity transgresses the divisions of 
 
364 Constas, “The Last Temptation of Satan,” 239–40. 
365 Ibid., 240. 
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created being, incarnating itself within matter in order to seduce humanity 
away from its obsession with sensuous signs.366 
 
The destabilization of signs and transgression of binary divisions become the 
means of the redemptive work: 
As a conspiracy of signs, divine deception entails the loss of fixed 
referential principles, collapsing the world into a symbolic, lucid universe 
which is perhaps best interpreted in terms of play, challenges, duels, and 
the strategy of appearances. It is a universe that can no longer be 
interpreted in terms of dominant structures or stable binary oppositions, 
but rather through seductive reversibility. … To seduce is to appear weak. 
To seduce is to render weak.367 
 
Constas’ reading of Gregory’s redemption texts is, to my mind, insufficient. He is 
right to point out that there is a destabilization of signs at work in them. But 
Constas’ appraisal precludes the possibility of some constructive outcome of the 
redemptive work. The mimetic approach embraces the destructive 
destabilization caused by the redemptive operation, in accordance with the 
deconstructivist tendency. But the redemptive work, by installing Christ in the 
center, does not leave us with a dissolved order. Instead, as Darby Kathleen Ray 
picks up, the ransom theory opens us to a reconfigured, inside-out order, in 
which Christ rules through serving and exercises strength through weakness.368 
 
366 Ibid., 255. 
367 Ibid., 260. 
368 Ray, Deceiving the Devil, 123–25. Similarly to Girard, Ray tries to construe redemption as 
Christ’s exposure of the moral bankruptcy of thisworldly power. She sees the ransom theory as a 
potent representation of evangelical subversiveness. 
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At the same time, this reconfigured order, whatever it might look like once fully 
formed, cannot be an order in the old sense. It preserves the power of sacrifice, 
while disrupting, subverting, and inverting the construction of that power. In 
breaking the curse of sacrifice, Christ redeems sacrifice from its violence. Were 




THE REDEMPTIVE SACRIFICE AND THE IMITATION OF GOD 
This study has circled through the foundational significance of redemption 
theory, the unfolding of the redemptive work in the Scriptures, and the 
possibilities for modelling redemption afforded by the classical theories of the 
Christian tradition. It is now time to complete this circuit by returning to the two 
questions that motivated the inquiry: What is the use of a theoretical 
understanding of redemption today? and, Is there a positive role for sacrifice in 
redemption theory? To answer this pair of questions, I invoked Girard’s Mimetic 
Theory as a framework around which to construct my method. 
The two questions are answered in this concluding chapter. I take them in 
the reverse order from which they were introduced, so as to finish off with the 
question that instigated the whole inquiry. First, I bring closure to the question of 
sacrifice by returning to the exchange-hypothesis, demonstrating how my 
argument about sacrifice flows logically from trends in Girard’s own thinking, 
and recapitulating how the redemptive work deserves to be understood as 
sacrificial in a strong sense (§ 24). I then end this study with a return to the 
conversion-hypothesis, raising again, and proposing an answer to, the question 
of what good a theoretical understanding of redemption does for anyone (§ 25). 
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§ 24. Turning Mimesis, Turning Sacrifice 
If there is a single point I wish to make with this study, it is this: redemption 
theory is a natural and indispensable part of what makes it possible to live in the 
world in a redeeming way, and the sacrificial, transactional element in 
redemption theory, stumbling-block that it is, lies at the heart and center of the 
redeeming way of life. MT provides a way to understand how this can be so 
without simply falling back on a set of initial assumptions. I will carry out my 
closing discussion of the sacrificial nature of redemption by comparing my 
conclusions with Girard’s own soteriology. I have already mentioned Girard’s 
perspective on Christ’s death, including how his view shifted over the course of 
his life. I will now examine this shift in more detail, try to show what is at stake 
in the way Girard thinks about Christ’s death, and argue that my different 
attitude toward Girard’s own idea of sacrifice completes the shift he underwent 
in his thinking. 
The earliest hints in Girard’s oeuvre that he has the life, death, and 
resurrection of Christ on his mind are found in his first major work, Deceit, Desire 
and the Novel. This book is not often taken into consideration in discussions of 
Girard’s mature theological views, as if it belonged strictly to younger Girard’s 
atheist phase. This presumption is misleading. Deceit, Desire and the Novel 
contains the seeds of nearly the full spectrum of Girard’s later thinking on 
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religion. The book is a literary analysis of the triangular (mimetic) structure of 
desire in great novels, but behind this veneer, one sees a work bursting with 
theological content. It begins with a comparison to Christ, and ends with a 
defense of the universal truth of Christian symbolism.369 The book’s “plot” 
parallels the arc of redemption history: beginning from the fall into mimetic 
rivalry, contrasted pointedly with the Christian saint’s imitation of Christ, the 
book proceeds to discuss the false apotheosis of mortals and the enslavement of 
souls, followed by several technical chapters, and finishing with the apocalypse 
and resurrection. Readers who overlook the centrality of these themes to Deceit, 
Desire and the Novel have committed the same fault that Girard complains about 
regarding literary critics who downplay Christian imagery in classic novels. In 
the case of Deceit, Desire and the Novel, Girard’s Christian imagery will prove 
essential to what he wishes to say. 
Two observations may be remarked about the theological tendency of 
Deceit, Desire and the Novel. First, its outlook is decidedly conservative. It 
bemoans the unwillingness of today’s literati to accept class differences as good, 
a complaint which continues throughout Girard’s corpus to the end of his life. 
He laments the stepwise fall of literary production from an aristocratic 
 
369 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 2, 310–14. 
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preoccupation, down to a middle-class ethic, and finally into the hands of the 
“proletarianized writer,” as Girard pooh-poohs his contemporaries. In a more 
firmly classist society, the novelist was able to become aware of his snobbish 
envy and the impossibility of fulfilling it. Nowadays, these Marxist writers are 
not able to muster the irony to acknowledge their envy of others, so constrained 
are they by their belief that everyone should be the same!370 The reasons why 
Girard finds this progression so unfortunate, even hyperbolically characterizing 
it as apocalyptic, can be discerned most clearly by reading the concerns of the 
later Violence and the Sacred back into Deceit, Desire and the Novel. People imitate 
each other by copying their desires. If one lives within a rigid class hierarchy, one 
will imitate the desires of those of higher classes, like Sancho Panza imitating 
Don Quixote, or a medieval mystic imitating Jesus Christ. Since the great 
strength of the class structure makes it a foregone conclusion that one can never 
become the equal of one’s model, this vertical imitation is benign, it cannot lead 
to rivalry. Girard terms this form of mimetic desire, in which the model is 
removed to an unreachable distance, “external mediation.” The mediator is the 
model, and the desired object that the mediator is perceived to possess is the 
thing mediated, the common object of desire shared by subject and model. But 
when class distinctions are weak, one believes one can really get what one’s 
 
370 Ibid., 262–63. 
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model has, or one can try to get above one’s peers. The way is now open to 
“internal mediation,” in which the subject and model enter into real competition 
for the common object of desire.371 Internal mediation is an intensely 
metaphysical kind of desire. It presumes that if only one could appropriate the 
being of one’s model, one would find fulfillment.372 One therefore becomes 
sickened with a metaphysical obsession over the model, with a desire to possess 
the model, or to possess everything the model has.373 The social distinctions that 
Girard would later posit to be generated by sacrifice are what pre-empt this 
delusional obsession and ensure the stability of society, limiting mediation to the 
external variety. When the sacrificial order erodes too much, internal mediation 
becomes strong, leading to contagious rivalry and a sacrificial crisis.374 The social 
order is therefore beneficial, not just materially, in that it spares us from much 
violence, but spiritually, because it prevents us from falling into a delusional 
metaphysical obsession with others around us. Class differences keep mimetic 
desires weak, and prevent them from corrupting us too much. With these 
assertions, Girard affirms formal social hierarchy. 
 
371 Ibid., 9. 
372 Cf. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 146: “Once his basic needs are satisfied (indeed, sometimes 
even before), man is subject to intense desires. … The reason is that he desires being, something 
that he himself lacks and which some other person seems to possess. … If the model, who is 
apparently already endowed with superior being, desires some object, that object must surely be 
capable of conferring an even greater plenitude of being” (emphasis original). 
373 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 53. 
374 See also § 11. 
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The second feature of Deceit, Desire and the Novel’s theological tendency to 
be remarked is its professed belief that an individual may become liberated from 
the sickness of internal mediation by some form of renunciation. Thus Girard 
dedicates his final chapter to the renunciation of metaphysical desire, and to the 
spiritual resurrection that accompanies renunciation.375 How exactly renunciation 
is to be done is not resolved. Girard lays in front of us only a pair of possibilities, 
each of which he would pursue in later phases of his work: once one recognizes 
the mimetic nature of one’s desire, one must renounce either one’s desire or one’s 
pride.376 Early Girard equivocates between these two possibilities, but tends in 
the direction of renunciation of desire. In his conclusion to Deceit, Desire and the 
Novel, he emphasizes the freedom from triangular desire won by the novelist as 
the culmination of his or her lifework. Yet this is bad theology. The original sin is 
not desire, because desire can be natural, even mimetic desire. If all mimetic 
desire were sinful, then Christianity would need to take a nihilistic view of 
human action, since there would be no way to discern the better from the worse. 
Only when envy and pride are introduced does desire become sinful. The only 
option is to accept mediated desire, and renounce one’s pride. One must 
acknowledge that one is not the originator of one’s own wants, that one is not 
 
375 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 290–95. 
376 Ibid., 272. 
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able to be autonomous in every respect. “We cannot escape mimetism,” reflects 
Girard toward the end of his life. “I had long tried to think of Christianity as in a 
higher position, but I have had to give up on that. I am now persuaded that we 
have to think from inside mimetism.”377 
If we humans cannot exist outside mimetism—meaning, by implication, 
outside some form of the transcendence-structure—and if mimetism is a source 
of spiritual sickness and physical violence, then are we not caught between a 
rock and a hard place? Are we to attempt the impossible, or resign ourselves to 
sin? The way out of this dilemma, adumbrated in Deceit, Desire and the Novel but 
recognized fully only in Girard’s late work, is to find a stable and beneficial 
external mediator. “There is no solution for mimetism aside from a good 
model.”378 In the medieval world that Girard’s imagination inhabits in Deceit, 
Desire and the Novel,379 this mediator is the saint;380 in his later work, the focus 
turns to Christ himself. The turning point at which Girard first explicitly 
acknowledged the possibility of good mimetic desire came in his 1993 interview 
with Rebecca Adams, arguably inaugurating the late phase of his work. What 
 
377 Girard, Battling to the End, 82 (emphasis original). 
378 Ibid., 101. 
379 Girard’s first field of study was manuscript transmission of medieval texts; see Cynthia L. 
Haven, Evolution of Desire: A Life of René Girard (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University 
Press, 2018), 33–34. 
380 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 60. 
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course of action did Girard advocate with respect to mimetic desire? “Not the 
renunciation of mimetic desire itself,” conceded Girard when pressed, “because 
what Jesus advocates is mimetic desire. Imitate me, and imitate the Father 
through me, he says. …” The imitation of Jesus is thus “twice mimetic.”381 The 
ascension of Christ into heaven in human form puts him at an infinite remove, 
making him an absolutely external mediator and therefore safe to imitate, while 
his human nature keeps him imitable. “In order to escape negative imitation, the 
reciprocity that brought people closer to the sacred,” Girard reflects, “we have to 
accept the idea that only positive imitation will place us at the correct distance 
from the divine.”382 Christ is put at this distance precisely so that he may be 
imitated to a good purpose, something which, as the Gospels bear out, was not 
yet possible for his fractious disciples when he lived among them in the flesh. For 
early Girard, “Following Christ means giving up mimetic desire.”383 For mature 
Girard, following Christ is about re-orienting mimetic desire. “Mimetic desire,” 
Girard concedes, “is intrinsically good.”384 
When it comes to the possibilities for a Christian conception of sacrifice, 
the impact of the shift in Girard’s valuing of mimetic desire is immense. For 
 
381 Rebecca Adams, “Violence, Difference, Sacrifice: A Conversation with René Girard,” Religion 
and Literature 25, no. 2 (1993): 9–33, at 22–26 (emphasis original). 
382 Girard, Battling to the End, 120. 
383 Girard, Things Hidden, 410. 
384 Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 15. 
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much of early Girard, it would seem that detachment from the world is the way 
to escape the grips of mimesis. Conversely, freedom from mimesis would mean 
detachment from the world. This is because sacrifice is configured by mimesis, 
and the world is configured by sacrifice. These relations hold true not just of the 
human secular world but, in the Christian anthropological cosmos, of creation as 
such. Christ, by being a good, unegotistical model who is removed at a safe 
distance, completely alters the chain of signs by placing himself at the origin-
point of the sacrificial system, that is, by becoming a sacrificial victim. He does 
this at the intersection of the arms of the Cross, which, Irenaeus tells us, point in 
each of the cardinal directions, gathering the universe into a single location. The 
surrogate rival of the whole community is replaced by someone with whom it is 
impossible to compete without misunderstanding his nature. If one recognizes 
Christ’s divinity, one recognizes also that his humanity inaugurates a new kind 
of human relationality. 
But this is not a cancellation of the sacrificial system. The Gospel takes up 
the sacrificial as its own, though only to turn it on its head. Christ, in being 
recognized as the impeccable model and the new victim, makes sacrifice 
impossible for all who maintain full cognizance of him. But the decision against 
sacrifice is itself structurally sacrificial. It depends on the placement of Christ at 
the heart of the sacrificial order. The displacement of meaning from the center 
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likewise depends on the placement of Christ at the very origin-point. This is not 
a non-sacrificial religion; it is an anti-sacrificial one, and, as such, it opts to beat 
swords into plowshares rather than to cast ironwork aside altogether. 
Christianity can only work through mimetism and the structural systems 
it engenders, even though it also refuses these in large part. Hence, it is no crime 
if the classic atonement theories we examined resort to sacrificial thinking. 
Rather than being a fault, this is a condition for their sophistication and potency. 
Girard half-recognizes the need to work within sacrificial structures in Things 
Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, a relatively early work in which he had 
not yet properly appreciated the good possibilities of mimesis: 
Thanks to the sacrificial reading it has been possible for what we call 
Christendom to exist for fifteen or twenty centuries; that is to say, a 
culture has existed that is based, like all cultures (up to a certain point) on 
the mythological forms engendered by the founding mechanism. 
Paradoxically, in the sacrificial reading the Christian text itself provides 
the basis. Mankind relies upon a misunderstanding of the text that 
explicitly reveals the founding mechanism to re-establish cultural forms 
which remain sacrificial and to engender a society that, by virtue of this 
misunderstanding, takes its place in the sequence of all other cultures, still 
clinging to the sacrificial vision that the Gospel rejects.385 
 
Because redemption operates within the structures of the sacred, the only 
available escape from the viciousness inherent in the system is through the 
 
385 Girard, Things Hidden, 174. 
293 
 
system: a good model, at a proper distance, occupying the sacrificial center of 
meaning. Only he can break the system by means of the system, by putting 
weakness in the place of strength, and substituting love into the center of 
systemic violence. 
This substitution is not a one-time event. It is unique, because only the 
God-man can do it; but because he has done it, his power enables his disciples to 
re-present it. Hence, the persecution of Christ is both the completion of the spilt 
blood of the Old Covenant saints, shed from Abel to Zechariah,386 and the 
beginning of the martyrdoms of the apostles of the New Covenant.387 Wherever 
the Gospel goes, the apostle who brings it may repeat its effects in a new place 
and for a new people. Martyrdom is not a method for attaining sanctity, nor is it 
a substitute for water baptism, except incidentally. It is a repetition of surrogate 
victimage that realizes again the inversion of meanings and exposure of sacred 
violence that were accomplished by Christ. In the early martyrologies, the great 
martyrs sometimes undergo a Christoform metamorphosis in the midst of their 
public execution.388 By so often repeating the motifs of public blaming and 
scapegoating, of all-against-one, the earliest hagiographies do not leave open the 
 
386 The Christological reading of the Psalms suggests that Christ and the saints undergo 
identification with scapegoats; cf. Girard, Job, the Victim of his People; cf. also I See Satan Fall Like 
Lightning, 128.  
387 See also § 9. 
388 Two clear examples: the Martyrdom of Polycarp and the Passion of Saints Perpetua and Felicity. 
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possibility that martyrdom was about the virtue learnt through a purifying 
death. 
Given the tight relation of the Girardian concept of sacrifice to mimesis, it 
is no surprise that the shift in how Girard thought about mimetic desire was 
accompanied by a shift in how he thought about Christ’s death. The change is in 
how he relates Christ’s death to his concept of sacrifice. In Things Hidden Since the 
Foundation of the World, early Girard explains in systematic detail why Christ’s 
death is not a sacrifice. The Gospels, he asserts, do not present Christ’s death as a 
sacrifice; rather, by refusing to sacralize his death, the Gospels explode the 
surrogate victim mechanism, initiating a historical process whereby sacrifice and 
scapegoating gradually become impossible for humanity.389 To think of the 
Crucifixion as a sacrifice is precisely to miss the point. Early Girard thus 
advocates a total disengagement from the sacrificial system. The problem with 
this view is that disengagement from the workings of sacrifice means 
disengagement from the world altogether. But such disengagement is 
theoretically impossible and practically impotent. 
In Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, Girard could not express 
his position less frontally. “I think that it is necessary to rid ourselves of the 
 
389 Girard, Things Hidden, 173 f. 
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sacred,” he says, “for the sacred plays no part in the death of Jesus.”390 Christ’s is 
a totally naturalistic death, and the moral consequences of it are commonsensical. 
The Gospel texts do not conceal the transference of violence from the crowd onto 
their surrogate victim, Jesus, and so they place responsibility “squarely on those 
who are responsible for it.”391 The death of Jesus is effective as a salvific event for 
a negative reason only, namely, that it has caused the victim mechanism to 
become “progressively less obscured by ignorance.” 
One could say that outside our [Western] society the mechanism is 
invisible because it is constantly in retreat; it keeps a position behind 
human beings. In Judeo-Western [sic] society, on the other hand, it has 
gradually come forward again and is more and more visible. … In so far 
as light is shed on the victimage mechanism, concepts like violence and 
unjust persecution become thinkable and begin to play a larger role in 
cultural institutions.392 
 
Yet this perspective conflicts with Girard’s claim (cited previously) that 
Christendom is made possible by the misrecognition of the Crucifixion as a 
sacrificial event. If it is within a Christian framework that Girard can see the 
truth about the persecution of Jesus, or if Christianity has been a historical 
vehicle of this great movement toward a consciousness of victims as Girard 
asserts, how can it be an entirely bad thing that this framework is sacrificial? 
 
390 Ibid., 222. 
391 Ibid., 163. 
392 Ibid., 119–20 (emphasis original). 
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When Girard’s friend, Jesuit theologian Raymund Schwager, pushed 
Girard to acknowledge positive possibilities for the notion of sacrifice, he was 
acting out of a desire to remain faithful to formal Catholic teaching. But 
Schwager was also responding sketchily to the contradiction in Girard’s 
commitments. “Are we really completely outside the mechanism?” Schwager 
asks Girard in an article of personal correspondence. “The people who come 
after us, won’t they find aspects of sacrificial thinking even in the way we use 
anti-sacrificial theory?”393 Of course they will, we must reply. One does not leave 
behind scapegoating; one may scapegoat scapegoating, like Abelard, or put it at 
the heart of a restorative spirituality, like Anselm, or invert it without 
eliminating it, like Gregory. Schwager and Girard have good reason to look for a 
positive way to acknowledge Christ’s death as a sacrifice. 
Schwager and Girard both came up with inadequate solutions to the 
problem Schwager raised. For Schwager, the Crucifixion could be considered a 
sacrifice with respect to the actions of the persecutors, and, since Jesus consented 
to undergo death at their hands, his death could therefore be considered a kind 
of self-sacrifice: 
The event by which Christ reveals a nonviolent and non-sacrificial God is 
a sacrificial event from the perspective of the people. Christ does not share this 
 
393 Girard, Correspondence, 99. 
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view … but he accepts what the people are doing. He consents to being 
sacrificed.394 
 
Schwager is cautious in his works not to allow the sacrificial dynamic to 
penetrate what we might call the “interior” of the Crucifixion, the Father-Son 
relationship. The sacrificial dynamic resides instead for him in the “exterior,” in 
what he calls the “intention” of the crowd in the same piece of correspondence.395 
Consequently, in his works Schwager is forced to look for the redemptive 
efficacy of the Crucifixion either in the forgiveness with which God reciprocates 
Jesus’ persecutors,396 or in Jesus’ total self-submission to the Father’s will as he is 
delivered into the hands of his enemies.397 The Crucifixion as a scapegoating 
event remains outside the proper soteriological relevance of the Cross until 
transformed with these “interior” supplements. All the content Schwager assigns 
to the Crucifixion is really there; but by formulating the problem as he does, 
Schwager narrowly misses the respect in which sacrifice is the very form of the 
redemptive operation. Jesus’ death was sacrificial only in the objective sense that 
he actually became a scapegoat. In doing so, he took over the whole machinery of 
Satan. 
 
394 Schwager in Girard, ibid., 64–65 (emphases original); compare Schwager, Must There Be 
Scapegoats?, esp. 203–214, where Schwager exegetically justifies his view while stating it less 
strongly. 
395 Girard, Correspondence, 65. 
396 Schwager, Must There Be Scapegoats?, 213–14. 
397 Schwager, Jesus in the Drama of Salvation, 189. 
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Girard’s own solution, inspired by Schwager’s and not much different 
from it, hits only a little closer to the mark. But this little goes a long way. Late 
Girard, like Schwager, posits two diametrically opposed meanings of sacrifice, 
one archaic and violent, the other a Christian practice of non-violent self-
sacrifice. In this view, Christ sacrificed himself in the sense that he gave himself 
up to the teeth of the surrogate victim mechanism for the good of others. This 
position is consistent, but it relies on manipulation of terminology without 
getting at the substance of the problem. What makes Girard’s solution worth a 
second look is the emphasis he places on the connection between the two senses 
of sacrifice. There is “a rift between the two meanings of sacrifice that, 
paradoxically, doesn’t preclude a continuity … yet without any indication of 
complicity with the religions of violence.”398 
It is this opposition in continuity that should be carried to its logical 
conclusion. It does us no good to assert that Christ’s death is a sacrifice in a 
different way from archaic sacrifice. In order for Christ’s death to be 
transformative at the level Girard is looking for, it must be a scapegoating event 
in the most objective way possible, and it must be capable of being truthfully 
represented after the fact in the form of a ritual sacrifice, as in the Christian 
 
398 Girard in Correspondence, 56. 
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liturgy. It must change scapegoating and sacrifice, and turn them in a way that 
makes them anti-scapegoating and anti-sacrificial. At the same time, it wouldn’t 
do any good to simply identify Christ’s sacrifice with archaic sacrifice, because 
the truth of the event would then remain concealed. It is, rather, an archaic 
sacrifice gone wrong in accordance with God’s own way of organizing things, his 
own economy. It is a sacrifice that bankrupts sacrifice by deconstructing it, 
showing the real nature of the violence involved, clearing the victim of 
responsibility and complicity, and radically re-orienting the sacrificial order 
around a new center, whose qualities of gentleness and humanity displace the 
qualities attributed to the victim by the transference. The god’s goodness, power, 
and ability to bring peace and war are not taken away, but they are 
fundamentally changed by their new relationship to the manifest qualities of 
Jesus. Understanding redemption as an objective scapegoating event thus opens 
the way to a certain Christology from below. 
Girard sensed, acknowledged, and duly emphasized the radical 
continuity between Christ’s sacrifice and archaic sacrifice after his 
correspondence with Schwager. Yet he continued to cling to two radically 
disjunct senses of sacrifice at the same time, without rigorously resolving their 
tension. He refrained from making the leap of recognizing that Christ’s sacrifice 
is able to be different only because it is the same. Perhaps this difficulty on 
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Girard’s part owes to his failure to consider Christ’s installation in the sacrificial 
order as a positive presence. To lend substance to this critique, consider the 
following passage, in which Girard expresses his late, revised view of Christ’s 
death: 
[Christ’s] Word revealed more and more of the hidden truth of human 
culture, which is to say the founding and ordering role of scapegoats. The 
accomplishment of his mission doomed Christ to a death that he scarcely 
desired, but one that he could not avoid without submitting to the law of 
the world, the law of scapegoats. 
So great is the distance between the sacrifice of Christ in this sense and 
archaic sacrifice that a greater one cannot be imagined. … 
Mimetic theory illustrates the basic opposition between archaic sacrifice 
and what is customarily called the sacrifice of Christ. 
 
So fixated does Girard remain on the vicious qualities of sacrifice that he 
continues to define Christ’s work only in negative relation to it. This negative 
relation is real and indispensable to the evangelical work, but leaves no basis for 
asserting a strong continuity between Christian and archaic sacrifice. A positive 
relationship must exist as well. Without it, there is no way to assert the potential 
to redeem natural or artificial categories. Girard pushes tremendously close to 
asserting the appropriate positive relationship further along in the passage just 
cited, but cannot secure a rational basis on which to follow through with it: 
The further [the two senses of sacrifice] are from each other, the more their 
union in a single word paradoxically hints at a going beyond the 
opposition between them. … 
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God himself reuses the scapegoat mechanism, at his own expense, in 
order to subvert it. … The irony has to do in part with the structural 
similarity between the two kinds of sacrifice, which, at one extreme, 
exhibit odd mirror effects in relation to violence, and, at the other, a love 
that surpasses our understanding and our powers of expression. 
 
Soon afterward, Girard hits directly on the idea of the sacrificial dialectic, noting 
that 
the good prostitute sacrificed rivalry for the sake of her child, whereas the 
bad prostitute agreed to sacrifice the child for the sake of the rivalry.399 
 
Unfortunately, Girard never systematically elaborated this train of thought, 
which is what contains the whole practical power of his thinking.400 Sacrifice 
must be turned back in on its own mechanisms if it is to be overcome. Girard 
nonetheless succeeds in getting beyond the terminology manipulation that was 
the substance of his earlier position. Girard now has the sketches of a substantive 
idea of self-sacrifice as a good. In order to bring Girard’s insight in these last lines 
to fulfillment, we should not ask with Schwager, “Must there be scapegoats?”401 
but should ask instead, “What good can come of scapegoats by getting rid of 
scapegoating?” Christ gets rid of scapegoating, but does so by turning scapegoats 
 
399 Girard, The One by Whom Scandal Comes, 41, 43 (emphases original). 
400 Despite not having systematically elaborated this gem of his late thinking, Girard certainly did 
not fail to make the effort to express it or develop it. Battling to the End is Girard’s effort to finally 
bring the inescapable persistence of violence to the fore of this thinking. This surprising reversal 
of Girard’s early attitude has caused the book to meet with a mixed reception among acolytes. 
401 The translated title of Schwager’s first book on Girard: Brauchen wir einen Sündenbock? Gewalt 
und Erlösung in den biblischen Schriften (Munich: Kösel, 1978). 
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into nodes of resistance and transformation. In a play on contraries that is not 
really a paradox, he keeps sacrifice in order to get rid of it. This is the sacrificial 
dialectic at work. We should embrace Scott Cowdell’s view that God “over-
accepts” sacrifice in sending his Son. He neither blocks nor accepts sacrifice; to 
do the first would be to reject nature and culture, while to do the latter would be 
a compromise with evil. In Cowdell’s dramatic theory of the atonement, God 
“over-accepts” sacrifice by taking it up into his creative drama and making it 
part of the performance.402 Cowdell’s view needs only to be played to an extreme. 
All this is to say that a preference is to be shown to an anti-sacrificial 
reading of Girard—and of the Gospels—over against a non-sacrificial one. Rather 
than disowning sacrifice so as to live without it, what both the logic of the Gospel 
and Girardian thinking enjoin us to do is to accept sacrifice against sacrifice. 
This all may seem rather formalized. Does this approach not reduce 
sacrifice to a play of signs, rendering the concept so malleable as to make any 
conclusions based off it too broad, or even trivial? Not at all. The formalization I 
have made of sacrifice as an exchange is subsequent to the real violence it 
involves, the real subjective perceptions of communities, and the real effect 
sacrifice creates in social cohesion. The work of redemption likewise always 
 
402 Cowdell, The Nonviolent God, 173–201. 
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manifests politically at the locus of real scapegoats, in the perception of the 
public, and in the civil order. Nothing has been made overly abstract in my 
approach. Though sublimated forms of sacrifice exist and are useful, these all 
derive from the fountainhead of real victims who are scapegoated. And the 
transformative image of the scapegoat lies not just with Christ and the apostles 
and martyrs who mimicked his death, but extends to those who are scapegoated 
involuntarily in our own time and place. In the American context, James Cone 
labels the Crucifixion “a first-century lynching.”403 Similar comparisons, and on a 
broader scale, have been made by theologians working in Latin America.404 
“Scapegoating” of mere signs and symbols must be considered subordinate to 
flesh-and-blood scapegoating, and it is only through the latter that deepgoing 
societal change can be driven. 
The point is not, of course, to preserve scapegoats in order to use them, or 
to conserve the sacrificial for some supposed essential good it contains. Nowhere 
in the New Testament is Jesus’ acquiescence to crucifixion called a good deed. 
Scapegoats are to be exposed in order to halt the repetition of their suffering. 
 
403 Cone, The Cross and the Lynching Tree, 30. 
404 Ignacio Ellacuría, “The Crucified People,” pages 580–603 in Ignacio Ellacuría and Jon Sobrino, 
Mysterium Liberationis: Fundamental Concepts of Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1993); 
Jon Sobrino, Christ the Liberator: A View from the Victims (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2001). Nor is there 
any reason, as Sobrino is fond of hinting at, why the power of redemption should not also be 
worked through those who (voluntarily or involuntarily) become identified with the scapegoat 
without necessarily being it. 
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Only in exposing scapegoats for what they are does their position become 
transformative. The point is rather that as long as the katechon, the imperial order, 
continues to restrain violence (1 Thes 2:6–7), there will always be a sacrificial 
foundation beneath, there will be scapegoats. The order that restrains violence in 
the present age is an embodiment of power, and it works through its symbols of 
power and its classifications of beings. A straightforward disavowal of power, 
symbols of power, and classifications, in postmodern style, is completely useless 
in this situation. It leads nowhere except to general theoretical statements, 
because if it were actually applied the disorder it would cause would be 
intolerable. 
Two concrete examples will illustrate my insistence on a redeemed 
sacrificial order more clearly. My first example is historical. If we are to consider 
the Roman adoption of Christianity as grounded in anything at all besides 
realistic interests or a desperate effort to sustain decaying Imperial institutions, 
then we ought to take the intersection of Imperial symbols and ecclesiastical 
symbols, of Roman power with Church power, seriously as a process of 
transformation, if also a profoundly tainted one. The transformation entailed for 
the most part the replacement of the signs and symbols of Imperial power with 
Christian ones: instead of a military dictator, a theocrat believed to rule on 
Christ’s behalf; the Cross as a new symbol in place of properly Imperial ones; the 
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substitution of Christian icons and priests for pagan ones. State sponsorship of 
monastic institutions often amounted to support for the critique of how Imperial 
society functioned, including its urban economic disparities, abuses of power, 
and failure to realize the natural equality of all people. The Christianized Empire 
did not stand on much higher moral ground than its predecessor, and it was 
certainly not a place I should like to have lived. But this is precisely the point. It 
was within the organization of the katechon that the Christian preaching was able 
to bring about an ideological revaluation to whatever extent it did. Ultimately, 
while Christianity may have assisted in the Empire’s preservation, it also ate the 
Empire from within. This could not have happened had the Church elected to 
bow out and watch history unfold from its pristine position. 
While this first example concerns structures generated by sacrifice, my 
second example deals directly with sacrifice itself. The Eucharist is an assembly 
that uses ritual enactments, symbols, and sacred categorizations to render the 
redemptive inversion in the sacrificial order fully explicit. In the theology of the 
oldest Christian traditions (Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and other Eastern 
traditions), the Eucharist is itself acknowledged to be a sacrifice, and it bears the 
complete form of one. It brings about the symbolic exchange in the change of the 
elements and in the purification and deification of those who receive them. It 
repeats an original scapegoating event, and does so doubly, in that the priest re-
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presents the execution of Christ, while the ceremony is normally performed on 
top of a relic of a saint (usually embedded in the altar).405 The people who 
assemble around the Eucharist are constituted as a microcosmic society, replete 
with a hierarchical class system and differentiated functions. In all this, there is 
one substitution that changes the whole effect of the ritual when compared with 
archaic sacrifice: at the focal point of the gathering, where we should expect to 
find a repetitive representation of the scapegoat-god as perceived by the 
persecuting community, we find instead such a mode of presence of the God to 
reverse the powers and qualities formerly attributed to the original victim. The 
liturgical narrativization of the ritual in the Eucharistic prayer identifies the 
victim with a divine being, but also with a historical figure, whose historicity is 
explicitly and correctly recognized.406 The founding murder is narrated in place 
of a founding myth. The result is a celebration around blood that nonetheless 
delights in itself for being a bloodless sacrifice, a fellowship of peace enacting a 
 
405 The Eastern Orthodox rite of the proskomide, during which the priest prepares the elements of 
consecration prior to the oblation, is particularly instructive here: the mimicking of the 
Crucifixion by elevating (literally “killing,” «αἴρειν») the bread, the fracturing of it in the form of 
a cross, the piercing of its side with a miniature spear, the pouring of the wine and water, and the 
detailed arrangement of the crumbs to represent the saints, all give the rite the appearance of a 
theological reenactment of the Crucifixion upon an effigy. 
406 The constitution of the Church upon an inverted immolation of a scapegoat is brought out 
clearly in the eucharistic prayer of the Didache, one of the earliest accounts of a Christian 
eucharistic ceremony: “Even as this broken bread was scattered over the hills, and was gathered 
together and became one, so let Your Church be gathered together from the ends of the earth into 
Your kingdom” (Didache 9). The reassembly of the broken body of Jesus is the principle of the 
unity of the Church. 
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sacrifice of praise. To reject sacrifice in the abstract is one thing. To redeem 
creation from its blood, the sacrificial system must be utilized for good. 
God, then, was not embarrassed to mimic archaic sacrifice. We, too, 
should not feel ashamed at the notion of sacrifice without first understanding 
how it is qualified. The basic structure of archaic sacrifice has been turned to 
redemptive use. 
§ 25. A Method for Living 
Scapegoating, sacrifice, and the symbolic realities they generate are integral to 
the constitution of the redemptive work; the notion of sacrifice is not to be cast 
aside as a mere scandal. The value and function of a theory of redemption will 
likewise be constituted positively by the principle of sacrifice. The same is true 
for the believer’s conversion, since a soteriology, including implicitly a theory of 
redemption, is integral to it. 
What good, then, can we say a theory of redemption does for anyone? If 
the doctrine of redemption describes an objective event, theories of redemption, 
in providing for us the how of redemption, give us a map on which to enact that 
event and to navigate the reality it creates. Soteriologies are the rational 
component of the movement of conversion. They do not give redemption its 
meaning, but furnish us with an understanding of redemption, in accordance 
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with which understanding one may live a re-oriented life. They do not direct us 
what to do in any very specific or concrete manner, but lay out the paths for 
understanding relationality, and for expanding the prevalence of redeemed 
relationality in a group. The Abelardian theory marks out Christ’s example as the 
path to neighborly love, inviting the faithful to imitate Christ’s pity for his 
creatures, and strengthening their love for each other through their love for him. 
The preoccupation of the theory is horizontal relationships. The satisfaction 
theory constructs a path along the vertical dimension, indebting the redeemed to 
God, as it were, and redirecting all their desire toward him alone. This theory 
maps out a way to install oneself within a strictly vertical form of the 
transcendence-structure, unmarred by any deviation from orientation toward the 
Deity. The ransom theory provides a subversive element, a path whereby values 
and power relations between beings are destabilized and reconstituted. It offers a 
corrective to the individualism of Abelard’s theory, and to the tendency of 
Anselmian-type theories to slip into a purely economic conception. 
Theories of redemption find their utility in their analogical nature; they 
tell us that redemption works like this. Dialogic truth is quite secondary in them, 
even if it is what often preoccupies theorists. Scot McKnight very rightly asks, 
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“Does atonement work?”407 This should not be taken as a question of the 
objective efficacy of the redemptive work. What is at stake in the question is 
rather how we can think about atonement so as to participate in historical 
movement and change. When theories of redemption make it their goal simply to 
know the truth, they do us no good, and are harmful rather for their tacit 
presumption to outthink Scripture. Theories of redemption have no business 
with moral utility, either; the criterion of a good theory is not that it induces 
good behavior. Good theories of redemption serve rather as textualizations of the 
game of overcoming evil and realizing the Kingdom. They are like boards on 
which the game can be played. The references of signifier to signifier are the 
spaces one is allowed to occupy, the assumptions of the theory delimit the paths 
one may move on. The best theories are the ones that mark out the clearest way 
to the finish. 
Redemption theory is an expression of soteriology that provides the board 
on which the redemptive game is to be played. Depending on which theory one 
is following, the board will look different, but one will still be playing the same 
game. All the variations, each with its particular rules, derive from the same 
generative source, and tend toward similar destinations. Redemption theory 
 
407 Scot McKnight, A Community Called Atonement (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 2007), 1. 
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possesses an underlying unity, even if it admits of a certain degree of variation, if 
not oftentimes aberration. 
Conversion is playing the game. The gameplay can specialize in either the 
individual or the collective realm. Conversion as it pertains to the individual is 
more readily intelligible in terms of mimesis and the re-orientation of mimetic 
desire; with respect to the collective, conversion is more readily intelligible in 
terms of the transformation of sacrifice. Both of these hermeneutical approaches 
refer to and depend on each other. In closing this study, I will sketch the 
appearance and significance of each of these dimensions of conversion. 
When taking a perspective on the individual, conversion and redemption 
must be thought of in terms of orientation, the transcendence-structure, and 
relationality. In Chapter 1, I invoked the Dionysian theology of divine names to 
justify my configuration of the Christian subject’s relation to God’s 
transcendence. God’s transcendence permeates each of his attributes, just as all of 
his attributes are contained within each other. He is wholly held in each of his 
names. When we relate to God as Transcendent, even Transcendent-as-such, we 
also relate to him who is Love and King and Good; when we relate to him as 
Good, we relate to him who is Transcendent and Love and King; and so forth. 
The language of transcendence is neither privileged nor exclusionary; the 
311 
 
inclusion of every name within each name only means that the language of 
transcendence is always available.408 
It follows, then, that when one recognizes God’s goodness rightly, one 
also recognizes his transcendent goodness; when one recognizes his kingship 
rightly, one also recognizes his transcendent kingship; when his love or power, 
also his transcendent love or power. 
The way one will relate to God under any of his names will be 
determined, if we take the mimetic point of view, by the transcendent mode in 
which he possesses that attribute, provided the believer recognizes it. God is the 
absolute external mediator, and the way we can relate to him is, consequentially, 
by imitating his possession of his names, seeking to acquire them for ourselves. 
No wonder the Christian tradition makes so much of images. As a saint in an 
icon conforms to the image of Christ, so all the faithful desire to do the same. All 
the while, painted images serve an anagogical function, leading the Christian up 
toward the likeness of the divine.409 This is the outcome of re-orientation toward 
God. 
 
408 While there is no speculative reason to privilege God’s transcendence over his other attributes, 
I have, of course, done just this for the sake of the Girardian argument I wished to make. This 
move is arbitrary, and does not stand for an absolute claim about God’s nature. 
409 Compare a homily delivered by Patriarch Photios the Great, published as Homily 17 in Cyril A. 
Mango, The Homilies of Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1958), 286–96. 
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Since God is infinitely greater than any being, it is impossible to enter into 
mimetic rivalry with him, unless one falls into an idolatrous conception of his 
deity. The question arises, however, of why the imitation of God should not lead 
to rivalry among his worshipers. If they are all trying to acquire what God has 
and is, then they will end up trying to acquire what each other has gotten as well. 
A similar problem is sorely obvious in the case of Christ. Since he retains a 
human similarity to us, he cannot be an external mediator in an absolute degree. 
Why can’t one compete with him? Surely the Incarnation, rightly understood, 
must not induce people to sin.410 
The solution, Girard recognizes, lies in the content of God’s desire. His 
desire is what is borrowed from him, as with all mimesis. But the object of his 
desire, his possession, is not a positive entity like what we might desire to 
acquire from a rival. The divine names are not beings. God’s desire is 
providential, he gives, he does not “hold on” to anything. His love is an 
unegotistical love, his goodness is toward his creation, his kingship is founded 
on these. His goodness toward all seems as though it had a certain negative 
quality to it, because it is so exceedingly superlative. God’s desire is more like a 
hole that can never be filled than a force to be reckoned with. With Jesus, this is 
 
410 These problems are discussed by Jim Grote in “The Imitation of Christ as Double-Bind: 
Toward a Girardian Spirituality,” Cistercian Studies 29, no. 4 (1994): 485–98. 
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doubly the case. Not only does Jesus possess the divine will with his Father, but 
it is his will to do as he sees the Father doing (John 5:19). The Son’s mimetic 
will/mimetic desire is not a positive possession of Jesus’ that he or the saints can 
be rivaled for, since, insofar as the saint imitates Christ, his or her whole desire is 
to become the image of another. Girard’s way of explaining the difference 
between these two kinds of mimesis is worth quoting in full: 
What Jesus invites us to imitate is his own desire, the spirit that directs him 
toward the goal on which his intention is fixed: to resemble God the 
Father as much as possible. 
The invitation to imitate the desire of Jesus may seem paradoxical, for 
Jesus does not claim to possess a desire proper, a desire “of his very own.” 
Contrary to what we ourselves claim, he does not claim to “be himself”; 
he does not flatter himself that he obeys only his own desire. His goal is to 
become the perfect image of God. Therefore he commits all his powers to 
imitating his Father. In inviting us to imitate him, he invites us to imitate 
his own imitation. 
Far from being a paradox, this invitation is more reasonable than that of 
our modern gurus, who ask their disciples to imitate them as the great 
man or woman who imitates no one. Jesus, by contrast, invites us to do 
what he himself does, to become like him a perfect imitator of God the 
Father. 
Why does Jesus regard the Father and himself as the best model for all 
humans? Because neither the Father nor the Son desires greedily, 
egotistically. God “makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and he 
sends his rain on the just and on the unjust.” God gives to us without 
counting, without marking the least difference between us. He lets the 
weeds grow with the wheat until the time of harvest. If we imitate the 
detached generosity of God, then the trap of mimetic rivalries will never 
close over us. …”411 
 




Everything Jesus does contributes to the subversion of the mimetic 
sickness. His life example and his teaching, just as much as his death and 
ascension, replace one mimesis with another that turns it on its head. When 
viewed in light of Christ’s subversive reuse of mimesis, subjective and objective 
theories of redemption turn out not to conflict. The Cross is precisely the 
symbolization of the giving desire, the inversion of mimetic egotism, that he 
models, and as such it is able to reorder sacrifice. Moral exemplification is not 
materially different from sacrificial atonement, provided that morality means not 
legalism, but a restructuring of desire. The two sides of the redemptive work 
need each other: Christ’s sacrifice changes the source of meaning and, therefore, 
the object of mimesis, while his word and example, not sufficient to save in 
themselves, point the way to an understanding of the Cross, the instrument by 
which these changes are brought about. 
Turning our sights upon the collective, we find ourselves confronted with 
the pastoral and political aspects of the redemptive work. I am able to touch on 
these lands ripe for cultivation only very briefly without overstepping the 
bounds of my project, but they seem a suitable point at which to leave off. 
Mimesis and the potent generativity of sacrifice are a major foundation of the 
social order. The consequences for that order, whether we consider it from a 
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down-to-earth political perspective or through the utopian imagination of 
religious eschatology, will be great if a change is effected at the base of the 
sacrificial order. The leading questions become: What is a converting 
community’s relation to the social order? What constitutes the social 
transformation that is inseparable from the redemptive work? 
The answers to these questions will depend largely on a community’s 
historical situation. The Gospel cannot be reduced; the Spirit will work from 
itself alone in every situation, adapting to circumstances as it pleases. An 
imperial autocracy built on top of an unenfranchised population will undergo 
change in a different way than a modern, democratic, capitalist society. Some 
political projects can be definitively ruled out as expressions of the redemptive 
operation. In a time when established political orders are the objects of deep 
distrust, I suppose it is worth mentioning some examples. Libertarian anarchy is 
off the table, because, if we take its ideology seriously, it lacks any sacrificial 
structure. A rigid hierarchicalism, perhaps like the Confucian paradise imagined 
by Milbank, in which “the subordinate are to obey freely, but masters are to rule 
generously and with care,” would be an incoherent outcome of the redemptive 
work, because it excludes the possibility of subversion a priori.412 To the contrary, 
 
412 John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (London: Routledge, 2003), 102–3. 
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the redemptive operation tends toward a right instability, a perpetual 
disordering that is itself a principle of order. In football defense, this is referred 
to as “organized chaos.” 
We can gain a sense of direction from looking at the categorization of 
atonement models into three classes. This categorization system, as often 
invoked by theologians as it may be, is far from a mere reflection of objective 
fact. There have been many ways of conceiving redemption, and they could have 
been arranged into classes in any number of ways. Yet, it is around the three 
general forms of moral influence, satisfaction, and ransom from the devil that all 
particular theories tend to coalesce for us. An example will demonstrate the 
peculiarity of these classifications. The penal substitution theory does not share 
much content with Anselm’s satisfaction theory. Anselm does not believe that 
Christ is taking the punishment for humanity’s sins. The penal substitution 
theory did not even evolve directly from Anselm’s view, as is often erroneously 
asserted.413 Yet the penal substitution theory and the satisfaction theory have 
been consistently grouped together in modern classification systems, even by 
sensitive historians like Aulén. Why is this so? 
 
413 On the development of the ideas of penal substitution and satisfaction in high medieval 
redemption theory, see again Burns, “The Concept of Satisfaction.” 
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One would be wise to consider whether something more contributes to 
the arbitrariness of our scholarly typologies than just old doctrinal controversies. 
If we take a step back and consider the political context within which modern 
redemption theory developed, the significance of our puzzling classification 
system becomes bluntly apparent. The three types of theory correspond to the 
three broad political traditions of Western capitalist democracy. The satisfaction 
theory is fundamentally conservative. So, for that matter, is the penal 
substitution theory. This similarity explains well why the two are grouped 
together. In the Anselmian and penal substitution views, a sacrifice is made of 
oneself (represented by Christ) to God, and the offering serves the end of 
upholding or restoring God’s established order. It is deemed right for everything 
to return to its proper place, power relations are respected, and subjectivity is 
oriented toward the generative source of those power relations, namely God. The 
Abelardian theory, on the other hand, stands for a kind of liberalism. While it 
cannot eliminate sacrifice, it can at least put it out of sight and downplay its 
necessity with its rhetoric, forefronting instead a rationalistic morality. Power 
relations are obfuscated by an individualistic emphasis on enlightenment, and 
subjectivity is oriented by a bourgeois conception of love as pity for suffering 
others. The ransom theory, finally, represents the radical position. Self-sacrifice is 
emphasized as in the satisfaction theory, but for the sake of liberation rather than 
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conservation. Structures are destabilized, power relations are inverted. 
Consistently with the Gregory’s ascetic vision, subjectivity is oriented toward the 
virtues, the divine powers of right that are not of this age. 
From the standpoint of MT, these differences between the three theories 
may be considered products of their common response to sacrifice. Each 
textualizes the sacrificial dialectic, but with different effects in each case. There 
cannot, therefore, be a question of rejecting two of these theories in favor one 
authentic representative of the mimetic perspective (nor can they be regarded as 
superseded by a new Girardian theory of redemption). The praxis of redemption 
requires all three, a soup of contraries that constitutes the “organized chaos” 
through which redemption takes effect. The existing order must not be 
conserved, because it is unjust. While ritual sacrifice is defunct in the modern 
West, scapegoating remains a living practice, and the sacrificial structures 
generated from it are as much a reality among modern Westerners as among 
those of other places and times. Moreover, the ritual act of sacrifice was never the 
problem in the first place. The problem was what it represented and what it 
sustained, and these are alive wherever one may be. The liberal perspective 
associated with Abelard provides a needed rational moral view on the situation, 
while the radical game brings about the appropriate disruptions and 
restructurings. The restructurings, however, inevitably produce their own new 
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excluded elements, and, while they may improve on the structures that preceded 
them, they are equally sacrificial. Like the second generation of Christians, who 
asserted the conservative ideology of the pastoral epistles in order to consolidate 
the partially realized, radical gains made by the first generation, the radical 
movement of redemption ends up needing to reaffirm an impure sacrificial 
structure if it is to be anything better than a source of trouble. So long as the 
present age lasts, one might surmise, the redemptive game will be impure and 
complex. 
The Kingdom is not a utopian ideal. It is something that, like redemption 
itself, transcends finite possibilities. As I remarked already, its only guarantee is 
God’s promise. 
The Kingdom, only dimly known in this time, is something we neither 
make for ourselves, nor passively allow to come upon us. Without human 
participation, the Kingdom is not on earth; but human agency does not cause it. 
We are not to “sit it out” in the face of history. The Kingdom nonetheless remains 
entirely a matter of hope and promise. 
Christian conversion is future-oriented and eschatological. Its object 
cannot be grasped by sight, only by way of analogy. It is a response to the 
calling, which bespeaks a future, some performance that has not yet been 
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realized. If the Lord says, “Come,” this means that the coming is not complete; if 
someone says, “Lord, come,” then the Lord’s coming is not complete. The 
metaphor of the calling nicely reflects the substance-less nature of the end goal 
toward which one is called, its lack of a true center. The temporality of the 
metaphor reflects that there is nonetheless “something” toward which one 
moves in response to the call. It is not that God doesn’t really exist, it is rather 
that he defies our normal categories of being and substance. 
Because the divine redemptive work utilizes and transforms sacrifice as a 
constructive force rather than blocking it, the historical movement toward 
transcendence is a movement into a next world, it is not an otherworldly 
movement. There is no rejection of creation, no Manichean dualism. The 
theology of sacrificial redemption is a theology of transformation, of the subject, 
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